The Archive page's GET /calls/search failed its CORS preflight (OPTIONS -> 405, no Access-Control-* headers). Allow the app origin(s) explicitly for the standard methods and the authorization/content-type headers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tbknwttzou4s46PAykmtix
Board minutes #62 Decision 2 (server-26#64), due 2026-08-31. CTO draft #60
finding 1 and CISO draft #61 finding 3 reached this independently.
GET/PUT /admin/features accepted only a Firebase admin token, so the unattended
runbook had no headless path and SSHed into the c2-core container to write
config/ai_features with the admin SDK. Moving a platform-wide AI cost switch
required a full container shell, and set_flags() wrote no audit entry either
way, so a flag flip was unattributable however it happened.
- New agent_service_key (AGENT_SERVICE_KEY), deliberately separate from the
Discord bot's service_key. Sharing one key would collapse two principals into
a single unattributable identity in every log line, and the bot has no
business flipping AI flags regardless.
- require_agent_key_or_admin accepts the agent key or a Firebase admin, and
rejects the Discord key. The "key is configured" guard is load-bearing:
compare_digest("", "") is a match, so a deployment that never set the key
would otherwise accept an empty credential.
- set_flags() writes an audit_log entry with before/after values and the actor,
wrapped so an audit failure cannot lose the flag write or 500 the route.
- Cascade helper sets the global doc and every system carrying an ai_flags
override in one call. A global False already beats everything, but a system
False beats a global True, so turning AI *on* could half-apply and leave a
radio system hot after shutoff. It scans for the override rather than
hardcoding the two known system IDs, so a new system cannot silently defeat
it.
- cascade defaults to False. PUT /systems/{id}/ai-flags and the AiFlagsPanel
toggle mean a per-system override is deliberate operator intent; cascading by
default would erase it on any unrelated global flip. The runbook opts in.
Issue items 5 and 6 (retiring the SSH path from drb-worksession.md) are NOT
done here and the runbook is untouched. The credential does not exist in
production yet, so the SSH path is still the only one that works; retiring it
now would break the next unattended run. Owner activation is recorded on #64.
Tests 273 -> 289.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Edge nodes are deployed to arbitrary locations by arbitrary people, so the
broker has to be reachable from the internet and secured on its own merits
rather than by a VPN.
Three defects made that impossible. The broker only had a plaintext 1883
listener; every node shared one drb-node password; and the ACL pattern used
%c, the client-supplied client id, so any holder of that shared password
could set client_id to another node and take over its namespace. The comment
claiming this cryptographically prevented cross-node access was wrong and is
gone.
Authentication now uses mosquitto 2.x's built-in dynamic-security plugin on
the stock eclipse-mosquitto image. c2-core administers it over the control
topic, creating each node's client on approval with username=<node_id> and
password=<its node_keys api_key>, attached to a role whose ACL is nodes/%u/#
against the authenticated username. One credential, one revocation point.
An HTTP-callback plugin was implemented first and rejected: that project is
archived upstream, which is not an acceptable dependency on an
internet-facing broker.
Because dynsec state is a second source of truth alongside Firestore,
approve/reissue/delete now write to the broker first and surface a 502
rather than drifting, and c2-core reconciles every approved node into dynsec
on startup.
Adds node self-enrollment (POST /nodes/enroll, GET /nodes/{id}/credentials)
so a new node can obtain its key over HTTPS without an operator handling
secrets by hand. Enrolling an already-approved node_id is refused on the
fleet token alone — otherwise a leaked token plus a guessable id would let
an attacker steal a live node's key before the real node asked for it.
Pickup secrets are stored hashed and returned once, and the endpoint is rate
limited per source IP.
Infrastructure: an 8883 TLS listener fed by Caddy's certificate via a
systemd path unit, a firewall rule for it, and Caddy now 404s /internal/*
so the api vhost cannot proxy internal routes.
Also fixes CORS, which allowed https://app.<domain> while the frontend is
served on the bare domain — every call from the portal would have failed —
and widens the vault gitignore to a glob, since ansible-vault leaves
backup siblings that the exact-name rule left committable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The package consistently throws 'L.GridLayer.GoogleMutant is not a constructor'
due to L-instance conflicts in the webpack bundle, despite multiple workaround
attempts. Removed package, transpilePackages entry, type stub, env var, and all
related component code. Traffic overlay dropped; geocoding (backend) unaffected.
Logan CusanoandClaude Sonnet 5