1a563c995c7535914e54c5a5f28f9c612f947acd
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5
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a3681ea698 |
Stamp org_id everywhere and gate every route that leaked across tenants
The previous commit shipped Firestore rules that reference an org_id claim
nothing issues yet, and an org_id filter nothing writes yet - this is the
commit that makes both real. Backend half of SAAS_PLAN.md B2/B2b/B2c.
Data model: organizations/{org_id} and org_members/{uid} are new
collections (models.py OrganizationRecord/OrgMember). org_id is now an
Optional field on NodeRecord, SystemRecord, CallRecord, IncidentRecord,
AlertRule, and AlertEvent - optional because every existing document
predates it; scripts/backfill_org_id.py (written, not run - it touches
production Firestore and Firebase Auth claims) is what closes that gap
later. plan_id/subscription_status/stripe_* on OrganizationRecord are
deliberately None: no billing or pricing model has been decided, so this is
a seam, not a promise. app/internal/tenancy.py holds FOUNDING_ORG_ID, the
org every pre-tenancy document and every legacy enrollment path resolves
into.
Where org_id comes from, end to end: a customer's node enrolls with a
per-org token (new enrollment_tokens/{token_hash} collection, minted via
POST /org/enrollment-tokens - new routers/org.py) instead of the old
fleet-wide ENROLLMENT_TOKEN, which still works as a fallback that resolves
to FOUNDING_ORG_ID so an already-deployed node's .env doesn't start failing
today. The node's org_id then flows onto every call it produces
(mqtt_handler.py's call_start/call_end, upload.py's /upload handler all
resolve it from the node doc), and onto every incident correlated from
those calls (incident_correlator.py's _create_incident/_create_master_incident).
That last one is the part that isn't just a read filter: _build_context's
`all_active = collection_list("incidents", status="active")` fed every
correlation candidate - fast-path talkgroup match, unit-continuity,
disambiguation - from the entire incidents collection, unscoped. Without
scoping it to the call's own org_id, a call from org A could link into an
incident org B already owns, which is a cross-tenant data merge at
correlation time, not just an over-broad read. Same shape of bug in
alerter.py: rule matching pulled every enabled alert_rule regardless of
org, so org A's keyword rule could fire (and POST org A's Discord webhook)
on org B's radio traffic. Both now resolve org_id from the call doc itself
rather than threading a new parameter through every caller.
Every list/get route gained org scoping via a new resolve_caller_org_id()
helper in internal/auth.py, which handles the three credential shapes those
routes accept (service key, node api_key, Firebase user) uniformly and
returns None (unrestricted) for the service key and platform admins -
preserving today's single-org behaviour exactly while closing the leak for
everyone else: GET /nodes, /systems, /calls, /incidents, /alerts,
/alert-rules. Write routes for nodes/systems (approve, create, delete, etc.)
deliberately stay platform-admin-only for now rather than being loosened to
org-owner/operator - that's a real gap called out in SAAS_PLAN.md 2.4's
"should be" column, but it's a separate authorization redesign the 12-item
build order doesn't actually enumerate, and doing it half-considered here
risked being exactly the "half-applied filter is worse than none" failure
mode the plan warns about. Today's founding org keeps working unchanged;
loosening node/system management to org owners is follow-up work, flagged
rather than guessed at.
Also closed the four spend/access-attack routes SAAS_PLAN.md B2c called out
by file and line: POST /calls/{id}/reprocess is now admin-only (was any
signed-in viewer looping the Whisper+Gemini pipeline for free - DEFERRED.md
had this as a live, independent-of-SaaS exploit) plus a per-call rate
limiter as a second guard; POST /alerts/{id}/acknowledge now checks the
alert's org_id; GET /admin/features moved from require_firebase_token to
require_admin_token; and trips.py's four unauthenticated mutation routes
(create_trip, update_trip_tags, create_event, update_event) are now
restricted to the founding org (or the bot's service key, or a platform
admin) - trips has no org_id of its own and isn't getting one, since
[[trips-feature-intentional]] says it's an internal utility riding along on
this stack, not a tenant-scoped product surface.
New public-but-scoped seam: POST /auth/signup (routers/links.py, alongside
the existing /auth/link* routes) provisions an organizations doc and an
owner org_members doc for a just-created Firebase user, then sets their
org_id/org_role claims - idempotent, so a double-submit doesn't create two
orgs. This is the only route that turns "has a Firebase account" into "can
read anything," which is what the frontend AuthProvider no-claim guard
(next commit) is built around.
Also new: GET/PATCH /org for the organization profile (closes the disabled
"Save changes" button noted in DEFERRED.md - there was no organizations
concept to save into before this), and POST /waitlist (public, source-IP
rate-limited, not coupled to any plan or tier - the commercial model is
still an open decision per SAAS_PLAN.md section 6).
Verified: all touched files py_compile clean; c2-core pytest is 69
passed / 10 failed, matching the documented pre-existing baseline exactly
(DEFERRED.md - mqtt_handler/node_sweeper test-vs-code drift, unrelated to
this change) - no new failures. flake8 --max-line-length=120 shows no new
violations in any touched file (checked each new E501/E221/E30x against
`git diff` to confirm it predates this commit); c2-core has no CI lint gate
regardless (CLAUDE.md - flake8 only runs in Client CI).
No new environment variables. Firestore composite indexes for the queries
this introduces were already shipped in the previous commit
(infra/firestore/firestore.indexes.json).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5
|
a195563da6 |
Let edge nodes read /systems with their own api_key
The node builds its OP25 config from GET /systems, but that router only accepted a Firebase token or the shared service key — a node holds neither. Every fetch returned 401 and the node fell back to its stale offline cache, so a system edited in the UI never reached the field. Confirmed on node-002 against the live server: "Failed to fetch systems from C2: 401 Unauthorized ... Offline cache will be used." The node sends no node_id with the request, only the bearer token, so the key is matched by querying node_keys for the value instead of fetching a known document the way /upload does. Read access only: the mutating routes in this router each carry their own require_admin_token, so widening the router-level gate doesn't let a node create, edit or delete a system. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
Logan
|
1f17b6c0d2 |
feat: add role-based user management, audit log, and session tracking
Introduces a full user management system with three roles (admin, operator,
viewer), an audit log, and per-session login history.
Backend:
- app/internal/audit.py: write_audit() helper → audit_log Firestore collection
- app/internal/auth.py: get_role() helper; require_admin_token accepts both
legacy admin:true claim and new role:"admin" claim for backward compat
- app/routers/users.py: CRUD under /admin/users — list, create (returns
one-time invite link), get (with sessions), patch role/nodes/name,
disable, enable, delete; operator role requires ≥1 owned node
- app/routers/links.py: POST /auth/session records sign-in events to
user_sessions Firestore collection
- app/routers/admin.py: GET /admin/audit paginated endpoint
- app/main.py: register users router
Frontend:
- AuthProvider: exposes role, isAdmin, isOperator, ownedNodeIds from claims
- Nav: role-gated links — viewers get dashboard/calls/incidents/map/alerts/
trips; operators add nodes/systems/tokens; admins add admin
- admin/page.tsx: new Users tab (list table, create modal, inline edit panel
with role/nodes editor, disable/enable/delete, login history) and Audit
Log tab (paginated, color-coded actions)
- login/page.tsx: calls recordSession() on email and Google sign-in
- nodes, systems, tokens pages: role guards redirect viewers to dashboard
- profile/page.tsx: shows accurate role badge and label
- lib/types.ts: UserRole, UserRecord, UserSession, AuditEntry types
- lib/c2api.ts: user management methods + recordSession
Firestore collections added: user_profiles, audit_log, user_sessions
Firebase custom claims schema: { role, owned_node_ids, admin (legacy) }
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Logan
|
18d96193ab |
Security fixes
auth.py
secrets.compare_digest replaces == for service key comparison (timing-safe)
Added require_service_key — bot-only endpoints (trip/event join/leave)
Added require_service_key_or_admin — node commands/config (bot via service key OR dashboard admin via Firebase)
Added _RateLimiter with three shared instances: trip_chat_limiter (20/5min per user), summarize_limiter (5/10min per incident), bootstrap_limiter (2/hr per system)
nodes.py
send_command and assign_system now require require_service_key_or_admin — the Discord bot can still call them via service key, but regular Firebase users are blocked
tokens.py
add_token, flush_tokens, set_preferred_system, delete_token all require require_admin_token
Token masking changed from token[:10] + "…" + token[-4:] to "•••" + token[-4:]
systems.py
All write endpoints (create, update, delete, ai-flags, ten-codes, vocabulary writes, bootstrap) now require require_admin_token
bootstrap_vocabulary also calls bootstrap_limiter.check(system_id)
incidents.py
POST /incidents/summarize (bulk) now requires require_admin_token
POST /incidents/{id}/summarize now calls summarize_limiter.check(incident_id)
trips.py
join_trip, leave_trip, join_event, leave_event require require_service_key — only the Discord bot can set Discord attendee identity
delete_trip, delete_event require require_service_key_or_admin
trip_chat rate-limited per caller UID, history stripped to user/assistant roles only, user message truncated to 2000 chars, Maps query strings capped at 200 chars
upload.py
Rejects files larger than settings.upload_max_bytes (default 100MB) with 413
storage.py
_safe_audio_filename() derives GCS object name from call_id + allowlisted extension, completely ignoring the client-supplied filename
config.py
Added upload_max_bytes: int = 100 * 1024 * 1024
Both Dockerfiles — python:3.14-slim → python:3.12-slim
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Logan
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636a847ee1 | changes | ||
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Logan
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2f0597c81b |
Initial commit — DRB server stack
Includes c2-core (FastAPI/MQTT/Firestore), discord-bot (slash commands), frontend (Next.js admin UI), and mosquitto config. |