Security fixes

auth.py

secrets.compare_digest replaces == for service key comparison (timing-safe)
Added require_service_key — bot-only endpoints (trip/event join/leave)
Added require_service_key_or_admin — node commands/config (bot via service key OR dashboard admin via Firebase)
Added _RateLimiter with three shared instances: trip_chat_limiter (20/5min per user), summarize_limiter (5/10min per incident), bootstrap_limiter (2/hr per system)
nodes.py

send_command and assign_system now require require_service_key_or_admin — the Discord bot can still call them via service key, but regular Firebase users are blocked
tokens.py

add_token, flush_tokens, set_preferred_system, delete_token all require require_admin_token
Token masking changed from token[:10] + "…" + token[-4:] to "•••" + token[-4:]
systems.py

All write endpoints (create, update, delete, ai-flags, ten-codes, vocabulary writes, bootstrap) now require require_admin_token
bootstrap_vocabulary also calls bootstrap_limiter.check(system_id)
incidents.py

POST /incidents/summarize (bulk) now requires require_admin_token
POST /incidents/{id}/summarize now calls summarize_limiter.check(incident_id)
trips.py

join_trip, leave_trip, join_event, leave_event require require_service_key — only the Discord bot can set Discord attendee identity
delete_trip, delete_event require require_service_key_or_admin
trip_chat rate-limited per caller UID, history stripped to user/assistant roles only, user message truncated to 2000 chars, Maps query strings capped at 200 chars
upload.py

Rejects files larger than settings.upload_max_bytes (default 100MB) with 413
storage.py

_safe_audio_filename() derives GCS object name from call_id + allowlisted extension, completely ignoring the client-supplied filename
config.py

Added upload_max_bytes: int = 100 * 1024 * 1024
Both Dockerfiles — python:3.14-slim → python:3.12-slim
This commit is contained in:
Logan
2026-06-21 13:40:08 -04:00
parent f0a0ea508a
commit 18d96193ab
11 changed files with 235 additions and 41 deletions
+73 -1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
import secrets
import time
from collections import defaultdict, deque
from typing import Optional
from fastapi import HTTPException, Security
from fastapi.security import HTTPBearer, HTTPAuthorizationCredentials
@@ -26,7 +29,7 @@ async def require_service_or_firebase_token(
if not credentials:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Missing authorization token")
token = credentials.credentials
if settings.service_key and token == settings.service_key:
if settings.service_key and secrets.compare_digest(token, settings.service_key):
return {"service": True}
try:
return firebase_auth.verify_id_token(token)
@@ -42,3 +45,72 @@ async def require_admin_token(
if not decoded.get("admin"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Admin access required")
return decoded
async def require_service_key(
credentials: Optional[HTTPAuthorizationCredentials] = Security(_bearer),
) -> dict:
"""Accept only the internal service key — used for bot-only endpoints."""
if not credentials:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Missing authorization token")
if not settings.service_key:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Service key not configured")
if not secrets.compare_digest(credentials.credentials, settings.service_key):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Service key required")
return {"service": True}
async def require_service_key_or_admin(
credentials: Optional[HTTPAuthorizationCredentials] = Security(_bearer),
) -> dict:
"""Accept either the internal service key or a Firebase admin token.
Used for endpoints that the Discord bot (service key) and dashboard admins
(Firebase + admin claim) both need to call, but regular Firebase users must not.
"""
if not credentials:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Missing authorization token")
token = credentials.credentials
if settings.service_key and secrets.compare_digest(token, settings.service_key):
return {"service": True}
try:
decoded = firebase_auth.verify_id_token(token)
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid or expired token")
if not decoded.get("admin"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Admin access required")
return decoded
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Simple in-memory sliding-window rate limiter
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Not persistent across restarts; good enough for a single-instance deployment.
# Key format is caller-defined (e.g. "{uid}:{endpoint}").
class _RateLimiter:
def __init__(self, max_calls: int, window_seconds: int):
self.max_calls = max_calls
self.window = window_seconds
self._log: dict[str, deque] = defaultdict(deque)
def check(self, key: str) -> None:
now = time.monotonic()
q = self._log[key]
while q and now - q[0] > self.window:
q.popleft()
if len(q) >= self.max_calls:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=429,
detail="Rate limit exceeded. Please wait before trying again.",
)
q.append(now)
# Shared limiter instances
# trip chat: 20 requests per user per 5 minutes
trip_chat_limiter = _RateLimiter(max_calls=20, window_seconds=300)
# per-incident summarize: 5 per incident per 10 minutes
summarize_limiter = _RateLimiter(max_calls=5, window_seconds=600)
# vocabulary bootstrap: 2 per system per hour
bootstrap_limiter = _RateLimiter(max_calls=2, window_seconds=3600)