Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5
87633ab50d
Two unauthenticated surfaces closed on the edge node. Dashboard and API: the local dashboard and every /api/* route were open to anything on the node's LAN. Adds a login page plus session-cookie auth for the browser, and cookie-or-Basic for the API so scripted callers stay possible. Passwords are hashed with stdlib scrypt (no new dependency, this runs on a Pi) and compared in constant time; the salt and session-signing secret persist in credentials.json. Startup warns while the default password is still in place. No non-browser callers of the node API exist today (C2 talks to nodes over MQTT and nodes call C2 outbound), so nothing breaks. Adds python-multipart, which FastAPI's Form() needs for the login POST and which was missing from requirements entirely. MQTT: nodes authenticated with a shared drb-node password, and the broker ACL keyed off %c — the client-supplied client id — so any holder of that one password could claim another node's topic namespace. Nodes now connect as username=<node_id>, password=<their C2-issued api_key>, which mosquitto's dynamic-security plugin checks, with the ACL keyed off the authenticated %u. TLS is gated on MQTT_TLS and uses default CA verification. The old key_request MQTT path stays in place behind TODO(mqtt-cutover) markers as the fallback until the cutover is proven; a node with no api_key on disk logs a clear repeated refusal rather than spinning. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>