Merge branch 'main' into feat/live-ops-wall

drb-c2-core/app/routers/nodes.py

@@ -119,11 +119,36 @@ async def delete_node(node_id: str, _: dict = Depends(require_admin_token)):
 
 @router.post("/{node_id}/reject")
 async def reject_node(node_id: str, _: dict = Depends(require_admin_token)):
+    """Reject = revoke (server-26#195). Before this, reject only flipped
+    ``approval_status``, so an approved-then-rejected node kept its MQTT login
+    (dynsec client), its ``/upload`` key and ``/systems`` read access (both
+    keyed off ``node_keys``).
+
+    Order is fail-closed, the opposite of approve's: the status flips to
+    ``rejected`` FIRST, so even if the broker call fails, ``/upload`` (which
+    now checks approval_status) and ``GET /nodes/{id}/credentials`` already
+    refuse the node, and ``dynsec.reconcile_all()`` will no longer re-create
+    its login on the next c2-core restart (it also deletes rejected nodes'
+    logins there). Then the broker login is deleted, then the key. A dynsec
+    failure returns 502 with node_keys left intact, and the admin retries:
+    every step is idempotent. Re-approving later mints a fresh key, because
+    node_keys is gone; the revoked key is never handed back.
+    """
     node = await fstore.doc_get("nodes", node_id)
     if not node:
         raise HTTPException(404, f"Node '{node_id}' not found.")
     await fstore.doc_update("nodes", node_id, {"approval_status": "rejected"})
-    return {"ok": True}
+    try:
+        await dynsec.delete_node_client(node_id)
+    except dynsec.DynsecError as e:
+        logger.error(f"Reject {node_id!r}: dynsec deleteClient failed, node_keys NOT deleted: {e}")
+        raise HTTPException(
+            502,
+            f"Node marked rejected, but its MQTT login could not be revoked: {e}. Retry reject.",
+        )
+    await fstore.doc_delete("node_keys", node_id)
+    logger.info(f"Reject {node_id!r}: status rejected, MQTT login and API key revoked")
+    return {"ok": True, "revoked": True}
 
 
 @router.post("/{node_id}/command")

drb-c2-core/app/routers/upload.py

@@ -47,6 +47,18 @@ async def upload_call_audio(
             f"(received prefix: {credentials.credentials[:8]}...)"
         )
         raise HTTPException(401, "Invalid node API key")
+    # server-26#195: a valid key is not enough, the node must still be
+    # approved. reject_node() deletes node_keys too, but this closes the
+    # window where that delete failed or was never run (a node rejected before
+    # reject revoked anything). Uncached read: revocation must bite on the
+    # next upload, not after doc_get_cached's 5-minute TTL.
+    node = await fstore.doc_get("nodes", node_id)
+    if not node or node.get("approval_status") != "approved":
+        logger.warning(
+            f"Upload 403: node_id={node_id!r} has a valid key but approval_status="
+            f"{(node or {}).get('approval_status')!r}"
+        )
+        raise HTTPException(403, "Node is not approved")
 
     data = await file.read()
     if not data:
@@ -63,10 +75,10 @@ async def upload_call_audio(
             # org_id is stamped defensively here too (not just in
             # mqtt_handler.py's call_start/call_end): key_doc above proves this
             # node_id is real and authenticated, so resolving org_id from the
-            # node doc here covers a call whose Firestore doc was somehow
-            # never written by call_start (the upload is otherwise the
-            # authoritative record of which node this audio came from).
-            node = await fstore.doc_get_cached("nodes", node_id)
+            # node doc (fetched by the approval gate above) here covers a call
+            # whose Firestore doc was somehow never written by call_start (the
+            # upload is otherwise the authoritative record of which node this
+            # audio came from).
             updates = {"audio_gcs_uri": gcs_uri}
             if node and node.get("org_id"):
                 updates["org_id"] = node["org_id"]