2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5	ee633cbe46	Secure the broker for public exposure: TLS and per-node credentials ... Edge nodes are deployed to arbitrary locations by arbitrary people, so the broker has to be reachable from the internet and secured on its own merits rather than by a VPN. Three defects made that impossible. The broker only had a plaintext 1883 listener; every node shared one drb-node password; and the ACL pattern used %c, the client-supplied client id, so any holder of that shared password could set client_id to another node and take over its namespace. The comment claiming this cryptographically prevented cross-node access was wrong and is gone. Authentication now uses mosquitto 2.x's built-in dynamic-security plugin on the stock eclipse-mosquitto image. c2-core administers it over the control topic, creating each node's client on approval with username=<node_id> and password=<its node_keys api_key>, attached to a role whose ACL is nodes/%u/# against the authenticated username. One credential, one revocation point. An HTTP-callback plugin was implemented first and rejected: that project is archived upstream, which is not an acceptable dependency on an internet-facing broker. Because dynsec state is a second source of truth alongside Firestore, approve/reissue/delete now write to the broker first and surface a 502 rather than drifting, and c2-core reconciles every approved node into dynsec on startup. Adds node self-enrollment (POST /nodes/enroll, GET /nodes/{id}/credentials) so a new node can obtain its key over HTTPS without an operator handling secrets by hand. Enrolling an already-approved node_id is refused on the fleet token alone — otherwise a leaked token plus a guessable id would let an attacker steal a live node's key before the real node asked for it. Pickup secrets are stored hashed and returned once, and the endpoint is rate limited per source IP. Infrastructure: an 8883 TLS listener fed by Caddy's certificate via a systemd path unit, a firewall rule for it, and Caddy now 404s /internal/* so the api vhost cannot proxy internal routes. Also fixes CORS, which allowed https://app.<domain> while the frontend is served on the bare domain — every call from the portal would have failed — and widens the vault gitignore to a glob, since ansible-vault leaves backup siblings that the exact-name rule left committable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-16 09:34:44 -04:00
Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5	6140dd7b9c	Fix prod compose port collision and make ansible deploy re-runnable ... docker-compose.prod.yml: compose merges `ports` by appending, so the prod override left the base file's 8888:8000 and 3000:3000 in place next to the 127.0.0.1-scoped ones. Each container tried to bind its port twice and the second bind failed with "address already in use", so c2-core and frontend could never start. It also meant the localhost-only binding never applied — both ports were published on every interface. Marked both `!override`, the same way mosquitto already used `!reset`. infra/ansible: - add the missing "Reload Caddy" handler; the Deploy Caddyfile task notified a handler that did not exist, which aborts the play - guard mkswap/swapon on whether /swapfile is already active, so a second run does not fail on "mounted" / "Device or resource busy" - git task now updates instead of clone-once, otherwise a re-run redeploys whatever code was on the VM at first clone - vault.yml.example: correct the registry token comment to read-only scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-09 21:19:03 -04:00