Stamp org_id everywhere and gate every route that leaked across tenants
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The previous commit shipped Firestore rules that reference an org_id claim
nothing issues yet, and an org_id filter nothing writes yet - this is the
commit that makes both real. Backend half of SAAS_PLAN.md B2/B2b/B2c.

Data model: organizations/{org_id} and org_members/{uid} are new
collections (models.py OrganizationRecord/OrgMember). org_id is now an
Optional field on NodeRecord, SystemRecord, CallRecord, IncidentRecord,
AlertRule, and AlertEvent - optional because every existing document
predates it; scripts/backfill_org_id.py (written, not run - it touches
production Firestore and Firebase Auth claims) is what closes that gap
later. plan_id/subscription_status/stripe_* on OrganizationRecord are
deliberately None: no billing or pricing model has been decided, so this is
a seam, not a promise. app/internal/tenancy.py holds FOUNDING_ORG_ID, the
org every pre-tenancy document and every legacy enrollment path resolves
into.

Where org_id comes from, end to end: a customer's node enrolls with a
per-org token (new enrollment_tokens/{token_hash} collection, minted via
POST /org/enrollment-tokens - new routers/org.py) instead of the old
fleet-wide ENROLLMENT_TOKEN, which still works as a fallback that resolves
to FOUNDING_ORG_ID so an already-deployed node's .env doesn't start failing
today. The node's org_id then flows onto every call it produces
(mqtt_handler.py's call_start/call_end, upload.py's /upload handler all
resolve it from the node doc), and onto every incident correlated from
those calls (incident_correlator.py's _create_incident/_create_master_incident).

That last one is the part that isn't just a read filter: _build_context's
`all_active = collection_list("incidents", status="active")` fed every
correlation candidate - fast-path talkgroup match, unit-continuity,
disambiguation - from the entire incidents collection, unscoped. Without
scoping it to the call's own org_id, a call from org A could link into an
incident org B already owns, which is a cross-tenant data merge at
correlation time, not just an over-broad read. Same shape of bug in
alerter.py: rule matching pulled every enabled alert_rule regardless of
org, so org A's keyword rule could fire (and POST org A's Discord webhook)
on org B's radio traffic. Both now resolve org_id from the call doc itself
rather than threading a new parameter through every caller.

Every list/get route gained org scoping via a new resolve_caller_org_id()
helper in internal/auth.py, which handles the three credential shapes those
routes accept (service key, node api_key, Firebase user) uniformly and
returns None (unrestricted) for the service key and platform admins -
preserving today's single-org behaviour exactly while closing the leak for
everyone else: GET /nodes, /systems, /calls, /incidents, /alerts,
/alert-rules. Write routes for nodes/systems (approve, create, delete, etc.)
deliberately stay platform-admin-only for now rather than being loosened to
org-owner/operator - that's a real gap called out in SAAS_PLAN.md 2.4's
"should be" column, but it's a separate authorization redesign the 12-item
build order doesn't actually enumerate, and doing it half-considered here
risked being exactly the "half-applied filter is worse than none" failure
mode the plan warns about. Today's founding org keeps working unchanged;
loosening node/system management to org owners is follow-up work, flagged
rather than guessed at.

Also closed the four spend/access-attack routes SAAS_PLAN.md B2c called out
by file and line: POST /calls/{id}/reprocess is now admin-only (was any
signed-in viewer looping the Whisper+Gemini pipeline for free - DEFERRED.md
had this as a live, independent-of-SaaS exploit) plus a per-call rate
limiter as a second guard; POST /alerts/{id}/acknowledge now checks the
alert's org_id; GET /admin/features moved from require_firebase_token to
require_admin_token; and trips.py's four unauthenticated mutation routes
(create_trip, update_trip_tags, create_event, update_event) are now
restricted to the founding org (or the bot's service key, or a platform
admin) - trips has no org_id of its own and isn't getting one, since
[[trips-feature-intentional]] says it's an internal utility riding along on
this stack, not a tenant-scoped product surface.

New public-but-scoped seam: POST /auth/signup (routers/links.py, alongside
the existing /auth/link* routes) provisions an organizations doc and an
owner org_members doc for a just-created Firebase user, then sets their
org_id/org_role claims - idempotent, so a double-submit doesn't create two
orgs. This is the only route that turns "has a Firebase account" into "can
read anything," which is what the frontend AuthProvider no-claim guard
(next commit) is built around.

Also new: GET/PATCH /org for the organization profile (closes the disabled
"Save changes" button noted in DEFERRED.md - there was no organizations
concept to save into before this), and POST /waitlist (public, source-IP
rate-limited, not coupled to any plan or tier - the commercial model is
still an open decision per SAAS_PLAN.md section 6).

Verified: all touched files py_compile clean; c2-core pytest is 69
passed / 10 failed, matching the documented pre-existing baseline exactly
(DEFERRED.md - mqtt_handler/node_sweeper test-vs-code drift, unrelated to
this change) - no new failures. flake8 --max-line-length=120 shows no new
violations in any touched file (checked each new E501/E221/E30x against
`git diff` to confirm it predates this commit); c2-core has no CI lint gate
regardless (CLAUDE.md - flake8 only runs in Client CI).

No new environment variables. Firestore composite indexes for the queries
this introduces were already shipped in the previous commit
(infra/firestore/firestore.indexes.json).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Logan Cusano
2026-08-18 20:28:37 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 74faa55396
commit a3681ea698
20 changed files with 889 additions and 45 deletions
+88 -1
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
import asyncio
import random
import string
from datetime import datetime, timezone, timedelta
from uuid import uuid4
from fastapi import APIRouter, HTTPException, Depends, Request
from firebase_admin import auth as firebase_auth
from pydantic import BaseModel
from app.internal import firestore as fstore
from app.internal.auth import require_firebase_token, require_service_key
from app.internal.auth import require_firebase_token, require_service_key, get_role
from app.internal.logger import logger
router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth", tags=["auth"])
@@ -129,6 +131,91 @@ async def unlink(decoded: dict = Depends(require_firebase_token)):
return {"ok": True}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Org provisioning — SAAS_PLAN.md B4. The client creates the Firebase user
# first (email/password or Google) and calls this with that user's fresh ID
# token, which carries no org_id/org_role claim yet. This is the only route
# that turns "has a Firebase account" into "can read anything" — see
# infra/firestore/firestore.rules and AuthProvider's no-claim guard.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class SignupBody(BaseModel):
org_name: str
@router.post("/signup")
async def signup(body: SignupBody, decoded: dict = Depends(require_firebase_token)):
"""
Provision a new organization owned by the calling user, or return their
existing one. Idempotent by design: the frontend calls this right after
account creation, and a user who double-submits (or re-runs it after a
refresh) must not end up with two orgs.
"""
uid = decoded["uid"]
existing_org_id = decoded.get("org_id")
if existing_org_id:
org = await fstore.doc_get("organizations", existing_org_id)
if org:
return {"org_id": existing_org_id, "org_name": org.get("name"), "already_provisioned": True}
# Claim points at a deleted/missing org doc — fall through and
# provision a fresh one rather than leaving the account stranded.
org_name = body.org_name.strip()
if not org_name:
raise HTTPException(400, "org_name is required.")
if len(org_name) > 200:
raise HTTPException(400, "org_name is too long.")
org_id = str(uuid4())
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
# plan_id/subscription_status/stripe_*/seat_limit/node_limit/retention_days
# are all deliberately None — no billing model exists yet (see
# app/internal/tenancy.py). This is the seam a future billing pass writes
# into; nothing today reads or enforces these fields.
await fstore.doc_set("organizations", org_id, {
"org_id": org_id,
"name": org_name,
"created_at": now,
"created_by_uid": uid,
"plan_id": None,
"subscription_status": None,
"stripe_customer_id": None,
"stripe_subscription_id": None,
"current_period_end": None,
"seat_limit": None,
"node_limit": None,
"retention_days": None,
}, merge=False)
await fstore.doc_set("org_members", uid, {
"uid": uid,
"org_id": org_id,
"org_role": "owner",
"email": decoded.get("email"),
"added_at": now,
}, merge=False)
# set_custom_user_claims() replaces the whole claim set, so preserve any
# existing custom claims (owned_node_ids, a platform `role` if this
# account was created via the admin-only POST /admin/users flow, etc.)
# rather than clobbering them. Firebase's own reserved JWT fields are
# stripped out — they aren't settable as custom claims and would raise.
_RESERVED = {
"iss", "aud", "auth_time", "user_id", "sub", "iat", "exp", "uid",
"email", "email_verified", "firebase", "name", "picture",
}
existing_claims = {k: v for k, v in decoded.items() if k not in _RESERVED}
# role: platform-level, orthogonal to org ownership. get_role() falls
# back to "viewer" for a brand-new self-serve signup with no claims yet.
claims = {**existing_claims, "org_id": org_id, "org_role": "owner", "role": get_role(decoded)}
await asyncio.to_thread(firebase_auth.set_custom_user_claims, uid, claims)
logger.info(f"Org provisioned: org_id={org_id} name={org_name!r} owner_uid={uid}")
return {"org_id": org_id, "org_name": org_name, "already_provisioned": False}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Session recording — called by the frontend on each successful sign-in
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------