3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5.5	c2c349043b	Node self-heals its API key; one-stop install.sh; real host-level OTA updater (#14, #15) ... install.sh (#14): after enrolling it now BLOCKS until an admin approves, printing "Please have an admin approve node '<id>' at <app>/settings/nodes to continue", polling GET /nodes/{id}/credentials with the pickup secret (no default timeout; Ctrl-C safe; re-run resumes from configs/pickup_secret). A re-run with a key on disk re-checks it against C2 and replaces a stale (reissued) key. credentials.json is merged atomically so the dashboard auth salt/secret survive. edge-node is ALWAYS force-recreated at the end, so a key written after the container started is loaded. --wait-approval N caps the wait; 0 = don't wait. git fetch uses --force so a re-cut v1 tag is accepted. edge-node (#14): with no key at startup, or on a broker auth refusal (CONNACK 4/5/134/135), mqtt_manager re-reads credentials.json, else fetches the key over HTTPS (key_pickup.py, pickup secret from /configs), persists it and rebuilds the paho client in place. Single-flight, 30s..15min backoff. A key pushed over MQTT while connected is applied for the next reconnect. OTA (#15): node_update no longer os._exit()s. It drops configs/update-requested; install.sh installs scripts/install-updater.sh's drb-update.{service,timer,path}. The path unit fires on the sentinel, the timer (~15 min) does an HTTPS check-in (POST /nodes/{id}/update-check, server-26 PR) so offline/locked-out nodes still update. drb-update.sh only installs the repo/ref/registry in root-owned /etc/drb/updater.conf; C2's answer is just a timestamp; origin and registry mismatches abort; creds go to curl via a 0600 header file. Tests: test_credential_recovery.py, test_host_updater.py (runs the real updater script with stub git/docker/curl). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-04 01:09:39 -04:00
Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5	87633ab50d	Authenticate the node dashboard, and the broker connection per node ... Two unauthenticated surfaces closed on the edge node. Dashboard and API: the local dashboard and every /api/* route were open to anything on the node's LAN. Adds a login page plus session-cookie auth for the browser, and cookie-or-Basic for the API so scripted callers stay possible. Passwords are hashed with stdlib scrypt (no new dependency, this runs on a Pi) and compared in constant time; the salt and session-signing secret persist in credentials.json. Startup warns while the default password is still in place. No non-browser callers of the node API exist today (C2 talks to nodes over MQTT and nodes call C2 outbound), so nothing breaks. Adds python-multipart, which FastAPI's Form() needs for the login POST and which was missing from requirements entirely. MQTT: nodes authenticated with a shared drb-node password, and the broker ACL keyed off %c — the client-supplied client id — so any holder of that one password could claim another node's topic namespace. Nodes now connect as username=<node_id>, password=<their C2-issued api_key>, which mosquitto's dynamic-security plugin checks, with the ACL keyed off the authenticated %u. TLS is gated on MQTT_TLS and uses default CA verification. The old key_request MQTT path stays in place behind TODO(mqtt-cutover) markers as the fallback until the cutover is proven; a node with no api_key on disk logs a clear repeated refusal rather than spinning. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-16 09:34:16 -04:00
Logan	1a9c92b6db	Initial commit — DRB client (edge node) stack ... Includes edge-node (FastAPI/MQTT/Discord voice), op25-container (SDR decoder), and icecast (audio streaming).	2026-04-05 19:01:51 -04:00