// Firestore security rules — the actual tenant boundary for DRB.
//
// WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: drb-frontend reads Firestore directly from the
// browser (see lib/use*.ts — onSnapshot(collection(db, ...))), so c2-core's
// app/internal/auth.py is NOT in that read path at all. These rules are the
// only thing standing between a signed-in stranger and every org's radio
// traffic. Before this file existed, whatever rules were live had been
// hand-set in the Firebase console: unversioned, unreviewed, unknown. See
// SAAS_PLAN.md B1.
//
// DEPLOY IS A MANUAL, OUT-OF-BAND STEP — nothing in CI or this codebase
// pushes these rules to Firebase:
//   firebase deploy --only firestore:rules --project <project-id>
// (from this directory, or point --config at infra/firestore/firebase.json
// from the repo root). Do this before or immediately after the code that
// starts stamping org_id ships — until these rules are live, the
// console-configured rules are still what's actually enforced.
//
// MODEL: c2-core (firebase-admin SDK, server-side) bypasses these rules
// entirely and is the sole writer for every collection below — that was
// already the architecture (see CLAUDE.md "Auth — three distinct
// mechanisms"). These rules therefore only need to gate READS for the
// browser client, and can safely deny ALL client writes.
//
// Deny-by-default: the catch-all match at the bottom denies anything not
// explicitly listed above it, including collections added later that
// someone forgets to add a rule for.

rules_version = '2';

service cloud.firestore {
  match /databases/{database}/documents {

    function signedIn() {
      return request.auth != null;
    }

    // Platform-level role (admin/operator/viewer) — set by drb-c2-core
    // routers/users.py custom claims. Distinct from org_role (owner/member),
    // which is per-organization. A platform admin can read across every org
    // (support/debugging), mirroring internal/auth.py's require_org()
    // ?org_id= override for the same role.
    function isPlatformAdmin() {
      return signedIn() &&
        (request.auth.token.role == 'admin' || request.auth.token.admin == true);
    }

    // The org_id claim is set by POST /auth/signup (or /admin/users) at
    // account-provisioning time. No claim => no access, by construction —
    // this is what backs AuthProvider's no-claim guard (SAAS_PLAN.md B3):
    // a user with no org_id claim can hold a valid Firebase session and
    // still read nothing here.
    function myOrgId() {
      return request.auth.token.org_id;
    }

    function inOrg(orgId) {
      return signedIn() && (myOrgId() == orgId || isPlatformAdmin());
    }

    function docInMyOrg() {
      return inOrg(resource.data.org_id);
    }

    // ── Org identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    match /organizations/{orgId} {
      allow read: if inOrg(orgId);
      allow write: if false; // c2-core only (POST /auth/signup, routers/org.py)
    }

    match /org_members/{uid} {
      allow read: if signedIn() && (request.auth.uid == uid || isPlatformAdmin() ||
        inOrg(resource.data.org_id));
      allow write: if false; // c2-core only
    }

    // ── Tenant-scoped radio data — the whole point of this file ───────────
    match /nodes/{nodeId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /systems/{systemId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /calls/{callId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /incidents/{incidentId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /alert_events/{alertId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /alert_rules/{ruleId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    // ── Never client-readable, org-scoped or not ───────────────────────────
    // Secrets / credential material. Reads for these go through c2-core
    // REST routes (which apply their own auth), never straight to Firestore.
    match /node_keys/{nodeId} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }

    match /enrollment_tokens/{tokenHash} {
      allow read, write: if false; // routers/org.py mints/lists/revokes server-side
    }

    match /org_api_keys/{keyId} {
      allow read, write: if false; // not implemented server-side yet (DEFERRED.md) — deny regardless
    }

    // ── Platform-admin-only collections ────────────────────────────────────
    // Listed here mainly so the deny-default catch-all's intent is explicit;
    // these are already read/written exclusively through c2-core admin
    // routes (require_admin_token), never straight from the browser.
    match /audit_log/{entryId} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }

    match /config/{docId} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }

    match /bot_tokens/{tokenId} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }

    match /waitlist/{entryId} {
      allow read, write: if false; // POST /waitlist writes via the admin SDK
    }

    // ── Trips (internal utility feature, not org-scoped — see
    // [[trips-feature-intentional]] and SAAS_PLAN.md B7. Frontend hides
    // /trips outside the founding org; these rules keep the existing
    // "public unless flagged private" trip model working for whichever
    // users the UI still exposes it to) ────────────────────────────────────
    match /trips/{tripId} {
      allow read: if signedIn();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /trip_events/{eventId} {
      allow read: if signedIn();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    // ── Deny-by-default catch-all ──────────────────────────────────────────
    // Anything not explicitly matched above — including collections added
    // later without a corresponding rule — is denied. This is the guard
    // rail: a missing rule fails closed, not open.
    match /{document=**} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }
  }
}