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Logan Cusano e6aab7589a
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Stop shipping "hackme" as the Icecast password
The source password had a `hackme` fallback in five places -- entrypoint.sh,
docker-compose.yml, setup.sh's prompt default, .env.example, edge-node's
config.py -- plus op25-container's os.getenv default and two README rows. Any
node whose operator pressed Enter through setup.sh is running a credential
that is written down in this repo.

That matters more than the usual default-password case because Icecast binds
all interfaces and the SOURCE password is write access: it does not just let a
LAN neighbour listen, it lets them PUSH audio into the stream the frontend and
mobile clients play as live radio. Injecting fake traffic into a public-safety
feed is the failure worth preventing.

Approach: remove every fallback rather than change them to a better default.
- icecast/entrypoint.sh refuses to start if either password is empty, and says
  how to generate one. This is the single hard gate; everything else is
  defence in depth behind it.
- docker-compose.yml uses ${VAR:?message} so a missing value stops the stack
  at compose time with a readable error instead of becoming an empty string.
- setup.sh GENERATES a random password when the operator presses Enter, via
  openssl rand -base64 24 with a /dev/urandom fallback. Pressing Enter now
  gives you a random password rather than a known one, which is the actual
  behaviour change -- a prompt default nobody types over is not a default, it
  is the value.
- .env.example ships the keys empty with the generation command in a comment,
  and README.md now marks both as required with no default.

Client suite: 185 passed.

Note this does NOT rotate anything already deployed. node-002's .env still has
whatever it was set up with; that is an operational step, tracked in the issue.

Closes logan/node-26#3
2026-08-20 03:12:44 -04:00

128 lines
5.8 KiB
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# Node Identity
NODE_ID=node-001
NODE_NAME="My Radio Node"
NODE_LAT=0.0
NODE_LON=0.0
# MQTT — point to your C2 server
#
# Post-cutover (MQTT-PUBLIC-AUTH-PLAN.md dynsec revision): there is no shared
# node login any more. The node authenticates as username=NODE_ID,
# password=<this node's C2-issued api_key> automatically — nothing to set
# here for that; the api_key is provisioned via MQTT after an admin approves
# the node (see credentials.json) and does not go in this file.
#
# Local/dev, pointed at a plaintext broker on :1883: leave MQTT_TLS unset.
MQTT_BROKER=localhost
MQTT_PORT=1883
MQTT_TLS=false
# Production, pointed at the public broker (real Let's Encrypt cert, default
# CA verification — do not disable it):
# MQTT_BROKER=mqtt.<domain>
# MQTT_PORT=8883
# MQTT_TLS=true
# DEPRECATED / REMOVED post-cutover — the shared "drb-node" login these
# backed no longer exists on the server (dynsec creates only per-node
# clients, keyed by api_key; see Server/drb-c2-core/app/internal/dynsec.py).
# Leave unset for any node pointed at a cut-over broker. Only meaningful as a
# legacy fallback if MQTT_BROKER still points at a pre-cutover broker running
# mosquitto's old password_file auth.
# MQTT_USER=drb-node
# MQTT_PASS=change-me-node
# C2 server for audio upload (leave blank to disable upload)
C2_URL=http://localhost:8888
# API key is provisioned automatically via MQTT after admin approves the node
# Icecast (local container — usually no need to change)
# Live listening only. Call recording and Discord voice use PulseAudio instead.
# REQUIRED, no default — the container refuses to start without them.
# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 24
ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD=
ICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD=
ICECAST_HOST=localhost
ICECAST_PORT=8000
ICECAST_MOUNT=/radio
# PulseAudio capture (usually no need to change)
# Monitor of the drb_sink null sink that Liquidsoap writes into.
PULSE_SOURCE=drb_sink.monitor
# Seconds to wait for the shared PulseAudio socket before giving up and retrying.
PULSE_WAIT_TIMEOUT=30
# --- Call segmentation -------------------------------------------------------
# Recording boundaries come from the AUDIO, not the control channel: a recording
# starts at voice onset and ends after this many seconds of silence actually
# heard in the stream. Transmissions on the same talkgroup separated by less
# than this stay in ONE recording, so back-and-forth traffic is one file.
# Tune from the "measured trailing silence" line logged on every close.
CALL_SILENCE_TIMEOUT=3.0
# dBFS (RMS over one ~46ms chunk) below which audio counts as silence and the
# recording is allowed to close.
#
# This does NOT need calibrating against your radio's noise floor. Between
# transmissions the capture is the monitor of a PulseAudio *null sink*, which
# emits DIGITAL silence: measured on a live node it sits at about -91 dBFS —
# one least-significant bit of a 16-bit sample — while speech averages about
# -18 dBFS. Anything from roughly -70 to -40 behaves identically. Only change
# this if you have replaced the audio path with something that has a real
# analog noise floor.
CALL_SILENCE_THRESHOLD_DB=-50
# DEPRECATED as a primary control. Used ONLY when PulseAudio capture is not
# producing audio, where the old control-channel state machine takes over so
# the node still reports radio activity (with no recordings) while its audio
# path is broken.
CALL_IDLE_TIMEOUT=3
# Seconds of audio kept past a CONTROL-CHANNEL-derived boundary — a talkgroup
# change, or a close in the fallback mode above. Buffered audio lags the
# control channel by ~1.5s (grant-to-speech offset measured 0.84-1.62s), so
# cutting at the exact control-channel timestamp clipped the last words of the
# outgoing call. Does NOT apply to the normal end of a call any more; that
# boundary comes from the audio and needs no pad. Safe to be generous — the
# extra is trimmed off again before upload.
CALL_TAIL_PAD_SECONDS=3.0
# Strip leading/trailing dead air before upload. Recordings deliberately
# over-capture at both ends, and silence costs Whisper spend and makes it
# hallucinate text that was never spoken. Trimming is a sample-offset slice of
# the buffered PCM (no re-encode) and only ever touches the head and tail, with
# a guard margin so no syllable is clipped. Set to false to upload raw audio.
TRIM_SILENCE=true
# dBFS (RMS) below which audio counts as silence when trimming the ends. Kept
# stricter than CALL_SILENCE_THRESHOLD_DB on purpose.
TRIM_SILENCE_THRESHOLD_DB=-40
# Seconds of audio kept either side of detected speech.
TRIM_SILENCE_GUARD_SECONDS=0.25
# OP25 container (usually no need to change)
OP25_API_URL=http://localhost:8001
OP25_TERMINAL_URL=http://localhost:8081
# DEBUGGING AID, NOT A DEPLOYMENT OPTION. Both OP25's control API (:8001) and
# its HTTP terminal (:8081) have NO authentication, so they are bound to
# 127.0.0.1 by default — reachable only from other containers on this same
# host (they share its network namespace), not from the site's LAN. Setting
# this to true rebinds both to 0.0.0.0, exposing unauthenticated OP25
# start/stop/config-rewrite and the raw terminal to anyone on that LAN. Only
# for local development off a real node; leave false everywhere else.
OP25_DEBUG_EXPOSE=false
# --- Local dashboard / API login ---------------------------------------------
# Protects the node's local dashboard (port 80) and JSON API. The node is
# reachable by anyone on whatever site's LAN it's deployed to, so this MUST be
# changed before the node leaves the bench — the default below is flagged at
# every startup in the logs until it's changed.
DASHBOARD_USERNAME=admin
DASHBOARD_PASSWORD=CHANGE-ME-drb-default
# Container registry — set these to pull pre-built images instead of building locally.
# Must match the DOCKER_ORG variable and repo name configured in Gitea.
# Leave blank to always build locally.
IMAGE_REGISTRY=git.vpn.cusano.net
DOCKER_ORG=
DOCKER_REPO=