install.sh: re-run collects the key via pickup_secret, never re-enrolls (#7)

Confirmed prod bug: §5 keyed idempotency on configs/credentials.json only.
Re-running the installer on a pending-then-approved node (the exact flow the
script's own output tells you to do) found no credentials.json and fell
through to a fresh POST /nodes/enroll — which enrollment.py's CRITICAL GUARD
answers with 403 for an already-approved node_id, rendered as "use Reissue
key". The working path (GET /nodes/{id}/credentials with the saved
pickup_secret — no already-approved guard on that endpoint) was only ever
tried within a single run.

§5 rewritten as a decision tree that runs before any POST /nodes/enroll:
  - credentials.json has api_key            -> skip (unchanged)
  - configs/pickup_secret exists            -> GET /credentials with it:
      200 + api_key   -> write credentials.json, done
      200, no key     -> say "approve it, re-run"; clean exit, start stack
      401 (rotated)   -> re-enroll iff --token, else specific die
      404 (deleted)   -> re-enroll iff --token, else specific die
      000             -> connectivity die
  - no creds, no pickup_secret              -> fresh enroll (do_fresh_enroll)

Also: fresh-enroll 403/401/429 handlers are now specific and point at
pickup-secret recovery, not just "Reissue key"; --wait-approval polling now
applies on the re-run path; §7's "re-run the installer" banner is
conditional on pickup_secret existing.

Response shapes verified against enrollment.py @ v1. approve_node mints
node_keys/{id}.api_key synchronously — no second bug; assigning a system is
independent and not required for a key. bash -n clean.

Recovery for a node stuck by the old behaviour (approved, no credentials.json,
pickup_secret on disk): re-run the patched install.sh (no --token needed), or
  curl -fsS $C2_URL/nodes/$NODE_ID/credentials \
    -H "X-Pickup-Secret: $(cat configs/pickup_secret)" | jq '{api_key}' > configs/credentials.json

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.env.example

@@ -5,11 +5,32 @@ NODE_LAT=0.0
 NODE_LON=0.0
 
 # MQTT — point to your C2 server
+#
+# Post-cutover (MQTT-PUBLIC-AUTH-PLAN.md dynsec revision): there is no shared
+# node login any more. The node authenticates as username=NODE_ID,
+# password=<this node's C2-issued api_key> automatically — nothing to set
+# here for that; the api_key is provisioned via MQTT after an admin approves
+# the node (see credentials.json) and does not go in this file.
+#
+# Local/dev, pointed at a plaintext broker on :1883: leave MQTT_TLS unset.
 MQTT_BROKER=localhost
 MQTT_PORT=1883
-# Must match MQTT_NODE_USER/MQTT_NODE_PASS in the server's top-level .env
+MQTT_TLS=false
-MQTT_USER=drb-node
+
-MQTT_PASS=change-me-node
+# Production, pointed at the public broker (real Let's Encrypt cert, default
+# CA verification — do not disable it):
+# MQTT_BROKER=mqtt.<domain>
+# MQTT_PORT=8883
+# MQTT_TLS=true
+
+# DEPRECATED / REMOVED post-cutover — the shared "drb-node" login these
+# backed no longer exists on the server (dynsec creates only per-node
+# clients, keyed by api_key; see Server/drb-c2-core/app/internal/dynsec.py).
+# Leave unset for any node pointed at a cut-over broker. Only meaningful as a
+# legacy fallback if MQTT_BROKER still points at a pre-cutover broker running
+# mosquitto's old password_file auth.
+# MQTT_USER=drb-node
+# MQTT_PASS=change-me-node
 
 # C2 server for audio upload (leave blank to disable upload)
 C2_URL=http://localhost:8888
@@ -17,8 +38,10 @@ C2_URL=http://localhost:8888
 
 # Icecast (local container — usually no need to change)
 # Live listening only. Call recording and Discord voice use PulseAudio instead.
-ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD=hackme
+# REQUIRED, no default — the container refuses to start without them.
-ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin
+# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 24
+ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD=
+ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD=
 ICECAST_HOST=localhost
 ICECAST_PORT=8000
 ICECAST_MOUNT=/radio
@@ -79,6 +102,22 @@ TRIM_SILENCE_GUARD_SECONDS=0.25
 # OP25 container (usually no need to change)
 OP25_API_URL=http://localhost:8001
 OP25_TERMINAL_URL=http://localhost:8081
+# DEBUGGING AID, NOT A DEPLOYMENT OPTION. Both OP25's control API (:8001) and
+# its HTTP terminal (:8081) have NO authentication, so they are bound to
+# 127.0.0.1 by default — reachable only from other containers on this same
+# host (they share its network namespace), not from the site's LAN. Setting
+# this to true rebinds both to 0.0.0.0, exposing unauthenticated OP25
+# start/stop/config-rewrite and the raw terminal to anyone on that LAN. Only
+# for local development off a real node; leave false everywhere else.
+OP25_DEBUG_EXPOSE=false
+
+# --- Local dashboard / API login ---------------------------------------------
+# Protects the node's local dashboard (port 80) and JSON API. The node is
+# reachable by anyone on whatever site's LAN it's deployed to, so this MUST be
+# changed before the node leaves the bench — the default below is flagged at
+# every startup in the logs until it's changed.
+DASHBOARD_USERNAME=admin
+DASHBOARD_PASSWORD=CHANGE-ME-drb-default
 
 # Container registry — set these to pull pre-built images instead of building locally.
 # Must match the DOCKER_ORG variable and repo name configured in Gitea.

.gitattributes

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# Shell scripts run inside Linux containers. A CRLF shebang there fails as
+# "bad interpreter: /bin/sh^M", which surfaces only as a container that will
+# not start. Windows checkouts have core.autocrlf=true, so pin these to LF.
+*.sh text eol=lf

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,12 @@
 .PHONY: setup test up up-prebuilt pull down logs
 
+# Local-dev only: seed .env from the example so `make up` has something to read.
+# A real edge node is provisioned with install.sh (one-shot bootstrap for a
+# clean Pi — clones, enrolls with C2, pulls prebuilt images):
+#   curl -fsSL https://git.vpn.cusano.net/logan/node-26/raw/tag/v1/install.sh | sudo bash -s -- --help
 setup:
-	@bash setup.sh
+	@test -f .env || cp .env.example .env
+	@echo ".env ready — edit it, then 'make up' (local build) or 'make up-prebuilt'"
 
 # Run pytest inside the running edge-node container.
 # Requires: docker compose up (or at least the edge-node image built).

README.md

@@ -135,21 +135,32 @@ Client/
 
 ## Setup
 
+### Provision a real node — `install.sh`
+
+One-shot bootstrap for a clean Raspberry Pi OS (arm64). Installs Docker, clones
+this repo at the `v1` tag, enrols with C2, pulls the prebuilt images and starts:
+
 ```bash
-# 1. Copy env template
+curl -fsSL https://git.vpn.cusano.net/logan/node-26/raw/tag/v1/install.sh \
-cp .env.example .env
+  | sudo bash -s -- --token DRB-xxxx --node-id node-003 \
-
+      --c2-url https://api.<domain> --mqtt-broker mqtt.<domain>
-# 2. Fill in at minimum: NODE_ID and MQTT_BROKER
-nano .env
-
-# 3. Build all images (op25 takes ~10-15 minutes first time)
-docker compose build
-
-# 4. Start
-docker compose up -d
 ```
 
-The node will appear as **pending** in the server admin dashboard. An admin must approve it before it becomes operational. After approval, assign a radio system in the dashboard and the node will start decoding automatically.
+Mint the `--token` at **Settings → Nodes** in the web app (the panel prints the
+whole command). Run `install.sh --help` for every flag; each also has a
+`DRB_*` env var. `--build` compiles op25 on the Pi (~1h) instead of pulling.
+
+### Local dev / manual
+
+```bash
+make setup            # seeds .env from .env.example
+nano .env             # at minimum: NODE_ID, MQTT_BROKER, C2_URL
+make up               # build locally (op25 ~10-15 min first time)
+# or: make up-prebuilt # pull images, no local build
+```
+
+The node appears as **pending** in the admin dashboard. An admin approves it,
+then assigns a radio system, and the node starts decoding automatically.
 
 ## Environment Variables (`.env`)
 
@@ -167,8 +178,8 @@ The node will appear as **pending** in the server admin dashboard. An admin must
 | `ICECAST_HOST` | No | `localhost` | Icecast hostname (leave as localhost — host network mode) |
 | `ICECAST_PORT` | No | `8000` | Icecast HTTP port |
 | `ICECAST_MOUNT` | No | `/radio` | Icecast mount point |
-| `ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD` | No | `hackme` | Icecast source password — change this |
+| `ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD` | **Yes** | none | Icecast source password. No default — the container refuses to start without it. `install.sh` generates one; otherwise `openssl rand -base64 24` |
-| `ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | No | `hackme` | Icecast admin password — change this |
+| `ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | **Yes** | none | Icecast admin password. Same rules |
 | `OP25_API_URL` | No | `http://localhost:8001` | OP25 container HTTP API |
 | `OP25_TERMINAL_URL` | No | `http://localhost:8081` | OP25 HTTP terminal (live talkgroup metadata) |
 

docker-compose.yml

@@ -5,9 +5,16 @@ services:
     restart: unless-stopped
     network_mode: host
     environment:
-      ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD: ${ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD:-hackme}
+      # :? not :- — a missing password must stop the stack, not silently
-      ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-admin}
+      # become a credential that is published in this file.
+      ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD: ${ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD:?set ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD in .env (run setup.sh, or openssl rand -base64 24)}
+      ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD: ${ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD:?set ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD in .env (run setup.sh, or openssl rand -base64 24)}
 
+  # No `ports:` here — network_mode: host makes it a no-op either way. The
+  # control API (:8001) and OP25's HTTP terminal (:8081) are unauthenticated,
+  # so they bind 127.0.0.1 by default (see OP25_DEBUG_EXPOSE in .env.example)
+  # rather than being exposed. edge-node still reaches both over localhost
+  # because it shares this host network namespace.
   op25:
     image: ${IMAGE_REGISTRY:-git.vpn.cusano.net}/${DOCKER_ORG:-logan}/${DOCKER_REPO:-node-26}/op25-client:stable
     build: ./op25-container

drb-edge-node/app/config.py

@@ -10,8 +10,27 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     node_lon: float = 0.0
 
     # MQTT
+    #
+    # Broker cutover (MQTT-PUBLIC-AUTH-PLAN.md, dynsec revision): the server no
+    # longer has a shared node login. Each node authenticates as
+    # username=NODE_ID, password=<its C2-issued api_key> (the same credential
+    # /upload already trusts via node_keys) — see mqtt_manager._build_client().
+    # For local dev against the old-style broker (localhost:1883, no TLS) set
+    # MQTT_BROKER=localhost and leave MQTT_TLS unset/false.
     mqtt_broker: str
     mqtt_port: int = 1883
+    # Set true for the public broker (mqtt.<domain>:8883, real Let's Encrypt
+    # cert) so client.tls_set() runs with default system-CA verification.
+    # False by default so local/dev against a plaintext :1883 broker still
+    # works unchanged. Do NOT pair with a self-signed/insecure cert setup —
+    # verification is never disabled (no tls_insecure_set(True) anywhere).
+    mqtt_tls: bool = False
+    # DEPRECATED / effectively dead post-cutover: the shared node login these
+    # backed no longer exists on the server (dynsec has no such client — see
+    # dynsec.py). Left in only as a legacy fallback for a pre-cutover broker
+    # that still uses mosquitto's old password_file auth; mqtt_manager only
+    # falls back to these when no api_key is on disk yet. Do not provision new
+    # nodes with these — see MQTT_USER/MQTT_PASS removal note in .env.example.
     mqtt_user: Optional[str] = None
     mqtt_pass: Optional[str] = None
 
@@ -23,7 +42,8 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     icecast_host: str = "localhost"
     icecast_port: int = 8000
     icecast_mount: str = "/radio"
-    icecast_source_password: str = "hackme"
+    # No default: see icecast/entrypoint.sh, which refuses to start without one.
+    icecast_source_password: str = ""
 
     # PulseAudio — the low-latency path used for call recording and Discord voice.
     # Liquidsoap (op25 container) writes into the `drb_sink` null sink; we capture
@@ -123,6 +143,22 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     # Offline call buffer — how many call_end events to keep while disconnected
     offline_call_buffer_size: int = 35
 
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # Local dashboard / API authentication
+    #
+    # These nodes are deployed at arbitrary third-party locations, reachable by
+    # anyone on that site's LAN — there is no auth on this HTTP surface without
+    # these. The password below is a FIRST-BOOT DEFAULT ONLY: change it via
+    # DASHBOARD_PASSWORD in .env before a node leaves the bench. main.py logs a
+    # startup warning every boot the default is still active.
+    #
+    # See app/internal/auth.py — the password is never compared or stored in
+    # plaintext (scrypt-hashed, constant-time compare); this setting just holds
+    # the operator-facing plaintext the same way MQTT_PASS/ICECAST_* already do.
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    dashboard_username: str = "admin"
+    dashboard_password: str = "CHANGE-ME-drb-default"
+
     class Config:
         env_file = ".env"
 

drb-edge-node/app/internal/auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+"""
+Local dashboard / API authentication.
+
+These edge nodes are deployed at arbitrary third-party locations and serve
+both an HTML dashboard and a JSON API on the same FastAPI app (port 80,
+network_mode: host) — anyone on that site's LAN can otherwise reach every
+control endpoint. This module adds username/password auth in front of it.
+
+Design:
+  - Username + password come from app/config.py (DASHBOARD_USERNAME /
+    DASHBOARD_PASSWORD env vars), with a first-boot default that MUST be
+    changed — see is_using_default_password() and its call site in main.py.
+  - The password is never compared or stored in plaintext. It's hashed with
+    stdlib hashlib.scrypt (no new dependency — this image runs on a Raspberry
+    Pi) using a salt generated once on first boot and persisted via
+    app/internal/credentials.py, then compared with hmac.compare_digest.
+  - Two auth paths, both accepted on every protected route:
+      * Browser dashboard: a signed session cookie set by POST /login
+        (HMAC-SHA256 over "username:expiry", no server-side session store —
+        the signing key is the persisted session secret from credentials.py).
+      * Machine callers: HTTP Basic with the same username/password. As of
+        this writing no non-browser caller of this node's own API was found
+        anywhere in Client/ or Server/ (nodes are only ever reached over MQTT
+        + node-initiated outbound HTTP to C2, never the other way around) —
+        Basic is kept anyway as a stateless fallback for curl/scripts in the
+        field, since it needs no login flow and costs little to support.
+
+Caveat worth knowing: this node's dashboard is plain HTTP (no TLS
+termination on :80), so both the session cookie and Basic credentials travel
+unencrypted on the local network either way. Auth here stops a passerby from
+opening the dashboard and pressing buttons; it does not stop a LAN-level
+sniffer. That would need TLS in front of the node, which is out of scope here.
+"""
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import time
+from typing import Optional
+
+from fastapi import Cookie, Header, HTTPException, status
+
+from app.config import settings
+from app.internal import credentials
+from app.internal.logger import logger
+
+SESSION_COOKIE_NAME = "drb_node_session"
+# 12h: long enough that the dashboard doesn't demand a daily re-login on a
+# device left open on someone's desk, short enough that a stolen cookie isn't
+# valid forever.
+SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 12 * 60 * 60
+
+# scrypt cost parameters. n=2**14 (16384) keeps the derivation well under the
+# ~1s ballpark on a Raspberry Pi's memory/CPU budget — this only runs on
+# login attempts (rare), never on the hot path.
+_SCRYPT_N = 2 ** 14
+_SCRYPT_R = 8
+_SCRYPT_P = 1
+_SCRYPT_DKLEN = 32
+
+# Kept in sync with app/config.py's Settings.dashboard_password default.
+DEFAULT_PASSWORD = "CHANGE-ME-drb-default"
+
+
+def _hash_password(password: str, salt: bytes) -> bytes:
+    return hashlib.scrypt(
+        password.encode("utf-8"),
+        salt=salt,
+        n=_SCRYPT_N,
+        r=_SCRYPT_R,
+        p=_SCRYPT_P,
+        dklen=_SCRYPT_DKLEN,
+    )
+
+
+def is_using_default_password() -> bool:
+    return settings.dashboard_password == DEFAULT_PASSWORD
+
+
+def verify_credentials(username: str, password: str) -> bool:
+    """Constant-time check of a submitted username/password against config."""
+    salt = credentials.get_auth_salt()
+    expected_hash = _hash_password(settings.dashboard_password, salt)
+    submitted_hash = _hash_password(password, salt)
+
+    user_ok = hmac.compare_digest(
+        username.encode("utf-8"), settings.dashboard_username.encode("utf-8")
+    )
+    pass_ok = hmac.compare_digest(submitted_hash, expected_hash)
+    return user_ok and pass_ok
+
+
+def _sign(payload: str) -> str:
+    secret = credentials.get_session_secret()
+    return hmac.new(secret, payload.encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+
+
+def create_session_token(username: str) -> str:
+    """Build a signed, expiring, opaque session token (no server-side state)."""
+    expiry = int(time.time()) + SESSION_TTL_SECONDS
+    payload = f"{username}:{expiry}"
+    sig = _sign(payload)
+    raw = f"{payload}:{sig}"
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw.encode("utf-8")).decode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _verify_session_token(token: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    try:
+        raw = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(token.encode("utf-8")).decode("utf-8")
+        username, expiry_s, sig = raw.rsplit(":", 2)
+        expiry = int(expiry_s)
+    except Exception:
+        return None
+
+    expected_sig = _sign(f"{username}:{expiry_s}")
+    if not hmac.compare_digest(sig, expected_sig):
+        return None
+    if time.time() > expiry:
+        return None
+    if not hmac.compare_digest(
+        username.encode("utf-8"), settings.dashboard_username.encode("utf-8")
+    ):
+        return None
+    return username
+
+
+def _verify_basic_auth(header_value: str) -> bool:
+    try:
+        scheme, _, encoded = header_value.partition(" ")
+        if scheme.lower() != "basic":
+            return False
+        decoded = base64.b64decode(encoded).decode("utf-8")
+        username, _, password = decoded.partition(":")
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    return verify_credentials(username, password)
+
+
+def is_authenticated(
+    session_cookie: Optional[str], authorization: Optional[str]
+) -> bool:
+    if session_cookie and _verify_session_token(session_cookie):
+        return True
+    if authorization and _verify_basic_auth(authorization):
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+async def require_session(
+    drb_node_session: Optional[str] = Cookie(default=None, alias=SESSION_COOKIE_NAME),
+) -> bool:
+    """Dependency for dashboard HTML pages. Returns False rather than raising
+    so the route can redirect to /login instead of showing a bare 401."""
+    return bool(drb_node_session and _verify_session_token(drb_node_session))
+
+
+async def require_auth(
+    drb_node_session: Optional[str] = Cookie(default=None, alias=SESSION_COOKIE_NAME),
+    authorization: Optional[str] = Header(default=None),
+) -> None:
+    """Dependency for /api/* routes — session cookie (dashboard's own fetch
+    calls) or HTTP Basic (machine callers) both satisfy it."""
+    if is_authenticated(drb_node_session, authorization):
+        return
+    raise HTTPException(
+        status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
+        detail="Authentication required",
+        headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Basic"},
+    )
+
+
+def warn_if_default_password() -> None:
+    if is_using_default_password():
+        logger.warning(
+            "DASHBOARD_PASSWORD is still the first-boot default — "
+            "set DASHBOARD_USERNAME/DASHBOARD_PASSWORD in .env before this "
+            "node leaves the bench. Anyone on the node's LAN can currently "
+            "log in with the default credentials."
+        )

drb-edge-node/app/internal/call_recorder.py

@@ -7,14 +7,16 @@ A persistent capture process runs for the lifetime of the node. Spawning FFmpeg
 per call used to lose the first 1-2 s to process startup, which meant short
 transmissions produced empty files, so capture never stops.
 
-RAW PCM, NOT MP3 — this is the change everything else hangs off. FFmpeg is
+RAW PCM, NOT A COMPRESSED STREAM — this is the change everything else hangs
-asked for s16le/22050/mono on stdout instead of an MP3 stream, so:
+off. FFmpeg is asked for s16le/22050/mono on stdout instead of an encoded
+stream, so:
 
   * silence detection is integer arithmetic over each chunk as it arrives, with
     no decode, which is what makes AUDIO-DRIVEN call boundaries possible;
   * trimming is a byte-offset slice, not a second FFmpeg pass;
-  * MP3 encoding happens exactly ONCE, at save time, so uploads are no longer
+  * encoding happens exactly ONCE, at save time, so uploads are no longer
-    double-encoded.
+    double-encoded. That encode is now FLAC (lossless) rather than 16 kbps MP3
+    — see the AUDIO_* constants below for why.
 
 TWO BUFFERS, TWO JOBS — this split is load-bearing:
 
@@ -94,14 +96,32 @@ RING_BUFFER_SECONDS = 30
 # under PRE_ROLL_SECONDS and well under the shortest utterance we care about.
 READ_CHUNK_BYTES = 2048
 
-# Encoder settings for the single encode at save time, matched on purpose to
+# Encoder settings for the single encode at save time.
-# what Liquidsoap already pushes to Icecast — %mp3(bitrate=16, samplerate=22050,
+#
-# stereo=false) — so the C2 /upload endpoint keeps receiving exactly the kind of
+# This used to be %mp3(bitrate=16) chosen to match what Liquidsoap pushes to
-# MP3 it has always received (multipart "audio/mpeg", stored to GCS as .mp3,
+# Icecast. That was the wrong thing to match: Icecast is the LISTENING path and
-# then fed to Whisper). MP3_SAMPLE_RATE MUST equal pcm.SAMPLE_RATE: the encode
+# 16 kbps is a bandwidth budget for a live stream, while this file is the
-# is a straight pass with no resampling.
+# ACCURACY path — it is what Whisper transcribes, and the transcript is what
-MP3_BITRATE = "16k"
+# every downstream stage is hostage to. P25 audio has already been through a
-MP3_SAMPLE_RATE = str(pcm.SAMPLE_RATE)
+# vocoder; 16 kbps MP3 stacked a second lossy stage on top of that, on the one
+# copy that had to stay faithful.
+#
+# FLAC instead: lossless, so the bytes Whisper receives are the bytes PulseAudio
+# captured. Roughly 1.3 MB/min against 120 KB/min for 16k MP3 — larger, but a
+# 600 s call is still ~13 MB, inside both Whisper's 25 MB request cap and the
+# C2 upload_max_bytes (100 MB). Icecast's own 16 kbps stream is untouched;
+# nothing about the listening path changes.
+#
+# AUDIO_SAMPLE_RATE MUST equal pcm.SAMPLE_RATE: the encode is a straight pass
+# with no resampling. Whisper resamples to 16 kHz itself, so handing it 22050
+# unresampled keeps the one resample in the pipeline inside the model.
+AUDIO_SAMPLE_RATE = str(pcm.SAMPLE_RATE)
+AUDIO_FORMAT = "flac"
+AUDIO_SUFFIX = ".flac"
+AUDIO_MIME = "audio/flac"
+# -compression_level 5 is ffmpeg's default: near-best ratio, and the encode is
+# off the hot path anyway (once per call, at save).
+FLAC_COMPRESSION_LEVEL = "5"
 
 # Bounded so a wedged encoder can never stall the upload path.
 ENCODE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 60.0
@@ -218,9 +238,12 @@ class Recording:
     all_silence: bool = False
 
 
-async def encode_mp3(audio: bytes, path: Path) -> bool:
+async def encode_recording(audio: bytes, path: Path) -> bool:
     """
-    The one and only encode in the pipeline: raw PCM in, MP3 file out.
+    The one and only encode in the pipeline: raw PCM in, FLAC file out.
+
+    Lossless on purpose — see the AUDIO_* constants above. This file is what
+    Whisper transcribes, so the encode must not throw anything away.
 
     Module-level rather than a method so tests can substitute it without
     needing FFmpeg, and so the "exactly one encode per call" property is
@@ -233,13 +256,13 @@ async def encode_mp3(audio: bytes, path: Path) -> bool:
         "-hide_banner", "-nostdin", "-nostats",
         "-loglevel", "warning", "-y",
         "-f", "s16le",
-        "-ar", MP3_SAMPLE_RATE,
+        "-ar", AUDIO_SAMPLE_RATE,
         "-ac", str(pcm.CHANNELS),
         "-i", "pipe:0",
-        "-ar", MP3_SAMPLE_RATE,
+        "-ar", AUDIO_SAMPLE_RATE,
         "-ac", str(pcm.CHANNELS),
-        "-b:a", MP3_BITRATE,
+        "-compression_level", FLAC_COMPRESSION_LEVEL,
-        "-f", "mp3", str(path),
+        "-f", AUDIO_FORMAT, str(path),
     ]
     try:
         proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
@@ -327,7 +350,7 @@ class CallRecorder:
             "-loglevel", "warning",
             "-f", "pulse", "-i", settings.pulse_source,
             "-ac", str(pcm.CHANNELS),
-            "-ar", MP3_SAMPLE_RATE,
+            "-ar", AUDIO_SAMPLE_RATE,
             # Raw PCM on stdout. No muxer, so no -flush_packets games: s16le is
             # a bare byte stream and every byte FFmpeg produces is immediately
             # readable, which is what keeps arrival timestamps honest.
@@ -360,7 +383,7 @@ class CallRecorder:
 
     async def _run_capture(self) -> None:
         cmd = self._ffmpeg_command()
-        logger.info(f"Starting capture: ffmpeg -f pulse -i {settings.pulse_source} (s16le/{MP3_SAMPLE_RATE}/mono)")
+        logger.info(f"Starting capture: ffmpeg -f pulse -i {settings.pulse_source} (s16le/{AUDIO_SAMPLE_RATE}/mono)")
         self._last_stderr_lines.clear()
         proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
             *cmd,
@@ -674,9 +697,9 @@ class CallRecorder:
 
         self._recordings_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         ts_str = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S")
-        output_path = self._recordings_dir / f"{ts_str}_{recording.call_id}.mp3"
+        output_path = self._recordings_dir / f"{ts_str}_{recording.call_id}{AUDIO_SUFFIX}"
 
-        if not await encode_mp3(audio, output_path):
+        if not await encode_recording(audio, output_path):
             output_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
             return None
 
@@ -766,7 +789,7 @@ class CallRecorder:
                 with open(file_path, "rb") as f:
                     r = await client.post(
                         upload_url,
-                        files={"file": (file_path.name, f, "audio/mpeg")},
+                        files={"file": (file_path.name, f, AUDIO_MIME)},
                         data=form,
                         headers=headers,
                     )

drb-edge-node/app/internal/credentials.py

@@ -1,30 +1,73 @@
 """
-Manages the persisted node API key.
+Manages the persisted node API key, plus the local-auth signing material used
+by app/internal/auth.py.
 
-The key is provisioned by the C2 server after an admin approves the node.
+The API key is provisioned by the C2 server after an admin approves the node.
 It arrives via MQTT and is saved to /configs/credentials.json so it survives
 container restarts.
+
+The scrypt salt and session-signing secret are generated locally on first boot
+(never provisioned externally) and persisted the same way, so dashboard
+sessions survive a container restart instead of forcing every operator to
+re-login whenever the node restarts.
 """
 import json
+import secrets
 from pathlib import Path
 from app.config import settings
 from app.internal.logger import logger
 
 _CREDS_FILE = Path(settings.config_path) / "credentials.json"
 _api_key: str | None = None
+_auth_salt: bytes | None = None
+_session_secret: bytes | None = None
 
 
 def load() -> None:
     """Load persisted credentials from disk on startup."""
-    global _api_key
+    global _api_key, _auth_salt, _session_secret
     if _CREDS_FILE.exists():
         try:
             data = json.loads(_CREDS_FILE.read_text())
             _api_key = data.get("api_key")
+            if data.get("auth_salt"):
+                _auth_salt = bytes.fromhex(data["auth_salt"])
+            if data.get("session_secret"):
+                _session_secret = bytes.fromhex(data["session_secret"])
             if _api_key:
                 logger.info("Node credentials loaded from disk.")
         except Exception as e:
             logger.warning(f"Could not read credentials file: {e}")
+    _ensure_auth_material()
+
+
+def _ensure_auth_material() -> None:
+    """Generate (once) and persist the local-auth salt + session secret."""
+    global _auth_salt, _session_secret
+    changed = False
+    if _auth_salt is None:
+        _auth_salt = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        changed = True
+    if _session_secret is None:
+        _session_secret = secrets.token_bytes(32)
+        changed = True
+    if changed:
+        _write()
+        logger.info("Generated local-auth signing material (first boot).")
+
+
+def get_auth_salt() -> bytes:
+    """Scrypt salt for dashboard password hashing — generated once, persisted."""
+    if _auth_salt is None:
+        _ensure_auth_material()
+    return _auth_salt  # type: ignore[return-value]
+
+
+def get_session_secret() -> bytes:
+    """HMAC key used to sign dashboard session cookies — generated once, persisted."""
+    if _session_secret is None:
+        _ensure_auth_material()
+    return _session_secret  # type: ignore[return-value]
 
 
 def get_api_key() -> str | None:
@@ -34,6 +77,15 @@ def get_api_key() -> str | None:
 def save_api_key(key: str) -> None:
     global _api_key
     _api_key = key
-    _CREDS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    _write()
-    _CREDS_FILE.write_text(json.dumps({"api_key": key}))
     logger.info("Node API key saved to disk.")
+
+
+def _write() -> None:
+    _CREDS_FILE.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    data: dict = {"api_key": _api_key}
+    if _auth_salt is not None:
+        data["auth_salt"] = _auth_salt.hex()
+    if _session_secret is not None:
+        data["session_secret"] = _session_secret.hex()
+    _CREDS_FILE.write_text(json.dumps(data))

drb-edge-node/app/internal/discord_radio.py

@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ class RadioBot:
         self._channel_id: Optional[int] = None
         self._was_streaming: bool = False
 
-    async def join(self, guild_id: int, channel_id: int, token: str, call_active: bool = False, system_name: str = None) -> bool:
+    async def join(self, guild_id: int, channel_id: int, token: str,
+                   call_active: bool = False, system_name: str = None) -> bool:
         # (Re)start the bot if the token changed or the bot isn't running
         if self._current_token != token or not self._is_bot_running():
             if not await self._start_bot(token):

drb-edge-node/app/internal/mqtt_manager.py

@@ -32,6 +32,16 @@ class MQTTManager:
         self._t_metadata = f"nodes/{nid}/metadata"
         self._t_commands = f"nodes/{nid}/commands"
         self._t_config = f"nodes/{nid}/config"
+        # TODO(mqtt-cutover): dead once enrollment lands client-side. This
+        # was the pre-dynsec key-delivery path (server retain-publishes the
+        # api_key here after admin approval; node asks for redelivery via
+        # _t_key_request if none shows up). Under dynsec a node with no
+        # api_key can't authenticate to the broker at all — see
+        # _build_client() — so this subscribe is only ever reachable while
+        # still using the legacy mqtt_user/mqtt_pass fallback against a
+        # pre-cutover broker. Left in as the rollback path per
+        # MQTT-PUBLIC-AUTH-PLAN.md; remove together with the server's
+        # matching TODO(mqtt-cutover) markers once enrollment replaces it.
         self._t_api_key = f"nodes/{nid}/api_key"
         self._t_key_request = f"nodes/{nid}/key_request"
         self._t_discovery = "nodes/discovery/request"
@@ -41,8 +51,47 @@ class MQTTManager:
             callback_api_version=mqtt.CallbackAPIVersion.VERSION2,
             client_id=settings.node_id,
         )
-        if settings.mqtt_user:
+
+        api_key = credentials.get_api_key()
+        if api_key:
+            # Post-cutover auth: broker's dynsec plugin authenticates this
+            # exact (username, password) pair as this node's own client — see
+            # Server/drb-c2-core/app/internal/dynsec.py upsert_node_client()
+            # and MQTT-PUBLIC-AUTH-PLAN.md. node_id doubles as the dynsec
+            # username AND the %u substitution in the "node" role's
+            # nodes/%u/# ACL pattern, so it must match exactly what C2 has on
+            # file for this node (it always does — node_id is not operator
+            # editable post-provisioning).
+            client.username_pw_set(settings.node_id, api_key)
+        elif settings.mqtt_user:
+            # Legacy fallback — only valid against a pre-cutover broker still
+            # using mosquitto's old password_file auth. See config.py's
+            # mqtt_user/mqtt_pass docstring. Not accepted by a dynsec broker.
             client.username_pw_set(settings.mqtt_user, settings.mqtt_pass)
+        else:
+            # No api_key on disk and no legacy shared login configured. A
+            # dynsec broker (allow_anonymous false) refuses this outright —
+            # expected, not a bug to route around here: this node hasn't been
+            # enrolled/approved yet, and the enrollment flow that would fix
+            # that client-side is a later, separate pass (out of scope here;
+            # see MQTT-PUBLIC-AUTH-PLAN.md). paho's reconnect_delay_set()
+            # below bounds the retry rate (2..60s exponential backoff), so
+            # this degrades to a slow, clearly-logged refusal loop via
+            # _on_connect's "MQTT connect refused" line — not a hot spin.
+            logger.warning(
+                "No API key on disk and no legacy MQTT_USER configured — "
+                "connecting without credentials; the broker is expected to "
+                "refuse this until the node is enrolled/approved."
+            )
+
+        if settings.mqtt_tls:
+            # No arguments = system CA store + ssl.CERT_REQUIRED (verified
+            # against paho's tls_set() source/docstring — unverified by
+            # running anything, per instruction). The broker presents a real
+            # Let's Encrypt cert for mqtt.<domain>:8883, so default
+            # verification is exactly correct: do not pass ca_certs, do not
+            # call tls_insecure_set(True).
+            client.tls_set()
 
         lwt = json.dumps({
             "node_id": settings.node_id,
@@ -62,10 +111,11 @@ class MQTTManager:
             self._connected = True
             client.subscribe(self._t_commands, qos=1)
             client.subscribe(self._t_config, qos=1)
-            client.subscribe(self._t_api_key, qos=2)
+            client.subscribe(self._t_api_key, qos=2)  # TODO(mqtt-cutover): see _t_api_key comment above
             client.subscribe(self._t_discovery, qos=0)
             logger.info("MQTT connected.")
             asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(self._publish_checkin(), self._loop)
+            # TODO(mqtt-cutover): see _t_api_key comment above
             asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(self._maybe_request_key(), self._loop)
             asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(self._flush_offline_buffer(), self._loop)
         else:

drb-edge-node/app/internal/system_cacher.py

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ from app.internal import credentials
 
 _CACHE_FILE = Path(settings.config_path) / "systems_cache.json"
 
+
 async def fetch_and_cache_systems() -> bool:
     """Fetch all systems from the C2 server and cache them locally."""
     if not settings.c2_url:
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ async def fetch_and_cache_systems() -> bool:
         logger.warning(f"Failed to fetch systems from C2: {e}. Offline cache will be used.")
         return False
 
+
 def load_cached_systems() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
     """Load cached systems from disk."""
     if _CACHE_FILE.exists():
@@ -41,6 +43,7 @@ def load_cached_systems() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
             logger.error(f"Failed to read systems cache: {e}")
     return []
 
+
 def get_cached_system(system_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
     """Retrieve a single system config from the cache."""
     systems = load_cached_systems()

drb-edge-node/app/main.py

@@ -266,8 +266,11 @@ async def on_config_push(payload: dict):
 async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
     logger.info(f"Edge node starting — ID: {settings.node_id}")
 
-    # Load persisted credentials (API key provisioned by C2 after approval)
+    # Load persisted credentials (API key provisioned by C2 after approval;
+    # also generates/loads the local dashboard's auth salt + session secret)
     credentials.load()
+    from app.internal import auth
+    auth.warn_if_default_password()
 
     # Wire callbacks
     metadata_watcher.on_call_start = on_call_start
@@ -294,7 +297,11 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
     initial_status = "online" if node_cfg.configured else "unconfigured"
     await mqtt_manager.publish_status(initial_status)
 
-    active_config = node_cfg.override_config if (node_cfg.override_system_id and node_cfg.override_config) else node_cfg.system_config
+    active_config = (
+        node_cfg.override_config
+        if (node_cfg.override_system_id and node_cfg.override_config)
+        else node_cfg.system_config
+    )
     if node_cfg.configured and active_config:
         from app.internal.op25_client import op25_client
         logger.info("Node is configured — waiting for OP25 API then generating config.")

drb-edge-node/app/routers/api.py

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Body
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Body
 from typing import Optional
 import asyncio
 import httpx
@@ -11,8 +11,14 @@ from app.internal.discord_radio import radio_bot
 from app.internal.metadata_watcher import metadata_watcher
 from app.internal import credentials
 from app.internal.mqtt_manager import mqtt_manager
+from app.internal import auth
 
-router = APIRouter(prefix="/api", tags=["api"])
+# Every route in this router requires auth — a valid dashboard session cookie
+# or HTTP Basic (see app/internal/auth.py). No exemption exists for any route
+# here: there is no health/liveness endpoint in this file or anywhere else in
+# the edge node (confirmed against source — no docker healthcheck references
+# one either), so nothing needs to stay open for a container healthcheck.
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/api", tags=["api"], dependencies=[Depends(auth.require_auth)])
 
 
 @router.get("/status")
@@ -24,7 +30,11 @@ async def get_status():
     active_tgid_name = metadata_watcher.current_tgid_name
     system_name = None
 
-    active_config = node_cfg.override_config if (node_cfg.override_system_id and node_cfg.override_config) else node_cfg.system_config
+    active_config = (
+        node_cfg.override_config
+        if (node_cfg.override_system_id and node_cfg.override_config)
+        else node_cfg.system_config
+    )
     if active_config:
         system_name = active_config.name
         if active_tgid:

drb-edge-node/app/routers/ui.py

@@ -1,18 +1,64 @@
 from pathlib import Path
-from fastapi import APIRouter
+from typing import Optional
-from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Form
+from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, RedirectResponse
+
+from app.internal import auth
 
 router = APIRouter(tags=["ui"])
 
 _TEMPLATE = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "templates" / "index.html"
 _SCANNER_TEMPLATE = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "templates" / "scanner.html"
+_LOGIN_TEMPLATE = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "templates" / "login.html"
+
+
+@router.get("/login", response_class=HTMLResponse)
+async def login_page(error: Optional[str] = None):
+    html = _LOGIN_TEMPLATE.read_text()
+    banner = (
+        '<div class="error">Invalid username or password.</div>' if error else ""
+    )
+    return html.replace("<!--ERROR_BANNER-->", banner)
+
+
+@router.post("/login")
+async def login_submit(username: str = Form(...), password: str = Form(...)):
+    if not auth.verify_credentials(username, password):
+        return RedirectResponse("/login?error=1", status_code=303)
+
+    token = auth.create_session_token(username)
+    resp = RedirectResponse("/", status_code=303)
+    resp.set_cookie(
+        auth.SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
+        token,
+        max_age=auth.SESSION_TTL_SECONDS,
+        httponly=True,
+        samesite="lax",
+        # No TLS termination on this port (LAN dashboard on :80) — `secure`
+        # would make the cookie never get sent at all.
+        secure=False,
+    )
+    return resp
+
+
+@router.post("/logout")
+@router.get("/logout")
+async def logout():
+    resp = RedirectResponse("/login", status_code=303)
+    resp.delete_cookie(auth.SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
+    return resp
 
 
 @router.get("/", response_class=HTMLResponse)
-async def index():
+async def index(authed: bool = Depends(auth.require_session)):
+    if not authed:
+        return RedirectResponse("/login")
     return _TEMPLATE.read_text()
 
 
 @router.get("/scanner", response_class=HTMLResponse)
-async def scanner():
+async def scanner(authed: bool = Depends(auth.require_session)):
+    if not authed:
+        return RedirectResponse("/login")
     return _SCANNER_TEMPLATE.read_text()

drb-edge-node/app/templates/index.html

@@ -268,6 +268,10 @@
           <svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" style="margin-right:8px"><rect x="2" y="3" width="20" height="14" rx="2" ry="2"></rect><line x1="8" y1="21" x2="16" y2="21"></line><line x1="12" y1="17" x2="12" y2="21"></line></svg>
           Scanner Mode
         </a>
+        <a href="/logout" class="btn btn-secondary">
+          <svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" style="margin-right:8px"><path d="M9 21H5a2 2 0 0 1-2-2V5a2 2 0 0 1 2-2h4"></path><polyline points="16 17 21 12 16 7"></polyline><line x1="21" y1="12" x2="9" y2="12"></line></svg>
+          Logout
+        </a>
       </div>
     </header>
 

drb-edge-node/app/templates/login.html

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="UTF-8">
+  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
+  <title>DRB Edge Node — Login</title>
+  <link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:wght@400;500;600;700;800&family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;700&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">
+  <style>
+    :root {
+      --bg: #0b0f19;
+      --glass-bg: rgba(20, 25, 40, 0.6);
+      --glass-border: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.08);
+      --accent: #3b82f6;
+      --accent-hover: #2563eb;
+      --danger: #ef4444;
+      --text-main: #f8fafc;
+      --text-muted: #94a3b8;
+    }
+
+    *, *::before, *::after {
+      box-sizing: border-box;
+      margin: 0;
+      padding: 0;
+    }
+
+    body {
+      font-family: 'Inter', sans-serif;
+      background: var(--bg);
+      background-image:
+        radial-gradient(circle at 15% 50%, rgba(59, 130, 246, 0.15), transparent 25%),
+        radial-gradient(circle at 85% 30%, rgba(139, 92, 246, 0.15), transparent 25%);
+      color: var(--text-main);
+      min-height: 100vh;
+      display: flex;
+      align-items: center;
+      justify-content: center;
+      padding: 1.5rem;
+    }
+
+    .login-card {
+      width: 100%;
+      max-width: 360px;
+      background: var(--glass-bg);
+      backdrop-filter: blur(12px);
+      -webkit-backdrop-filter: blur(12px);
+      border: 1px solid var(--glass-border);
+      border-radius: 16px;
+      padding: 2rem;
+      box-shadow: 0 4px 6px -1px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.1), 0 2px 4px -1px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.06);
+    }
+
+    h1 {
+      font-size: 1.5rem;
+      font-weight: 800;
+      margin-bottom: 0.25rem;
+    }
+
+    .subtitle {
+      color: var(--text-muted);
+      font-family: 'JetBrains Mono', monospace;
+      font-size: 0.8rem;
+      margin-bottom: 1.5rem;
+    }
+
+    label {
+      display: block;
+      font-size: 0.8rem;
+      color: var(--text-muted);
+      margin-bottom: 0.35rem;
+      margin-top: 1rem;
+    }
+
+    input[type="text"], input[type="password"] {
+      width: 100%;
+      padding: 0.65rem 0.75rem;
+      border-radius: 8px;
+      border: 1px solid var(--glass-border);
+      background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.05);
+      color: var(--text-main);
+      font-family: inherit;
+      font-size: 0.95rem;
+    }
+
+    input[type="text"]:focus, input[type="password"]:focus {
+      outline: none;
+      border-color: var(--accent);
+    }
+
+    button {
+      width: 100%;
+      margin-top: 1.5rem;
+      padding: 0.75rem 1.5rem;
+      border-radius: 8px;
+      font-weight: 600;
+      font-size: 0.9rem;
+      border: none;
+      cursor: pointer;
+      background: var(--accent);
+      color: white;
+      box-shadow: 0 4px 14px 0 rgba(59, 130, 246, 0.39);
+      transition: all 0.2s ease;
+    }
+
+    button:hover {
+      background: var(--accent-hover);
+    }
+
+    .error {
+      margin-top: 1rem;
+      padding: 0.6rem 0.8rem;
+      border-radius: 8px;
+      background: rgba(239, 68, 68, 0.15);
+      border: 1px solid rgba(239, 68, 68, 0.2);
+      color: var(--danger);
+      font-size: 0.85rem;
+    }
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <div class="login-card">
+    <h1>DRB Edge Node</h1>
+    <p class="subtitle">Sign in to the local dashboard</p>
+    <form method="post" action="/login">
+      <label for="username">Username</label>
+      <input type="text" id="username" name="username" autocomplete="username" required autofocus>
+      <label for="password">Password</label>
+      <input type="password" id="password" name="password" autocomplete="current-password" required>
+      <button type="submit">Sign in</button>
+    </form>
+    <!--ERROR_BANNER-->
+  </div>
+</body>
+</html>

drb-edge-node/requirements.txt

@@ -5,5 +5,6 @@ paho-mqtt>=2.0.0
 httpx
 discord.py[voice]
 PyNaCl
+python-multipart
 pytest
 pytest-asyncio

drb-edge-node/tests/test_auth.py

@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+"""
+Unit tests for local dashboard/API auth (app.internal.auth), plus the
+credentials.py additions that persist its signing material (auth_salt,
+session_secret) alongside the existing node API key.
+
+This file is pure logic: password hashing/constant-time comparison, session
+token signing/expiry, and HTTP Basic header parsing. See test_auth_endpoints.py
+for the HTTP-level login/redirect/protection round trip through the routers.
+"""
+import base64
+import secrets
+import time
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi import HTTPException
+
+from app.config import settings
+from app.internal import auth, credentials
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def isolated_credentials(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Every test gets a fresh, on-disk-isolated credentials store so the
+    generated auth salt / session secret never leak between tests, and a
+    known username/password instead of the shipped default."""
+    creds_file = tmp_path / "credentials.json"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_CREDS_FILE", creds_file)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_api_key", None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_auth_salt", None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_session_secret", None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "dashboard_username", "tester")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "dashboard_password", "s3cret-pass")
+    yield
+
+
+def _basic_header(username: str, password: str) -> str:
+    encoded = base64.b64encode(f"{username}:{password}".encode()).decode()
+    return f"Basic {encoded}"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# credentials.py: auth salt / session secret generation + persistence
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_auth_material_is_generated_on_first_access():
+    salt = credentials.get_auth_salt()
+    secret = credentials.get_session_secret()
+    assert isinstance(salt, bytes) and len(salt) == 16
+    assert isinstance(secret, bytes) and len(secret) == 32
+
+
+def test_auth_material_is_stable_across_repeated_calls():
+    assert credentials.get_auth_salt() == credentials.get_auth_salt()
+    assert credentials.get_session_secret() == credentials.get_session_secret()
+
+
+def test_auth_material_persists_to_disk_and_survives_reload():
+    salt = credentials.get_auth_salt()
+    secret = credentials.get_session_secret()
+
+    # Simulate a container restart: drop in-memory state, reload from disk.
+    credentials._api_key = None
+    credentials._auth_salt = None
+    credentials._session_secret = None
+    credentials.load()
+
+    assert credentials.get_auth_salt() == salt
+    assert credentials.get_session_secret() == secret
+
+
+def test_saving_api_key_does_not_clobber_auth_material():
+    """save_api_key() used to json.dumps({"api_key": key}) directly, which
+    would have wiped auth_salt/session_secret out of credentials.json the
+    moment C2 provisioned an API key after this feature was added."""
+    salt = credentials.get_auth_salt()
+    secret = credentials.get_session_secret()
+
+    credentials.save_api_key("some-node-api-key")
+
+    assert credentials.get_api_key() == "some-node-api-key"
+    assert credentials.get_auth_salt() == salt
+    assert credentials.get_session_secret() == secret
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# verify_credentials() — password hashing + constant-time compare
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_verify_credentials_accepts_correct_username_and_password():
+    assert auth.verify_credentials("tester", "s3cret-pass") is True
+
+
+def test_verify_credentials_rejects_wrong_password():
+    assert auth.verify_credentials("tester", "wrong") is False
+
+
+def test_verify_credentials_rejects_wrong_username():
+    assert auth.verify_credentials("someone-else", "s3cret-pass") is False
+
+
+def test_verify_credentials_rejects_empty_password():
+    assert auth.verify_credentials("tester", "") is False
+
+
+def test_password_is_hashed_not_compared_in_plaintext():
+    with patch.object(auth, "_hash_password", wraps=auth._hash_password) as spy:
+        auth.verify_credentials("tester", "s3cret-pass")
+    # Once for the configured password, once for the submitted one — neither
+    # side is ever compared as a raw string.
+    assert spy.call_count == 2
+
+
+def test_is_using_default_password_detects_the_shipped_default(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "dashboard_password", auth.DEFAULT_PASSWORD)
+    assert auth.is_using_default_password() is True
+
+
+def test_is_using_default_password_false_once_changed():
+    assert auth.is_using_default_password() is False  # fixture already changed it
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# session tokens
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_session_token_round_trips():
+    token = auth.create_session_token("tester")
+    assert auth._verify_session_token(token) == "tester"
+
+
+def test_session_token_rejects_tampered_payload():
+    token = auth.create_session_token("tester")
+    tampered = ("X" if token[0] != "X" else "Y") + token[1:]
+    assert auth._verify_session_token(tampered) is None
+
+
+def test_session_token_rejects_expired_token(monkeypatch):
+    token = auth.create_session_token("tester")
+    future = time.time() + auth.SESSION_TTL_SECONDS + 1
+    monkeypatch.setattr(time, "time", lambda: future)
+    assert auth._verify_session_token(token) is None
+
+
+def test_session_token_rejects_username_mismatch(monkeypatch):
+    token = auth.create_session_token("tester")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "dashboard_username", "someone-else")
+    assert auth._verify_session_token(token) is None
+
+
+def test_session_token_garbage_input_does_not_raise():
+    assert auth._verify_session_token("not-a-real-token") is None
+    assert auth._verify_session_token("") is None
+
+
+def test_session_token_signed_with_a_different_secret_is_rejected():
+    token = auth.create_session_token("tester")
+    # As if the node restarted without a persisted credentials.json.
+    credentials._session_secret = secrets.token_bytes(32)
+    assert auth._verify_session_token(token) is None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# HTTP Basic parsing
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_basic_auth_accepts_valid_header():
+    assert auth._verify_basic_auth(_basic_header("tester", "s3cret-pass")) is True
+
+
+def test_basic_auth_rejects_wrong_credentials():
+    assert auth._verify_basic_auth(_basic_header("tester", "wrong")) is False
+
+
+def test_basic_auth_rejects_non_basic_scheme():
+    assert auth._verify_basic_auth("Bearer sometoken") is False
+
+
+def test_basic_auth_tolerates_garbage_without_raising():
+    assert auth._verify_basic_auth("Basic not-valid-base64!!") is False
+    assert auth._verify_basic_auth("") is False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# is_authenticated() — the combined check require_auth is built on
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_is_authenticated_true_with_valid_session_cookie():
+    token = auth.create_session_token("tester")
+    assert auth.is_authenticated(token, None) is True
+
+
+def test_is_authenticated_true_with_valid_basic_header():
+    assert auth.is_authenticated(None, _basic_header("tester", "s3cret-pass")) is True
+
+
+def test_is_authenticated_false_with_neither():
+    assert auth.is_authenticated(None, None) is False
+
+
+def test_is_authenticated_false_with_invalid_session_and_no_header():
+    assert auth.is_authenticated("garbage", None) is False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# FastAPI dependencies: require_session / require_auth
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+async def test_require_session_false_with_no_cookie():
+    assert await auth.require_session(None) is False
+
+
+async def test_require_session_true_with_valid_cookie():
+    token = auth.create_session_token("tester")
+    assert await auth.require_session(token) is True
+
+
+async def test_require_auth_raises_401_with_no_credentials():
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
+        await auth.require_auth(None, None)
+    assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401
+    assert exc_info.value.headers["WWW-Authenticate"] == "Basic"
+
+
+async def test_require_auth_passes_with_valid_session_cookie():
+    token = auth.create_session_token("tester")
+    await auth.require_auth(token, None)  # must not raise
+
+
+async def test_require_auth_passes_with_valid_basic_header():
+    await auth.require_auth(None, _basic_header("tester", "s3cret-pass"))  # must not raise
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# startup warning
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_warn_if_default_password_logs_when_default(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "dashboard_password", auth.DEFAULT_PASSWORD)
+    with patch("app.internal.auth.logger") as mock_logger:
+        auth.warn_if_default_password()
+    mock_logger.warning.assert_called_once()
+
+
+def test_warn_if_default_password_silent_once_changed():
+    with patch("app.internal.auth.logger") as mock_logger:
+        auth.warn_if_default_password()
+    mock_logger.warning.assert_not_called()

drb-edge-node/tests/test_auth_endpoints.py

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+"""
+HTTP-level tests for the auth-protected dashboard/API surface: login/logout
+flow, session-cookie protection of the HTML pages, and Basic-auth protection
+of the JSON API.
+
+Built as a standalone FastAPI app assembling the real api/ui routers — NOT
+app.main:app, which wires a lifespan that connects to MQTT, starts the
+PulseAudio capture loop, and pings OP25/C2. None of that belongs in a unit
+test, and none of it is needed to exercise the auth layer: the auth
+dependency runs (and short-circuits with a redirect/401) before any route
+body that would touch those services.
+"""
+import base64
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi import FastAPI
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+from app.config import settings
+from app.internal import auth, credentials
+from app.routers import api, ui
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def isolated_credentials(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    creds_file = tmp_path / "credentials.json"
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_CREDS_FILE", creds_file)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_api_key", None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_auth_salt", None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_session_secret", None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "dashboard_username", "tester")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "dashboard_password", "s3cret-pass")
+    yield
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def client():
+    test_app = FastAPI()
+    test_app.include_router(api.router)
+    test_app.include_router(ui.router)
+    with TestClient(test_app) as c:
+        yield c
+
+
+def _basic_header(username: str, password: str) -> dict:
+    encoded = base64.b64encode(f"{username}:{password}".encode()).decode()
+    return {"Authorization": f"Basic {encoded}"}
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# /api/* — machine-facing JSON API
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_api_route_rejects_unauthenticated_requests(client):
+    r = client.get("/api/status", follow_redirects=False)
+    assert r.status_code == 401
+    assert r.headers["www-authenticate"] == "Basic"
+
+
+def test_api_route_accepts_valid_basic_auth(client):
+    r = client.get("/api/config", headers=_basic_header("tester", "s3cret-pass"))
+    assert r.status_code == 200
+
+
+def test_api_route_rejects_wrong_basic_auth_password(client):
+    r = client.get("/api/config", headers=_basic_header("tester", "wrong"))
+    assert r.status_code == 401
+
+
+def test_api_route_accepts_dashboard_session_cookie(client):
+    login = client.post(
+        "/login", data={"username": "tester", "password": "s3cret-pass"}, follow_redirects=False
+    )
+    assert login.status_code == 303
+    assert auth.SESSION_COOKIE_NAME in login.cookies
+
+    r = client.get("/api/config")  # cookie jar carries the session cookie
+    assert r.status_code == 200
+
+
+def test_every_api_route_is_registered_behind_the_auth_dependency():
+    """Structural guard: catches a future route added to api.py that forgets
+    the router is meant to protect everything in it."""
+    assert any(
+        getattr(dep, "dependency", None) is auth.require_auth
+        for dep in api.router.dependencies
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# / and /scanner — the HTML dashboard
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_index_redirects_to_login_when_unauthenticated(client):
+    r = client.get("/", follow_redirects=False)
+    assert r.status_code in (302, 307)
+    assert r.headers["location"] == "/login"
+
+
+def test_scanner_redirects_to_login_when_unauthenticated(client):
+    r = client.get("/scanner", follow_redirects=False)
+    assert r.status_code in (302, 307)
+    assert r.headers["location"] == "/login"
+
+
+def test_index_served_with_a_valid_session_cookie(client):
+    client.post("/login", data={"username": "tester", "password": "s3cret-pass"})
+    r = client.get("/")
+    assert r.status_code == 200
+    assert "text/html" in r.headers["content-type"]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# /login, /logout
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_login_page_loads_without_auth(client):
+    r = client.get("/login")
+    assert r.status_code == 200
+
+
+def test_login_with_correct_credentials_sets_cookie_and_redirects_home(client):
+    r = client.post(
+        "/login", data={"username": "tester", "password": "s3cret-pass"}, follow_redirects=False
+    )
+    assert r.status_code == 303
+    assert r.headers["location"] == "/"
+    cookie = r.cookies.get(auth.SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
+    assert cookie
+    assert auth._verify_session_token(cookie) == "tester"
+
+
+def test_login_with_wrong_password_redirects_back_with_error_and_no_cookie(client):
+    r = client.post(
+        "/login", data={"username": "tester", "password": "wrong"}, follow_redirects=False
+    )
+    assert r.status_code == 303
+    assert r.headers["location"] == "/login?error=1"
+    assert auth.SESSION_COOKIE_NAME not in r.cookies
+
+
+def test_login_error_banner_renders_on_the_login_page(client):
+    r = client.get("/login?error=1")
+    assert r.status_code == 200
+    assert "Invalid username or password" in r.text
+
+
+def test_logout_clears_the_session_cookie_and_redirects_to_login(client):
+    client.post("/login", data={"username": "tester", "password": "s3cret-pass"})
+    assert client.get("/").status_code == 200  # confirm we were logged in
+
+    r = client.get("/logout", follow_redirects=False)
+    assert r.status_code == 303
+    assert r.headers["location"] == "/login"
+
+    r2 = client.get("/", follow_redirects=False)
+    assert r2.status_code in (302, 307)  # session cookie was cleared

drb-edge-node/tests/test_call_recorder.py

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ def encodes(monkeypatch):
         path.write_bytes(audio)
         return True
 
-    monkeypatch.setattr(recorder_mod, "encode_mp3", _encode)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(recorder_mod, "encode_recording", _encode)
     return calls
 
 
@@ -412,21 +412,31 @@ async def test_a_failed_encode_leaves_no_file_and_no_recording(recorder, monkeyp
     async def _fail(audio, path):
         return False
 
-    monkeypatch.setattr(recorder_mod, "encode_mp3", _fail)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(recorder_mod, "encode_recording", _fail)
     ingest(recorder, T0, T0 + 5.0)
     await recorder.start_recording("call-1", start_epoch=T0 + 1.0)
 
     assert await recorder.stop_recording(end_epoch=T0 + 3.0) is None
-    assert list(recorder._recordings_dir.glob("*.mp3")) == []
+    assert list(recorder._recordings_dir.glob("*.flac")) == []
 
 
 def test_encoder_command_contract_matches_what_c2_expects():
     """
-    /upload has always received mono MP3 at 22050 Hz / 16 kbps, and Whisper
+    The saved file is what Whisper transcribes, so the encode must stay
-    consumes it downstream. The single encode must not quietly change that.
+    LOSSLESS and must not resample. It was 16 kbps MP3 — a bitrate copied from
+    Icecast's live stream, i.e. the listening path's budget applied to the
+    accuracy path — which put a second lossy stage on top of the P25 vocoder.
+
+    The sample rate must equal pcm.SAMPLE_RATE or the encode stops being a
+    straight pass and the byte-offset trim arithmetic no longer lines up.
     """
-    assert recorder_mod.MP3_SAMPLE_RATE == str(pcm.SAMPLE_RATE) == "22050"
+    assert recorder_mod.AUDIO_SAMPLE_RATE == str(pcm.SAMPLE_RATE) == "22050"
-    assert recorder_mod.MP3_BITRATE == "16k"
+    assert recorder_mod.AUDIO_FORMAT == "flac"
+    assert recorder_mod.AUDIO_SUFFIX == ".flac"
+    assert recorder_mod.AUDIO_MIME == "audio/flac"
+    # No bitrate constant should exist: a bitrate on a lossless codec would mean
+    # someone reintroduced lossy encoding.
+    assert not hasattr(recorder_mod, "MP3_BITRATE")
 
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -523,7 +533,7 @@ async def test_discard_drops_the_audio_without_writing_anything(recorder, encode
 
     assert not recorder.is_recording
     assert encodes == []
-    assert list(recorder._recordings_dir.glob("*.mp3")) == []
+    assert list(recorder._recordings_dir.glob("*.flac")) == []
     # ...and the recorder is immediately reusable.
     assert await recorder.start_recording("call-next", start_epoch=T0 + 2.0) is True
 

drb-edge-node/tests/test_mqtt_manager.py

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+"""
+Unit tests for mqtt_manager's per-node auth + TLS wiring
+(MQTT-PUBLIC-AUTH-PLAN.md dynsec cutover).
+
+Pure client-construction tests — _build_client() only builds a paho Client
+object, it never calls .connect(), so no real broker is involved. What's
+verified here is the credential/TLS *selection logic*, matching what the
+server's dynsec plugin now expects (username=node_id, password=api_key,
+default-verified TLS on the public listener) — see
+Server/drb-c2-core/app/internal/dynsec.py and mosquitto.conf (read-only
+reference, not touched by this change).
+"""
+import ssl
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from app.config import settings
+from app.internal import credentials
+from app.internal.mqtt_manager import mqtt_manager
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def isolated_mqtt_settings(monkeypatch):
+    """Every test gets known, isolated mqtt_* settings and a clean
+    credentials._api_key so tests can't see real .env values or leak state
+    between tests (mirrors the isolated_credentials fixture in test_auth.py)."""
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "mqtt_user", None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "mqtt_pass", None)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "mqtt_tls", False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_api_key", None)
+    yield
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Credential selection: api_key > legacy mqtt_user > anonymous
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_build_client_uses_node_id_and_api_key_when_present(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_api_key", "the-api-key")
+
+    client = mqtt_manager._build_client()
+
+    assert client._username == settings.node_id.encode()
+    assert client._password == b"the-api-key"
+
+
+def test_build_client_falls_back_to_legacy_mqtt_user_without_api_key(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "mqtt_user", "drb-node")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "mqtt_pass", "legacy-pass")
+
+    client = mqtt_manager._build_client()
+
+    assert client._username == b"drb-node"
+    assert client._password == b"legacy-pass"
+
+
+def test_build_client_api_key_takes_priority_over_legacy_mqtt_user(monkeypatch):
+    """Once a node has a real api_key, it must never fall back to the shared
+    legacy login even if MQTT_USER/MQTT_PASS are still set in .env."""
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_api_key", "the-api-key")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "mqtt_user", "drb-node")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "mqtt_pass", "legacy-pass")
+
+    client = mqtt_manager._build_client()
+
+    assert client._username == settings.node_id.encode()
+    assert client._password == b"the-api-key"
+
+
+def test_build_client_with_no_credentials_connects_anonymously(monkeypatch):
+    """No api_key on disk, no legacy login configured: _build_client() must
+    still return a usable client (paho, not this code, decides what happens
+    on the wire — the dynsec broker refuses it, see the warning test below).
+    This must never raise."""
+    client = mqtt_manager._build_client()
+
+    assert client._username is None
+    assert client._password is None
+
+
+def test_build_client_warns_when_no_credentials_available(caplog):
+    with caplog.at_level("WARNING", logger="drb-edge-node"):
+        mqtt_manager._build_client()
+
+    messages = [r.message for r in caplog.records]
+    assert any("No API key" in m for m in messages), \
+        "an unenrolled node must log a clear, greppable warning, not fail silently"
+
+
+def test_build_client_does_not_warn_when_api_key_present(monkeypatch, caplog):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_api_key", "the-api-key")
+
+    with caplog.at_level("WARNING", logger="drb-edge-node"):
+        mqtt_manager._build_client()
+
+    assert not any("No API key" in r.message for r in caplog.records)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# TLS
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_build_client_no_tls_by_default(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_api_key", "the-api-key")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "mqtt_tls", False)
+
+    client = mqtt_manager._build_client()
+
+    assert client._ssl_context is None
+
+
+def test_build_client_enables_tls_with_default_verification(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_api_key", "the-api-key")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "mqtt_tls", True)
+
+    client = mqtt_manager._build_client()
+
+    assert isinstance(client._ssl_context, ssl.SSLContext)
+    # The whole point: default CA verification against the broker's real
+    # Let's Encrypt cert must stay ON. tls_insecure_set(True) must never be
+    # called — that would defeat verification entirely.
+    assert client._ssl_context.verify_mode == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
+    assert client._tls_insecure is False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Offline call buffer must be untouched by the auth/TLS change
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_build_client_does_not_touch_offline_buffer(monkeypatch):
+    """_build_client() is called fresh on every connect(); it must never
+    reset or otherwise touch the offline call-buffer deque — that survives
+    reconnects/auth changes by design (the whole point of the buffer)."""
+    monkeypatch.setattr(credentials, "_api_key", "the-api-key")
+    mqtt_manager._offline_buffer.append(("nodes/test/metadata", {"call_id": "sentinel"}))
+
+    with patch.object(mqtt_manager, "_offline_buffer", mqtt_manager._offline_buffer):
+        mqtt_manager._build_client()
+
+    assert list(mqtt_manager._offline_buffer) == [("nodes/test/metadata", {"call_id": "sentinel"})]
+    mqtt_manager._offline_buffer.clear()

icecast/entrypoint.sh

@@ -1,8 +1,19 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 set -e
 
-ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD="${ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD:-hackme}"
+# No defaults here on purpose. This container binds all interfaces, so a
-ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD="${ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD:-admin}"
+# fallback password is a published credential on every node that ever accepted
+# it -- and the source password is what lets a caller PUSH audio into the
+# stream the frontend plays as live radio. Refuse to start instead.
+for var in ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD; do
+  eval "value=\${$var}"
+  if [ -z "$value" ]; then
+    echo "icecast: $var is not set." >&2
+    echo "icecast: set it in the node's .env -- 'bash setup.sh' generates a random one," >&2
+    echo "icecast: or run: openssl rand -base64 24" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+done
 
 export ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD
 

install.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# DRB edge node — one-shot bootstrap for a clean Raspberry Pi OS (arm64).
+#
+#   curl -fsSL https://git.vpn.cusano.net/logan/node-26/raw/tag/v1/install.sh \
+#     | sudo bash -s -- --token DRB-xxxx --node-id node-003 \
+#         --c2-url https://api.<domain> --mqtt-broker mqtt.<domain>
+#
+# (fetch install.sh from the same tag it installs; use raw/branch/main with
+#  --track-main for the owner's own always-latest nodes)
+#
+# Hosting, the pinned ref, and setup.sh's retirement are settled (owner
+# decisions, 2026-09-06). One standing hazard remains — D3 below.
+#
+# What it does, in order:
+#   1. Preflight (root, arch, apt, SDR present)
+#   2. Install Docker + compose plugin + git + curl + jq
+#   3. Clone logan/node-26 at a PINNED ref into $INSTALL_DIR
+#   4. Write .env (non-interactive from flags/env, interactive fallback)
+#   5. Enroll with C2 (POST /nodes/enroll) and poll for the api_key
+#   6. docker compose pull && up -d   (prebuilt; --build opts into the ~1h build)
+#   7. Print the approval step
+#
+# It does NOT set up WireGuard. WireGuard-per-node was evaluated and rejected
+# (Server/MQTT-PUBLIC-AUTH-PLAN.md, Server/infra/main.tf:67-73). A field node
+# reaches production over the public internet only:
+#     https://api.<domain>      enrollment + /upload   (Caddy, real TLS)
+#     mqtt.<domain>:8883        MQTT over TLS, username=NODE_ID password=api_key
+# The two stale "nodes reach it via WireGuard" comments in
+# Server/docker-compose.prod.yml:6 and Server/infra/main.tf:69 are leftovers.
+#
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# SETTLED (owner decisions, 2026-09-06 — node-26#4)
+#
+#   D1  HOSTING. git.vpn.cusano.net is PUBLIC — it is a CNAME to
+#       cusano-net.duckdns.org (71.117.95.129) with a real Let's Encrypt cert,
+#       resolvable from any public resolver. install.sh, `git clone` and
+#       `docker compose pull` all work from a customer's Pi with no VPN.
+#       Caveat, not a blocker: that IP is a dynamic-DNS record on the owner's
+#       home uplink, so it is a single point of failure and a bandwidth limit
+#       — fine for the beachhead, revisit before scaling node count.
+#
+#   D2  PIN. node-26 gets a `v1` tag (owner cuts it — see the git command in
+#       the mint panel / node-26#4). DEFAULT_REF below is `v1`. `--track-main`
+#       stays as an opt-in for the owner's own nodes.
+#
+# STANDING HAZARD
+#
+#   D3  SOURCE-OVERLAY. docker-compose.yml bind-mounts ./drb-edge-node/app and
+#       ./op25-container/app OVER the image's /app. So even in prebuilt mode
+#       the running Python is the CLONED REF's code against the pulled image's
+#       dependencies. `v1` == the commit CI built the current :latest/:stable
+#       from, so today they match — but the moment `v1` and the image tags
+#       diverge this silently mixes them. Fix: drop those two mounts from the
+#       prod compose path, or always retag images from the same ref as `v1`.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# ── Defaults ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+DEFAULT_REF="v1"                                                  # D2
+DEFAULT_REPO_URL="https://git.vpn.cusano.net/logan/node-26.git"   # D1 (public)
+DEFAULT_INSTALL_DIR="/opt/drb/node-26"
+
+REPO_URL="${DRB_REPO_URL:-$DEFAULT_REPO_URL}"
+REF="${DRB_REF:-$DEFAULT_REF}"
+INSTALL_DIR="${DRB_INSTALL_DIR:-$DEFAULT_INSTALL_DIR}"
+
+NODE_ID="${DRB_NODE_ID:-}"
+NODE_NAME="${DRB_NODE_NAME:-}"
+NODE_LAT="${DRB_NODE_LAT:-}"
+NODE_LON="${DRB_NODE_LON:-}"
+C2_URL="${DRB_C2_URL:-}"
+MQTT_BROKER="${DRB_MQTT_BROKER:-}"
+MQTT_PORT="${DRB_MQTT_PORT:-8883}"
+MQTT_TLS="${DRB_MQTT_TLS:-true}"
+ENROLLMENT_TOKEN="${DRB_ENROLLMENT_TOKEN:-}"
+DASHBOARD_USER="${DRB_DASHBOARD_USERNAME:-admin}"
+DASHBOARD_PASS="${DRB_DASHBOARD_PASSWORD:-}"
+REGISTRY="${DRB_IMAGE_REGISTRY:-git.vpn.cusano.net}"   # D1 (public host)
+DOCKER_ORG="${DRB_DOCKER_ORG:-logan}"
+DOCKER_REPO="${DRB_DOCKER_REPO:-node-26}"
+REGISTRY_USER="${DRB_REGISTRY_USER:-}"
+REGISTRY_PASS="${DRB_REGISTRY_PASS:-}"
+
+DO_BUILD=0        # 0 = pull prebuilt images (default), 1 = build on the Pi (~1h for op25)
+DO_START=1
+ASSUME_YES=0
+ENROLL_WAIT="${DRB_ENROLL_WAIT:-0}"   # seconds to block waiting for admin approval; 0 = don't block
+
+C='\033[0;36m'; G='\033[0;32m'; Y='\033[1;33m'; R='\033[0;31m'; N='\033[0m'
+say()  { printf "${C}==>${N} %s\n" "$*"; }
+ok()   { printf "${G}  ok${N} %s\n" "$*"; }
+warn() { printf "${Y}  !!${N} %s\n" "$*" >&2; }
+die()  { printf "${R}error:${N} %s\n" "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
+
+usage() {
+  cat <<'USAGE'
+Usage: install.sh [options]
+
+  --token TOKEN        Enrollment token (Settings -> Nodes -> New token)
+  --node-id ID         Unique node id, e.g. node-003
+  --name NAME          Display name (default: node id)
+  --lat N --lon N      Decimal degrees for the map
+  --c2-url URL         e.g. https://api.drb.example.net
+  --mqtt-broker HOST   e.g. mqtt.drb.example.net
+  --mqtt-port N        default 8883
+  --no-tls             plaintext MQTT (LAN/dev brokers only)
+  --dashboard-pass PW  local dashboard password (generated if omitted)
+  --ref REF            git ref to install (default: v1)
+  --track-main         install main HEAD instead of the v1 tag
+  --dir PATH           install location (default /opt/drb/node-26)
+  --build              build images locally instead of pulling (~1h for op25)
+  --no-start           configure and enroll, but do not start containers
+  --wait-approval SEC  block up to SEC seconds polling for admin approval
+  -y, --yes            never prompt; fail instead of asking
+
+Every option also has an env var: DRB_NODE_ID, DRB_C2_URL, DRB_ENROLLMENT_TOKEN,
+DRB_MQTT_BROKER, DRB_REF, DRB_INSTALL_DIR, DRB_REGISTRY_USER/PASS, ...
+Secrets are read from the environment or prompted on the TTY, never from a pipe.
+USAGE
+}
+
+while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
+  case "$1" in
+    --token)          ENROLLMENT_TOKEN="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    --node-id)        NODE_ID="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    --name)           NODE_NAME="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    --lat)            NODE_LAT="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    --lon)            NODE_LON="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    --c2-url)         C2_URL="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    --mqtt-broker)    MQTT_BROKER="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    --mqtt-port)      MQTT_PORT="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    --no-tls)         MQTT_TLS=false; [ "$MQTT_PORT" = 8883 ] && MQTT_PORT=1883; shift ;;
+    --dashboard-pass) DASHBOARD_PASS="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    --ref)            REF="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    --track-main)     REF="main"; shift ;;
+    --dir)            INSTALL_DIR="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    --build)          DO_BUILD=1; shift ;;
+    --no-start)       DO_START=0; shift ;;
+    --wait-approval)  ENROLL_WAIT="$2"; shift 2 ;;
+    -y|--yes)         ASSUME_YES=1; shift ;;
+    -h|--help)        usage; exit 0 ;;
+    *)                die "unknown option: $1 (try --help)" ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+# Prompts must come from the terminal, not from the `curl |` pipe on stdin.
+ask() {  # ask VAR "prompt" "default"
+  local __v="$1" __p="$2" __d="${3:-}" __r=""
+  if [ "$ASSUME_YES" = 1 ] || [ ! -r /dev/tty ]; then
+    [ -n "$__d" ] || die "$__p is required (non-interactive: pass the flag or env var)"
+    printf -v "$__v" '%s' "$__d"; return
+  fi
+  read -rp "$__p${__d:+ [$__d]}: " __r </dev/tty
+  printf -v "$__v" '%s' "${__r:-$__d}"
+}
+ask_secret() {
+  local __v="$1" __p="$2" __r=""
+  if [ "$ASSUME_YES" = 1 ] || [ ! -r /dev/tty ]; then printf -v "$__v" '%s' ''; return; fi
+  read -rsp "$__p: " __r </dev/tty; echo >/dev/tty
+  printf -v "$__v" '%s' "$__r"
+}
+genpw() { head -c 24 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -d '\n=' ; }
+
+# ── 1. Preflight ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+say "Preflight"
+[ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] || die "run as root: curl -fsSL <url> | sudo bash -s -- ..."
+command -v apt-get >/dev/null || die "apt-get not found — this script targets Raspberry Pi OS / Debian"
+
+ARCH="$(dpkg --print-architecture)"
+case "$ARCH" in
+  arm64|aarch64) ok "arch $ARCH" ;;
+  *) warn "arch is $ARCH — CI only builds linux/arm64 images. Prebuilt pull will fail; use --build." ;;
+esac
+ok "running as root"
+
+# Not fatal: the dongle can be plugged in after install.
+if command -v lsusb >/dev/null 2>&1 && lsusb | grep -qiE 'rtl2838|realtek.*283[28]|sdr'; then
+  ok "SDR dongle detected on USB"
+else
+  warn "no RTL-SDR dongle detected on USB — plug one in before expecting audio"
+fi
+
+# ── 2. Dependencies ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+say "Installing dependencies"
+export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+apt-get update -qq
+apt-get install -y -qq git curl ca-certificates jq usbutils openssl >/dev/null
+ok "git curl jq openssl"
+
+if ! command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  say "Installing Docker (get.docker.com)"
+  curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
+fi
+docker --version >/dev/null || die "docker install failed"
+ok "$(docker --version)"
+
+if ! docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  apt-get install -y -qq docker-compose-plugin >/dev/null
+fi
+docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "docker compose plugin missing"
+ok "$(docker compose version --short 2>/dev/null || echo 'compose plugin')"
+
+systemctl enable --now docker >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+
+# The docker group only matters for the human who logs in LATER — this script
+# is already root, so nothing below needs a re-login. setup.sh's bug (add the
+# group, then immediately run compose in the same unprivileged shell) does not
+# apply here.
+TARGET_USER="${SUDO_USER:-}"
+if [ -n "$TARGET_USER" ] && [ "$TARGET_USER" != root ]; then
+  usermod -aG docker "$TARGET_USER" || true
+  ok "added '$TARGET_USER' to the docker group (takes effect at their next login)"
+fi
+
+# ── 3. Fetch the repo at a pinned ref ───────────────────────────────────────
+say "Fetching node-26 @ ${REF}"
+mkdir -p "$(dirname "$INSTALL_DIR")"
+if [ -d "$INSTALL_DIR/.git" ]; then
+  ok "existing install at $INSTALL_DIR — updating in place (.env is preserved)"
+  git -C "$INSTALL_DIR" remote set-url origin "$REPO_URL"
+  git -C "$INSTALL_DIR" fetch --tags --prune origin
+else
+  git clone --no-checkout "$REPO_URL" "$INSTALL_DIR"
+fi
+git -C "$INSTALL_DIR" -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout --force "$REF"
+RESOLVED_SHA="$(git -C "$INSTALL_DIR" rev-parse HEAD)"
+ok "checked out $REF ($RESOLVED_SHA)"
+[ "$REF" = main ] && warn "tracking main — two nodes installed on different days run different software"
+
+cd "$INSTALL_DIR"
+mkdir -p configs recordings
+chmod 700 configs
+
+# ── 4. Configuration ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+say "Configuring"
+if [ -f .env ]; then
+  ok ".env already present — keeping it (delete it to reconfigure)"
+  # Re-read the three values section 5 needs. Not `source .env` — that would
+  # execute whatever is in the file.
+  envget() { grep -E "^$1=" .env | head -1 | cut -d= -f2- | tr -d '"'; }
+  NODE_ID="$(envget NODE_ID)"
+  C2_URL="${C2_URL:-$(envget C2_URL)}"; C2_URL="${C2_URL%/}"
+  NODE_NAME="${NODE_NAME:-$(envget NODE_NAME)}"
+  NODE_LAT="${NODE_LAT:-$(envget NODE_LAT)}"
+  NODE_LON="${NODE_LON:-$(envget NODE_LON)}"
+  DASHBOARD_USER="$(envget DASHBOARD_USERNAME)"
+  [ -n "$NODE_ID" ] || die ".env exists but has no NODE_ID — fix or delete it"
+else
+  [ -n "$NODE_ID" ] || ask NODE_ID "Node ID (e.g. node-003)"
+  [[ "$NODE_ID" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$ ]] || die "NODE_ID must be letters/numbers/dash/underscore only"
+  [ -n "$NODE_NAME" ] || ask NODE_NAME "Display name" "$NODE_ID"
+  [ -n "$NODE_LAT" ]  || ask NODE_LAT  "Latitude"  "0.0"
+  [ -n "$NODE_LON" ]  || ask NODE_LON  "Longitude" "0.0"
+  [ -n "$C2_URL" ]    || ask C2_URL    "C2 API base URL (https://api.<domain>)"
+  C2_URL="${C2_URL%/}"
+  [ -n "$MQTT_BROKER" ] || ask MQTT_BROKER "MQTT broker host (mqtt.<domain>)"
+
+  if [ -z "$DASHBOARD_PASS" ]; then
+    ask_secret DASHBOARD_PASS "Local dashboard password (Enter to generate)"
+    [ -n "$DASHBOARD_PASS" ] || { DASHBOARD_PASS="$(genpw)"; GENERATED_DASH=1; }
+  fi
+  ICE_SRC="$(genpw)"; ICE_ADM="$(genpw)"
+
+  umask 077
+  cat > .env <<EOF
+# Written by install.sh on $(date -Is) from ref ${RESOLVED_SHA}
+NODE_ID=${NODE_ID}
+NODE_NAME="${NODE_NAME}"
+NODE_LAT=${NODE_LAT}
+NODE_LON=${NODE_LON}
+
+# MQTT — post-cutover auth. There is NO shared node login: the node
+# authenticates as username=NODE_ID, password=<its C2-issued api_key>, which
+# section 5 below fetches into configs/credentials.json. Deliberately no
+# MQTT_USER/MQTT_PASS here; a dynsec broker rejects them.
+MQTT_BROKER=${MQTT_BROKER}
+MQTT_PORT=${MQTT_PORT}
+MQTT_TLS=${MQTT_TLS}
+
+C2_URL=${C2_URL}
+
+ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD=${ICE_SRC}
+ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${ICE_ADM}
+ICECAST_HOST=localhost
+ICECAST_PORT=8000
+ICECAST_MOUNT=/radio
+
+DASHBOARD_USERNAME=${DASHBOARD_USER}
+DASHBOARD_PASSWORD=${DASHBOARD_PASS}
+
+PULSE_SOURCE=drb_sink.monitor
+OP25_API_URL=http://localhost:8001
+OP25_TERMINAL_URL=http://localhost:8081
+OP25_DEBUG_EXPOSE=false
+
+IMAGE_REGISTRY=${REGISTRY}
+DOCKER_ORG=${DOCKER_ORG}
+DOCKER_REPO=${DOCKER_REPO}
+EOF
+  umask 022
+  chmod 600 .env
+  [ -n "$TARGET_USER" ] && chown "$TARGET_USER" .env 2>/dev/null || true
+  ok ".env written for '$NODE_ID'"
+fi
+
+# ── 5. Enrollment ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Client half of Server/drb-c2-core/app/routers/enrollment.py. It does NOT
+# exist in the edge-node app today (mqtt_manager.py:73-85 says so explicitly),
+# so without this section a fresh node can never obtain an api_key against a
+# dynsec broker: MQTT needs the key, and the legacy key-over-MQTT delivery
+# needs MQTT. Doing it here breaks that loop.
+#
+# Two server endpoints, and the exact response shapes verified against
+# enrollment.py @ v1:
+#
+#   POST /nodes/enroll   (X-Enrollment-Token)
+#     200 -> {node_id, pickup_secret, approval_status}
+#     403 -> node_id is ALREADY APPROVED. The CRITICAL GUARD in enrollment.py
+#            refuses to mint a fresh pickup_secret off the shared fleet token.
+#            So we must only ever POST this for a node we have not enrolled
+#            from this machine before — i.e. when configs/pickup_secret is
+#            absent. Re-running the installer must NOT re-POST here.
+#     401 bad/revoked token · 400 missing node_id · 429 rate limited
+#
+#   GET /nodes/{id}/credentials   (X-Pickup-Secret)
+#     Always HTTP 200 with {approval_status, api_key} unless the secret or
+#     node is bad. api_key is null until an admin approves the node in the UI
+#     (nodes.py approve_node() mints node_keys/{id}.api_key synchronously in
+#     the same call — approve is enough; assigning a system is independent and
+#     NOT required for a key). This endpoint has NO already-approved guard, so
+#     it is the correct — and only working — re-run path after approval.
+#     401 -> missing/invalid/rotated pickup secret
+#     404 -> node unknown to C2 (deleted server-side, or never enrolled)
+CREDS="$INSTALL_DIR/configs/credentials.json"
+PICKUP_FILE="$INSTALL_DIR/configs/pickup_secret"
+
+# GET /nodes/{id}/credentials. Sets CRED_HTTP + CRED_BODY (no -f: we need the
+# body and status on a 4xx). One implementation so first-run and re-run agree.
+creds_pickup() {  # creds_pickup PICKUP_SECRET
+  local _tmp; _tmp="$(mktemp)"
+  CRED_HTTP="$(curl -sS -o "$_tmp" -w '%{http_code}' \
+      "$C2_URL/nodes/$NODE_ID/credentials" -H "X-Pickup-Secret: $1" 2>/dev/null || echo 000)"
+  CRED_BODY="$(cat "$_tmp" 2>/dev/null || true)"
+  rm -f "$_tmp"
+}
+cred_field() { printf '%s' "${CRED_BODY:-}" | jq -r "$1 // empty" 2>/dev/null || true; }
+
+write_creds() {  # write_creds API_KEY
+  umask 077; jq -n --arg k "$1" '{api_key:$k}' > "$CREDS"; umask 022
+  ok "api_key received and written to configs/credentials.json"
+}
+
+say_pending() {  # say_pending APPROVAL_STATUS  — not an error: node is enrolled, key not minted yet
+  warn "not approved yet — C2 reports approval_status=${1:-pending}, no api_key minted."
+  warn "an admin must, at  <app-url>/settings/nodes :  Approve '$NODE_ID'  (assigning a system is separate)."
+  warn "then re-run this installer — it reuses configs/pickup_secret — or fetch it directly:"
+  warn "  curl -fsS $C2_URL/nodes/$NODE_ID/credentials -H \"X-Pickup-Secret: \$(cat $PICKUP_FILE)\" | jq -r .api_key"
+}
+
+# Poll creds_pickup for up to ENROLL_WAIT seconds while still pending. Result
+# left in CRED_HTTP/CRED_BODY. --wait-approval is what would have avoided the
+# original prod bug; the default (0) does not block, so the re-run path below
+# must stand on its own.
+wait_for_key() {  # wait_for_key PICKUP_SECRET
+  [ "${ENROLL_WAIT:-0}" -gt 0 ] || return 0
+  local _end; _end=$(( $(date +%s) + ENROLL_WAIT ))
+  say "Waiting up to ${ENROLL_WAIT}s for an admin to approve '$NODE_ID'"
+  while [ "$(date +%s)" -lt "$_end" ]; do
+    sleep 10
+    creds_pickup "$1"
+    [ "$CRED_HTTP" = 200 ] || return 0
+    [ -z "$(cred_field '.api_key')" ] || return 0
+  done
+}
+
+do_fresh_enroll() {
+  say "Enrolling '$NODE_ID' with $C2_URL"
+  [ -n "$ENROLLMENT_TOKEN" ] || ask_secret ENROLLMENT_TOKEN "Enrollment token"
+  [ -n "$ENROLLMENT_TOKEN" ] || die "no enrollment token — mint one at Settings -> Nodes, then re-run with --token"
+
+  local BODY RESP PICKUP STATUS KEY
+  BODY="$(jq -nc --arg id "$NODE_ID" --arg n "${NODE_NAME:-$NODE_ID}" \
+            --argjson lat "${NODE_LAT:-0}" --argjson lon "${NODE_LON:-0}" \
+            '{node_id:$id,name:$n,lat:$lat,lon:$lon}')"
+  # Token goes in a header from a shell variable — never on a process command
+  # line, never echoed.
+  if ! RESP="$(curl -fsS -X POST "$C2_URL/nodes/enroll" \
+            -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+            -H "X-Enrollment-Token: $ENROLLMENT_TOKEN" \
+            --data "$BODY" 2>&1)"; then
+    case "$RESP" in
+      *403*) die "enroll refused (403): node '$NODE_ID' is already approved on C2, and
+  this machine has no configs/pickup_secret to collect its key with. A token
+  alone cannot re-issue an approved node's key (enrollment.py CRITICAL GUARD).
+  Recover by restoring this node's original configs/pickup_secret and re-running,
+  or have an admin Reissue key (Settings -> Nodes) and write the key into
+  $CREDS by hand (see node-26#6)." ;;
+      *401*) die "enroll refused (401): enrollment token missing/invalid/revoked —
+  mint a fresh one at Settings -> Nodes and re-run with --token." ;;
+      *429*) die "enroll refused (429): rate limited. Wait ~1 minute, then re-run." ;;
+      *)     die "enroll failed: $RESP" ;;
+    esac
+  fi
+  PICKUP="$(printf '%s' "$RESP" | jq -r '.pickup_secret')"
+  STATUS="$(printf '%s' "$RESP" | jq -r '.approval_status')"
+  [ -n "$PICKUP" ] && [ "$PICKUP" != null ] || die "enroll returned no pickup_secret: $RESP"
+
+  umask 077; printf '%s' "$PICKUP" > "$PICKUP_FILE"; umask 022
+  ok "enrolled — approval_status=$STATUS (pickup secret saved to configs/pickup_secret)"
+
+  creds_pickup "$PICKUP"
+  [ "$CRED_HTTP" = 200 ] || die "post-enroll credential fetch failed (HTTP $CRED_HTTP): ${CRED_BODY:-<no body>}"
+  KEY="$(cred_field '.api_key')"
+  if [ -z "$KEY" ]; then
+    wait_for_key "$PICKUP" || true
+    KEY="$(cred_field '.api_key')"
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$KEY" ]; then
+    write_creds "$KEY"
+  else
+    say_pending "$(cred_field '.approval_status')"
+  fi
+}
+
+if [ -s "$CREDS" ] && jq -e '.api_key // empty' "$CREDS" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  say "Enrollment"
+  ok "api_key already on disk — skipping enrollment"
+elif [ -z "${C2_URL:-}" ]; then
+  say "Enrollment"
+  warn "no C2_URL — skipping enrollment"
+elif [ -s "$PICKUP_FILE" ]; then
+  # RE-RUN. This node already enrolled from this machine. Do NOT POST
+  # /nodes/enroll again — an approved node_id gets 403 there, and the v1
+  # installer's own "re-run to pick up the key" advice then dead-ends on
+  # "use Reissue key". The pickup endpoint has no such guard: use it.
+  say "Enrollment — collecting credentials for '$NODE_ID' (pickup secret from a previous run)"
+  PICKUP="$(cat "$PICKUP_FILE")"
+  creds_pickup "$PICKUP"
+  case "$CRED_HTTP" in
+    200)
+      API_KEY="$(cred_field '.api_key')"
+      if [ -z "$API_KEY" ]; then
+        wait_for_key "$PICKUP" || true
+        API_KEY="$(cred_field '.api_key')"
+      fi
+      if [ -n "$API_KEY" ]; then
+        write_creds "$API_KEY"
+      else
+        # Still pending. Enrolled and idempotent — next run collects the key.
+        # Clean exit, fall through to start the stack. NOT a failure.
+        say_pending "$(cred_field '.approval_status')"
+      fi
+      ;;
+    401)
+      if [ -n "$ENROLLMENT_TOKEN" ]; then
+        warn "saved pickup secret rejected (401) — likely rotated by a re-enroll elsewhere. Re-enrolling with --token."
+        rm -f "$PICKUP_FILE"
+        do_fresh_enroll
+      else
+        die "saved pickup secret is stale (401) and no --token was given. Re-run with
+  --token DRB-… to re-enroll (only works while the node is still pending), or
+  have an admin Reissue key for an approved node and write $CREDS by hand."
+      fi
+      ;;
+    404)
+      if [ -n "$ENROLLMENT_TOKEN" ]; then
+        warn "C2 does not know node '$NODE_ID' (404) — deleted server-side or never fully enrolled. Re-enrolling with --token."
+        rm -f "$PICKUP_FILE"
+        do_fresh_enroll
+      else
+        die "C2 does not know node '$NODE_ID' (404) and no --token was given.
+  Re-run with --token DRB-… to enroll it again."
+      fi
+      ;;
+    000)
+      die "could not reach $C2_URL/nodes/$NODE_ID/credentials — check --c2-url and connectivity." ;;
+    *)
+      die "credential pickup failed (HTTP $CRED_HTTP): ${CRED_BODY:-<no body>}" ;;
+  esac
+else
+  say "Enrollment"
+  do_fresh_enroll
+fi
+
+# ── 6. Images + start ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+if [ "$DO_START" = 1 ]; then
+  if [ -n "$REGISTRY_USER" ] && [ -n "$REGISTRY_PASS" ]; then
+    printf '%s' "$REGISTRY_PASS" | docker login "$REGISTRY" -u "$REGISTRY_USER" --password-stdin >/dev/null
+    ok "logged in to $REGISTRY"
+  fi
+
+  if [ "$DO_BUILD" = 1 ]; then
+    say "Building images locally — op25 takes roughly an hour on a Pi"
+    docker compose build
+    docker compose up -d
+  else
+    say "Pulling prebuilt images from $REGISTRY/$DOCKER_ORG/$DOCKER_REPO"
+    if ! docker compose pull; then
+      die "pull failed. $REGISTRY is public, so this is most likely a login
+  requirement or a transient network error: re-run with DRB_REGISTRY_USER /
+  DRB_REGISTRY_PASS set, or with --build to compile on the Pi (~1h for op25)."
+    fi
+    docker compose up --no-build -d
+  fi
+  ok "stack started"
+else
+  say "Skipping start (--no-start). Run: cd $INSTALL_DIR && make up-prebuilt"
+fi
+
+# ── 7. What the operator does next ──────────────────────────────────────────
+IP="$(hostname -I 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}')"
+cat <<EOF
+
+$(printf "${G}Node '%s' installed at %s${N}" "$NODE_ID" "$INSTALL_DIR")
+
+  ref            ${RESOLVED_SHA}
+  images         $([ "$DO_BUILD" = 1 ] && echo "built locally" || echo "pulled from $REGISTRY")
+  dashboard      http://${IP:-<node-ip>}/    (user: ${DASHBOARD_USER})
+  logs           cd $INSTALL_DIR && docker compose logs -f edge-node
+
+NEXT — an admin must approve this node before it can do anything:
+
+  1. Open  <app-url>/settings/nodes
+  2. Approve  "$NODE_ID"
+  3. Assign it a radio system
+
+EOF
+if [ "${GENERATED_DASH:-0}" = 1 ]; then
+  printf "${Y}Generated dashboard password (shown once): %s${N}\n\n" "$DASHBOARD_PASS"
+fi
+if [ ! -s "$CREDS" ]; then
+  if [ -s "$PICKUP_FILE" ]; then
+    printf "${Y}This node has no api_key yet. After an admin approves it, re-run the same\ninstall command — it reuses configs/pickup_secret and will collect the key\n(no --token needed for the re-run).${N}\n\n"
+  else
+    printf "${Y}This node has no api_key and no saved pickup secret, so a plain re-run cannot\nfix it. Re-run with --token DRB-… to enroll; or, if the node is already\napproved, have an admin Reissue key and write it into\n%s by hand.${N}\n\n" "$CREDS"
+  fi
+fi

op25-container/.gitea/workflows/build-nightly.yml

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-name: release-tag
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - dev
-
-jobs:
-  release-image:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    env:
-      DOCKER_LATEST: stable
-      CONTAINER_NAME: drb-client-discord-bot
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-
-      - name: Set up QEMU
-        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
-
-      - name: Set up Docker BuildX
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
-        with: # replace it with your local IP
-          config-inline: |
-            [registry."git.vpn.cusano.net"] 
-              http = false
-              insecure = false            
-
-      - name: Login to DockerHub
-        uses: docker/login-action@v3
-        with:
-          registry: git.vpn.cusano.net # replace it with your local IP
-          username: ${{ secrets.GIT_REPO_USERNAME }}
-          password: ${{ secrets.GIT_REPO_PASSWORD }}
-          
-      - name: Get Meta
-        id: meta
-        run: |
-          echo REPO_NAME=$(echo ${GITHUB_REPOSITORY} | awk -F"/" '{print $2}') >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          echo REPO_VERSION=$(git describe --tags --always | sed 's/^v//') >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT                
-
-      - name: Validate build configuration
-        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
-        with:
-          call: check
-
-      - name: Build and push
-        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
-        with:
-          context: .
-          file: ./Dockerfile
-          platforms: |
-            linux/arm64
-          push: true
-          tags: | # replace it with your local IP and tags
-            git.vpn.cusano.net/${{ vars.DOCKER_ORG }}/${{ steps.meta.outputs.REPO_NAME }}/${{ env.CONTAINER_NAME }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.REPO_VERSION }}
-            git.vpn.cusano.net/${{ vars.DOCKER_ORG }}/${{ steps.meta.outputs.REPO_NAME }}/${{ env.CONTAINER_NAME }}:${{ env.DOCKER_LATEST }}

op25-container/.gitea/workflows/build-stable.yml

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-name: release-tag
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - master
-
-jobs:
-  release-image:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    permissions:
-      contents: read
-      packages: write
-    env:
-      DOCKER_LATEST: stable
-      CONTAINER_NAME: op25-client
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@v5
-
-      - name: Set up QEMU
-        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
-
-      - name: Set up Docker BuildX
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
-        with:
-          config-inline: |
-            [registry."git.vpn.cusano.net"] 
-              http = false
-              insecure = false          
-
-      - name: Login to Gitea Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@v3
-        with:
-          registry: git.vpn.cusano.net
-          username: ${{ gitea.actor }} # Uses the user or bot that triggered the workflow
-          password: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_COM_TOKEN }} # The built-in, temporary token
-          
-      - name: Get Meta
-        id: meta
-        run: |
-          echo REPO_NAME=$(echo ${GITHUB_REPOSITORY} | awk -F"/" '{print $2}') >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          echo REPO_VERSION=$(git describe --tags --always | sed 's/^v//') >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT        
-
-      - name: Validate build configuration
-        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
-        with:
-          call: check
-
-      - name: Build and push
-        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
-        with:
-          context: .
-          file: ./Dockerfile
-          platforms: |
-            linux/arm64
-          push: true
-          tags: |
-            git.vpn.cusano.net/${{ vars.DOCKER_ORG }}/${{ steps.meta.outputs.REPO_NAME }}/${{ env.CONTAINER_NAME }}:${{ steps.meta.outputs.REPO_VERSION }}
-            git.vpn.cusano.net/${{ vars.DOCKER_ORG }}/${{ steps.meta.outputs.REPO_NAME }}/${{ env.CONTAINER_NAME }}:${{ env.DOCKER_LATEST }}

op25-container/.gitea/workflows/lint.yml

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-name: Lint
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - master
-  pull_request:
-    branches:
-      - "*"
-
-jobs:
-  lint:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-
-    steps:
-    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-
-    - name: Set up Python
-      uses: actions/setup-python@v5
-      with:
-        python-version: '3.13'
-
-    - name: Install dependencies
-      run: |
-        python -m pip install --upgrade pip
-        pip install flake8
-
-    - name: Run Lint
-      run: |
-        flake8 --max-line-length=88 --ignore=E203,E302,E501 .

op25-container/Dockerfile

@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 # OP25 Core Container
-FROM python:slim-trixie
+# Pinned to a Python major version deliberately. The bare `slim-trixie` tag
+# carries no version at all, so a rebuild could move the interpreter across a
+# major release -- which this repo has already been bitten by once, when
+# app/models.py only ran because trixie happened to ship 3.14 and PEP 649
+# defers annotation evaluation. Matches drb-edge-node, which is already 3.14.
+FROM python:3.14-slim
 
 # Set environment variables
 ENV DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
@@ -50,5 +55,8 @@ RUN sed -i 's/\r$//' /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh && \
 # 2. Update ENTRYPOINT to use the wrapper script
 ENTRYPOINT ["/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh"]
 
-# 3. Use CMD to pass the uvicorn command as arguments to the ENTRYPOINT script
+# 3. Use CMD to pass the launch command as arguments to the ENTRYPOINT script.
-CMD ["uvicorn", "main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8001", "--reload"]
+# main.py starts uvicorn itself (see `if __name__ == "__main__"`) so the bind
+# address can be driven by OP25_DEBUG_EXPOSE at runtime instead of being baked
+# into this image at build time.
+CMD ["python", "main.py"]

op25-container/app/config.py

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings
+
+
+class Settings(BaseSettings):
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    # OP25_DEBUG_EXPOSE — debugging aid, NOT a deployment mode.
+    #
+    # False (default): the op25 FastAPI control API (:8001, start/stop/
+    # generate-config) and OP25's own HTTP terminal (:8081, live talkgroup
+    # metadata) both bind 127.0.0.1. All three Client containers share the
+    # host network namespace (network_mode: host), so edge-node still reaches
+    # both over localhost with no functional change — nothing off-box can.
+    # Neither surface has authentication, so this is the only thing closing
+    # that hole.
+    #
+    # True: both bind 0.0.0.0 — reachable by anything on the node's LAN with
+    # NO authentication (start/stop OP25, rewrite its config, raw terminal
+    # access). Only ever set this for local development off a real deployed
+    # node. A loud warning naming both ports is logged at startup whenever
+    # this is true.
+    # ------------------------------------------------------------------
+    op25_debug_expose: bool = False
+
+    class Config:
+        env_file = ".env"
+
+
+settings = Settings()
+
+
+def bind_host() -> str:
+    """Resolve the single bind address for both :8001 and :8081 from the flag."""
+    return "0.0.0.0" if settings.op25_debug_expose else "127.0.0.1"

op25-container/app/main.py

@@ -5,18 +5,26 @@ import routers.op25_controller as op25_controller
 from internal.logger import create_logger
 from internal.liquidsoap_config_utils import generate_liquid_script
 from models import IcecastConfig
+from config import settings, bind_host
 
 LOGGER = create_logger(__name__)
 
 
 @asynccontextmanager
 async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
+    if settings.op25_debug_expose:
+        LOGGER.warning(
+            "OP25_DEBUG_EXPOSE=true — the op25 control API (:8001) and OP25's "
+            "HTTP terminal (:8081) are bound to 0.0.0.0 and reachable by "
+            "ANYTHING on this node's LAN with NO authentication. This is a "
+            "debugging aid only; do not leave it set on a deployed node."
+        )
     try:
         config = IcecastConfig(
             icecast_host=os.getenv("ICECAST_HOST", "localhost"),
             icecast_port=int(os.getenv("ICECAST_PORT", "8000")),
             icecast_mountpoint=os.getenv("ICECAST_MOUNT", "/radio"),
-            icecast_password=os.getenv("ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD", "hackme"),
+            icecast_password=os.getenv("ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD", ""),
         )
         generate_liquid_script(config)
         LOGGER.info("op25.liq generated from environment variables.")
@@ -28,3 +36,12 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
 app = FastAPI(lifespan=lifespan)
 
 app.include_router(op25_controller.create_op25_router(), prefix="/op25")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    # Launched directly (see Dockerfile CMD) instead of via `uvicorn main:app
+    # --host ...` so the bind address is driven by OP25_DEBUG_EXPOSE (config.py)
+    # rather than a value baked into the image at build time.
+    import uvicorn
+
+    uvicorn.run("main:app", host=bind_host(), port=8001, reload=True)

op25-container/app/models.py

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 from pydantic import BaseModel
 from typing import List, Optional, Union
 from enum import Enum
+from config import bind_host
 
 # Preset device settings for common RTL-SDR hardware.
 # gains: OP25 gain string passed to the device block.
@@ -34,6 +35,20 @@ class TalkgroupTag(BaseModel):
     talkgroup: str
     tagDec: int
 
+# Defined before ConfigGenerator, which annotates a field with it. Under
+# Python 3.14 (PEP 649) annotations are evaluated lazily, so the original
+# order happened to work in the container; on 3.13 or earlier it is a hard
+# NameError at import. Keep the definition above its first use so this file
+# does not depend on the base image's Python version.
+class IcecastConfig(BaseModel):
+    icecast_host: str
+    icecast_port: int
+    icecast_mountpoint: str
+    icecast_password: str
+    icecast_description: Optional[str] = "OP25"
+    icecast_genre: Optional[str] = "Public Safety"
+
+
 class ConfigGenerator(BaseModel):
     type: DecodeMode
     systemName: str
@@ -115,7 +130,9 @@ class MetadataConfig(BaseModel):
 
 class TerminalConfig(BaseModel):
     module: Optional[str] = "terminal.py"
-    terminal_type: Optional[str] = "http:0.0.0.0:8081"
+    # Bind address comes from OP25_DEBUG_EXPOSE (config.py) — 127.0.0.1 unless
+    # that flag is set. See config.py for why.
+    terminal_type: Optional[str] = f"http:{bind_host()}:8081"
     terminal_timeout: Optional[float] = 5.0
     curses_plot_interval: Optional[float] = 0.2
     http_plot_interval: Optional[float] = 1.0
@@ -127,10 +144,4 @@ class TerminalConfig(BaseModel):
 
 ### ======================================================
 # Icecast models
-class IcecastConfig(BaseModel):
+# (IcecastConfig itself is defined above ConfigGenerator, which references it.)
-    icecast_host: str
-    icecast_port: int
-    icecast_mountpoint: str
-    icecast_password: str
-    icecast_description: Optional[str] = "OP25"
-    icecast_genre: Optional[str] = "Public Safety"

op25-container/requirements.txt

@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 uvicorn
 fastapi
+pydantic-settings

setup.sh

@@ -1,148 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Interactive first-time setup for a DRB edge node.
-# Installs system dependencies (Docker, make, curl) then writes .env
-# and optionally builds + starts the stack.
-set -e
-
-GREEN='\033[0;32m'; YELLOW='\033[1;33m'; CYAN='\033[0;36m'; RED='\033[0;31m'; NC='\033[0m'
-cd "$(dirname "$0")"
-
-echo -e "${CYAN}DRB Edge Node Setup${NC}"
-echo "-------------------"
-
-# ── Dependency installation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
-install_deps() {
-  if ! command -v apt-get &>/dev/null; then
-    echo -e "${YELLOW}⚠  apt-get not found — skipping auto-install. Ensure docker, make, and curl are installed.${NC}"
-    return
-  fi
-
-  echo ""
-  echo -e "${CYAN}Installing system dependencies…${NC}"
-  sudo apt-get update -qq
-
-  local pkgs=()
-  command -v make &>/dev/null  || pkgs+=(make)
-  command -v curl &>/dev/null  || pkgs+=(curl)
-  command -v git  &>/dev/null  || pkgs+=(git)
-
-  if [ ${#pkgs[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
-    echo "  Installing: ${pkgs[*]}"
-    sudo apt-get install -y -qq "${pkgs[@]}"
-  fi
-
-  # Docker — use get.docker.com if not present
-  if ! command -v docker &>/dev/null; then
-    echo "  Installing Docker via get.docker.com…"
-    curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sudo sh
-    # Allow current user to run docker without sudo
-    sudo usermod -aG docker "$USER"
-    echo -e "${YELLOW}  ⚠  Docker group added. You may need to log out and back in for it to take effect.${NC}"
-    echo -e "${YELLOW}     If 'docker compose' fails below, run: newgrp docker${NC}"
-  else
-    echo -e "${GREEN}  ✓ docker$(docker --version | grep -oP ' \d+\.\d+\.\d+' | head -1)${NC}"
-  fi
-
-  # Docker Compose plugin check (comes with Docker Engine ≥ 20.10)
-  if ! docker compose version &>/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    echo -e "${RED}  docker compose plugin not found. Installing…${NC}"
-    sudo apt-get install -y -qq docker-compose-plugin
-  else
-    echo -e "${GREEN}  ✓ docker compose $(docker compose version --short 2>/dev/null || true)${NC}"
-  fi
-
-  echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Dependencies ready${NC}"
-}
-
-install_deps
-
-if [ -f .env ]; then
-  echo -e "${YELLOW}Warning: .env already exists.${NC}"
-  read -rp "Overwrite? [y/N] " yn
-  [[ "$yn" =~ ^[Yy]$ ]] || { echo "Aborted."; exit 0; }
-fi
-
-# --- Node identity ---
-echo ""
-echo "Unique node ID — no spaces (e.g. node-ossining, node-002)"
-read -rp "NODE_ID: " NODE_ID
-while [[ ! "$NODE_ID" =~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$ ]]; do
-  echo "  Use letters, numbers, dashes, underscores only."
-  read -rp "NODE_ID: " NODE_ID
-done
-
-echo ""
-read -rp "Node display name [$NODE_ID]: " NODE_NAME
-NODE_NAME="${NODE_NAME:-$NODE_ID}"
-
-# --- GPS ---
-echo ""
-echo "GPS coordinates (decimal degrees — used for the map)"
-read -rp "Latitude  [0.0]: " NODE_LAT; NODE_LAT="${NODE_LAT:-0.0}"
-read -rp "Longitude [0.0]: " NODE_LON; NODE_LON="${NODE_LON:-0.0}"
-
-# --- C2 server ---
-echo ""
-echo "C2 server — hostname or IP of the machine running the server stack"
-read -rp "C2 server host: " C2_HOST; C2_HOST="${C2_HOST:-localhost}"
-read -rp "C2 API port [8888]: " C2_PORT; C2_PORT="${C2_PORT:-8888}"
-
-# --- MQTT ---
-echo ""
-echo "MQTT credentials (must match MQTT_NODE_USER/PASS in the server .env)"
-read -rp "MQTT port [1883]: " MQTT_PORT; MQTT_PORT="${MQTT_PORT:-1883}"
-read -rp "MQTT username [drb-node]: " MQTT_USER; MQTT_USER="${MQTT_USER:-drb-node}"
-read -rsp "MQTT password: " MQTT_PASS; echo ""; MQTT_PASS="${MQTT_PASS:-change-me-node}"
-
-# --- Icecast ---
-echo ""
-echo "Icecast passwords (local container)"
-read -rsp "Source password [hackme]: " ICECAST_SOURCE; echo ""; ICECAST_SOURCE="${ICECAST_SOURCE:-hackme}"
-read -rsp "Admin password [admin]: "  ICECAST_ADMIN;  echo ""; ICECAST_ADMIN="${ICECAST_ADMIN:-admin}"
-
-# --- Write .env ---
-cat > .env <<EOF
-# Node Identity
-NODE_ID=${NODE_ID}
-NODE_NAME="${NODE_NAME}"
-NODE_LAT=${NODE_LAT}
-NODE_LON=${NODE_LON}
-
-# MQTT — point to your C2 server
-MQTT_BROKER=${C2_HOST}
-MQTT_PORT=${MQTT_PORT}
-MQTT_USER=${MQTT_USER}
-MQTT_PASS=${MQTT_PASS}
-
-# C2 server for audio upload
-C2_URL=http://${C2_HOST}:${C2_PORT}
-# API key is provisioned automatically via MQTT after admin approves the node
-
-# Icecast (local container — usually no need to change)
-ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD=${ICECAST_SOURCE}
-ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${ICECAST_ADMIN}
-ICECAST_HOST=localhost
-ICECAST_PORT=8000
-ICECAST_MOUNT=/radio
-
-# OP25 container (usually no need to change)
-OP25_API_URL=http://localhost:8001
-OP25_TERMINAL_URL=http://localhost:8081
-EOF
-
-echo ""
-echo -e "${GREEN}✓ .env written for node '${NODE_ID}'${NC}"
-echo ""
-
-read -rp "Build and start now? [Y/n] " start
-if [[ ! "$start" =~ ^[Nn]$ ]]; then
-  echo ""
-  echo "Building images (op25 takes ~10 min on first run)…"
-  docker compose build
-  docker compose up -d
-  echo ""
-  echo -e "${GREEN}✓ Node '${NODE_ID}' started.${NC}"
-  echo "   → Check the dashboard — it will appear as pending approval."
-else
-  echo "Run 'make up' when ready."
-fi