Merge pull request 'map: remove stray clock, unstack incident rail, OSM tile fallback (#118)' (#122) from fix/118-map-overlays into main

collectionGroup alert_events (acknowledged, org_id, triggered_at desc) — the index the /watch Triggered Alerts tab and the site-wide useUnacknowledgedAlerts hook require. Still needs a manual deploy; no automation exists (#51).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Tbknwttzou4s46PAykmtix

.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ jobs:
             NEXT_PUBLIC_FIREBASE_MESSAGING_SENDER_ID=${{ secrets.FIREBASE_MESSAGING_SENDER_ID }}
             NEXT_PUBLIC_FIREBASE_APP_ID=${{ secrets.FIREBASE_APP_ID }}
             NEXT_PUBLIC_FIRESTORE_DATABASE=${{ secrets.FIRESTORE_DATABASE }}
+            NEXT_PUBLIC_MAP_TILE_URL=https://tile.openstreetmap.org/{z}/{x}/{y}.png
 
   deploy:
     name: Deploy to VM

drb-c2-core/.env.example

@@ -33,6 +33,13 @@ SUMMARY_INTERVAL_MINUTES=15
 CORRELATION_WINDOW_HOURS=4
 EMBEDDING_SIMILARITY_THRESHOLD=0.82
 
+# Browser origins allowed to call this API cross-origin (JSON list). The only
+# browser caller is the frontend's Archive page (GET /calls/search). Set this
+# to the exact origin the frontend is served from — scheme + host, no path.
+# Defaults to https://drb.cusano.net. A "*" entry works for local dev but is
+# logged as a probable misconfiguration and never gets a credentialed response.
+CORS_ORIGINS=["https://drb.cusano.net"]
+
 # Fleet-wide token edge nodes present as X-Enrollment-Token on first boot
 # (POST /nodes/enroll). Shared across every node — NOT a per-node secret.
 # Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32

drb-c2-core/app/config.py

@@ -180,16 +180,18 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     # between genuinely separate transmissions on a busy dispatch channel.
     duplicate_window_seconds: int = 10
 
-    # CORS — set to your frontend origin(s) in production, e.g. ["https://app.example.com"]
+    # Browser origins allowed to call this API cross-origin. The only browser
-    # Defaults to "*" for local development only.
+    # caller is the frontend's Archive page (GET /calls/search) — every other
+    # page reads Firestore directly. The frontend is served on the BARE domain
+    # (see infra Caddyfile.j2 — only drb. and api. have DNS records), so the
+    # default is that origin, not app.<domain>. Override via CORS_ORIGINS (JSON
+    # list) if the frontend ever moves; keep infra/.../c2-core.env.j2 in sync.
     #
-    # Leaving this as "*" is not merely permissive: main.py turns OFF
+    # A "*" entry here still works for local dev but is refused a credentialed
-    # allow_credentials when it sees a wildcard, because Starlette would
+    # response: main.py never enables allow_credentials (auth is a Bearer
-    # otherwise reflect each caller's origin back WITH
+    # header, not a cookie), and it logs a loud ERROR when it sees a wildcard
-    # Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. So a production deployment that
+    # in a deployment so a forgotten override is visible.
-    # forgets to set this gets a loud ERROR at startup and loses credentialed
+    cors_origins: list[str] = ["https://drb.cusano.net"]
-    # cross-origin requests, rather than silently accepting every origin.
-    cors_origins: list[str] = ["*"]
 
     # Discord webhook URL that app/internal/ai_health.py posts to when an AI
     # tier (transcription/correlation) transitions into or out of degraded

drb-c2-core/app/main.py

@@ -78,33 +78,40 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
 
 app = FastAPI(title="DRB C2 Core", lifespan=lifespan)
 
-# "*" plus allow_credentials=True is not the permissive-but-harmless setting it
+# The browser needs CORS to reach this API at all: the frontend's Archive page
-# looks like. Starlette does not refuse the combination -- it reflects the
+# calls GET /calls/search with Authorization + Content-Type headers, which
-# caller's Origin back and still sends Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true,
+# forces a preflight. Without this middleware the OPTIONS gets a bare 405 and
-# so the effective policy becomes "any origin, with credentials", the opposite
+# the fetch fails (#110). allow_origins is an explicit list -- never "*" in a
-# of what a wildcard normally means. Rather than trust every deployment to
+# deployment -- so name every host the frontend is served from in CORS_ORIGINS.
-# remember to override CORS_ORIGINS, make the dangerous pair unrepresentable.
+#
+# allow_credentials stays False on purpose: auth here is a Bearer header, not a
+# cookie, so credentialed CORS is never needed, and keeping it False is what
+# lets an explicit-origin allowlist work without Starlette's "*"-only
+# restriction. "*" + credentials is the dangerous pair (Starlette reflects the
+# caller's Origin back WITH Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true); this code
+# cannot produce it because credentials are hard-off.
 def cors_allows_credentials(origins: list[str]) -> bool:
-    """False when any entry is a wildcard. Extracted so it can be tested
+    """Always False -- credentialed CORS is never enabled here (Bearer auth,
-    without re-importing this module, which drags in every router."""
+    not cookies). Kept as a named predicate so a future edit that wants to
-    return "*" not in origins
+    turn credentials on has to go through here and confront the "*" case.
+    A wildcard entry would additionally be refused a credentialed response."""
+    return False
 
 
-_cors_is_wildcard = not cors_allows_credentials(settings.cors_origins)
+_cors_is_wildcard = "*" in settings.cors_origins
 if _cors_is_wildcard:
     logger.error(
-        "CORS_ORIGINS is '*', so credentialed cross-origin requests are being "
+        "CORS_ORIGINS contains '*'. That is fine for local dev but is almost "
-        "DISABLED to avoid reflecting every caller's origin back with "
+        "certainly a misconfigured deployment -- set CORS_ORIGINS to your "
-        "Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. Set CORS_ORIGINS to your frontend "
+        "frontend origin(s), e.g. [\"https://drb.cusano.net\"]."
-        "origin(s) in production, e.g. [\"https://app.example.com\"]."
     )
 
 app.add_middleware(
     CORSMiddleware,
     allow_origins=settings.cors_origins,
-    allow_methods=["*"],
+    allow_methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"],
-    allow_headers=["*"],
+    allow_headers=["authorization", "content-type"],
-    allow_credentials=not _cors_is_wildcard,
+    allow_credentials=False,
 )
 
 app.include_router(nodes.router,     dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])

drb-c2-core/tests/test_cors.py

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"""
+End-to-end CORS wiring for the one browser-facing REST surface.
+
+The frontend's Archive page calls GET /calls/search with Authorization +
+Content-Type headers, which forces the browser to send a CORS preflight
+first. Before #110 that OPTIONS got a bare 405 with no Access-Control-*
+headers and the fetch failed with "TypeError: Failed to fetch". These
+tests drive the real app through TestClient so a regression in the
+middleware wiring (not just the helper) is caught.
+
+TestClient is NOT used as a context manager on purpose: that would run the
+lifespan (mqtt_handler.connect(), the sweeper loops, dynsec bootstrap),
+none of which is needed here -- CORSMiddleware answers a preflight before
+routing or dependencies run.
+"""
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+from app.config import settings
+from app.main import app
+
+client = TestClient(app)
+
+ALLOWED_ORIGIN = "https://drb.cusano.net"
+DISALLOWED_ORIGIN = "https://evil.example.com"
+
+
+def test_default_allowed_origin_matches_the_deployed_frontend():
+    # The frontend is served on the bare domain (infra Caddyfile.j2), so the
+    # default must allow exactly that origin without any env override.
+    assert ALLOWED_ORIGIN in settings.cors_origins
+
+
+def test_preflight_for_calls_search_is_allowed():
+    resp = client.options(
+        "/calls/search",
+        headers={
+            "Origin": ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
+            "Access-Control-Request-Method": "GET",
+            "Access-Control-Request-Headers": "authorization,content-type",
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") == ALLOWED_ORIGIN
+    allow_methods = resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-methods", "").upper()
+    assert "GET" in allow_methods
+    # Bearer auth, not cookies -- credentials must never be advertised.
+    assert "access-control-allow-credentials" not in resp.headers
+
+
+def test_preflight_from_disallowed_origin_gets_no_allow_origin():
+    resp = client.options(
+        "/calls/search",
+        headers={
+            "Origin": DISALLOWED_ORIGIN,
+            "Access-Control-Request-Method": "GET",
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") is None
+
+
+def test_simple_get_from_allowed_origin_is_annotated():
+    # Even a non-preflight GET must carry Access-Control-Allow-Origin or the
+    # browser hides the response body from the page.
+    resp = client.get("/health", headers={"Origin": ALLOWED_ORIGIN})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") == ALLOWED_ORIGIN

drb-c2-core/tests/test_cors_policy.py

@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@ Starlette does not reject `allow_origins=["*"]` combined with
 `allow_credentials=True`. It reflects the caller's Origin back in
 Access-Control-Allow-Origin and still sends
 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, so the effective policy is the
-opposite of what a wildcard usually means. main.py defuses that by turning
+opposite of what a wildcard usually means. main.py never enables
-credentials off whenever it sees a wildcard; these tests hold it to that.
+credentials at all (auth is a Bearer header, not a cookie), which makes
+that pair unrepresentable; these tests hold it to that.
 
 The policy lives in a pure function so it can be exercised directly --
 reloading app.main to vary settings drags every router back through import
@@ -28,11 +29,11 @@ def test_wildcard_among_real_origins_still_disables_credentials():
     assert cors_allows_credentials(["https://app.example.com", "*"]) is False
 
 
-def test_named_origins_keep_credentials():
+def test_credentials_never_enabled_even_for_named_origins():
-    # Naming your origins is how you ask for credentialed requests, so a
+    # Auth here is a Bearer header, not a cookie, so credentialed CORS is
-    # correctly configured deployment must not be penalised.
+    # never needed. The predicate is hard-off regardless of the origin list.
-    assert cors_allows_credentials(["https://app.example.com"]) is True
+    assert cors_allows_credentials(["https://app.example.com"]) is False
-    assert cors_allows_credentials([]) is True
+    assert cors_allows_credentials([]) is False
 
 
 def test_the_app_actually_mounted_that_policy():
@@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ def test_the_app_actually_mounted_that_policy():
         (mw.kwargs for mw in app.user_middleware if mw.cls is CORSMiddleware), None
     )
     assert opts is not None, "CORSMiddleware is not mounted at all"
+    assert opts["allow_credentials"] is False
     assert opts["allow_credentials"] is cors_allows_credentials(settings.cors_origins)
 
 

drb-frontend/components/MapView.tsx

@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ L.Icon.Default.mergeOptions({
 });
 
 // ── Basemap tiles ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-// Default is CARTO's keyless dark raster basemap — no token, fits the dark UI.
+// Prod sets NEXT_PUBLIC_MAP_TILE_URL to a keyed style (a CARTO account style,
-// Overridable via NEXT_PUBLIC_MAP_TILE_URL so a keyed style (a CARTO account
+// MapTiler, Mapbox, …). The in-code fallback is plain OpenStreetMap so the map
-// style, MapTiler, Mapbox, …) can be dropped in for prod without a code change.
+// still renders if that var is missing — CARTO's keyless CDN has proven flaky.
-// Whatever is supplied must use Leaflet's {s}/{z}/{x}/{y}{r} placeholder scheme.
+// Whatever is supplied must use Leaflet's {s}/{z}/{x}/{y}{r} placeholder scheme;
+// the {z}/{x}/{y} tokens below are substituted by Leaflet at runtime.
 const MAP_TILE_URL =
   process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_MAP_TILE_URL ||
-  "https://{s}.basemaps.cartocdn.com/dark_all/{z}/{x}/{y}{r}.png";
+  "https://tile.openstreetmap.org/{z}/{x}/{y}.png";
-const MAP_TILE_ATTRIBUTION =
+const MAP_TILE_ATTRIBUTION = "© OpenStreetMap contributors";
-  '&copy; <a href="https://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright">OpenStreetMap</a> contributors &copy; <a href="https://carto.com/">CARTO</a>';
 
 // ── Colour ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 // Severity is the only hue on this map — see UI_REDESIGN.md §2.3. Incident
@@ -459,9 +459,6 @@ export default function MapView({ nodes, activeCalls, incidents = [], calls = []
   const [drawerOpen, setDrawerOpen] = useState(false);
   const [agoClock, setAgoClock] = useState(0);
   const [radarEpoch, setRadarEpoch] = useState(() => Date.now());
-  const [clockStr, setClockStr] = useState(() =>
-    new Date().toLocaleTimeString([], { hour12: false, hour: "2-digit", minute: "2-digit", second: "2-digit" })
-  );
 
   useEffect(() => {
     const id = setInterval(() => setAgoClock((t: number) => t + 1), 10_000);
@@ -474,15 +471,6 @@ export default function MapView({ nodes, activeCalls, incidents = [], calls = []
     return () => clearInterval(id);
   }, []);
 
-  // Live clock for TOC situational awareness
-  useEffect(() => {
-    const id = setInterval(() =>
-      setClockStr(new Date().toLocaleTimeString([], { hour12: false, hour: "2-digit", minute: "2-digit", second: "2-digit" })),
-      1000
-    );
-    return () => clearInterval(id);
-  }, []);
-
   // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
   const ago = useMemo(() => (lastUpdated ? timeAgo(lastUpdated) : null), [lastUpdated, agoClock]);
 
@@ -623,13 +611,8 @@ export default function MapView({ nodes, activeCalls, incidents = [], calls = []
         )}
       </div>
 
-      {/* ── Clock — bottom-left for TOC situational awareness ───────────────── */}
-      <div className="absolute bottom-8 left-3 z-[1001] bg-surface/90 border border-line rounded-lg px-3 py-2 pointer-events-none">
-        <span className="text-ink text-sm font-mono tabular-nums">{clockStr}</span>
-      </div>
-
       {/* ── Legend — shape-first, both themes. Never a bare colour swatch. ──── */}
-      <div className="absolute bottom-8 right-3 z-[1001] bg-surface/90 border border-line rounded-lg px-3 py-2.5 text-xs pointer-events-none space-y-2">
+      <div className="absolute bottom-8 right-3 z-[1001] bg-surface/90 border border-line rounded-lg px-3 py-2.5 text-xs pointer-events-none space-y-2 max-h-[calc(100%-4rem)] overflow-y-auto">
         <div className="space-y-1">
           <p className="text-ink-muted font-medium text-[10px] uppercase tracking-wide">Severity</p>
           {(["major", "moderate", "minor", "routine"] as Severity[]).map((sev) => (
@@ -673,15 +656,19 @@ export default function MapView({ nodes, activeCalls, incidents = [], calls = []
       {/* ── Incident overlay panel ───────────────────────────────────────────── */}
       {incidents.length > 0 && (
         <>
-          {/* Desktop: left sidebar — starts below zoom controls + fit-all button */}
+          {/* Desktop: left sidebar — offset below the zoom stack + fit-all button
-          <div className="absolute top-[8rem] left-3 bottom-[4.5rem] z-[1001] hidden md:flex flex-col w-56 gap-1.5">
+              so it never overlaps the Leaflet +/- controls (#118). Height is
+              capped and the list scrolls on its own, so the rail never reaches
+              the bottom-right legend. pointer-events are off on the wrapper and
+              back on for the cards, so the map still pans in the gaps. */}
+          <div className="absolute top-[9.5rem] left-3 z-[1001] hidden md:flex flex-col w-56 gap-1.5 max-h-[calc(100%-12rem)] pointer-events-none">
             {/* Gate A / A2 (server-26#46) — the rail's titles, locations and
                 unit counts are pipeline output. Pinned above the scroll area
                 so it cannot be scrolled off the screen it qualifies. */}
-            <div className="bg-surface/90 backdrop-blur-sm border border-line rounded-lg px-2 py-1.5 shrink-0">
+            <div className="bg-surface/90 backdrop-blur-sm border border-line rounded-lg px-2 py-1.5 shrink-0 pointer-events-auto">
               <MachineOutputNotice variant="inline" className="text-[10px] leading-snug items-start" />
             </div>
-            <div className="flex flex-col gap-1.5 overflow-y-auto">
+            <div className="flex flex-col gap-1.5 overflow-y-auto min-h-0 pointer-events-auto">
             {incidents.map((inc) => {
               const color = severityColor(inc.severity);
               const age = inc.started_at ? timeAgo(new Date(inc.started_at)) : null;

infra/firestore/firestore.indexes.json

@@ -75,6 +75,16 @@
         { "fieldPath": "acknowledged", "order": "ASCENDING" },
         { "fieldPath": "triggered_at", "order": "ASCENDING" }
       ]
+    },
+    {
+      "//": "drb-frontend lib/useAlerts.ts useUnacknowledgedAlerts (nav badge) and the /watch \"Triggered Alerts\" tab — where(org_id ==) where(acknowledged == false) orderBy(triggered_at desc). Threw \"the query requires an index\" on every page until this was declared (server-26#51). Field tuple and triggered_at DESCENDING copy the console create_composite link in that issue verbatim, so a gcloud/console create and a firebase deploy converge on one index rather than the ASC-vs-DESC pair that caused server-26#33. Distinct from the (org_id, triggered_at) alert-feed index above (no acknowledged filter) and supersedes the pre-tenancy live alert_events(acknowledged, triggered_at) index #33 says to delete.",
+      "collectionGroup": "alert_events",
+      "queryScope": "COLLECTION",
+      "fields": [
+        { "fieldPath": "acknowledged", "order": "ASCENDING" },
+        { "fieldPath": "org_id", "order": "ASCENDING" },
+        { "fieldPath": "triggered_at", "order": "DESCENDING" }
+      ]
     }
   ],
   "fieldOverrides": []