Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5.5
bdbde359a1
- Cap one refresh's NWS zone fetches at 15 s wall clock. They run under the feed lock, so a hung zone endpoint could otherwise stall every /weather/alerts request for minutes; unfinished zones retry next refresh. - Prod c2-core.env.j2 never set NWS_USER_AGENT, so the VM would have sent the contact-less placeholder. Default it to the site URL (overridable via vault_nws_user_agent); warn on the .env.example example.com placeholder too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
65 lines
4.3 KiB
Plaintext
65 lines
4.3 KiB
Plaintext
# Template for your Ansible Vault secrets file.
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# Copy to vault.yml, fill in values, then encrypt:
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# ansible-vault encrypt vault.yml
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# Edit later with:
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# ansible-vault edit vault.yml
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# DO NOT put a literal "$" in any value here. Docker compose interpolates the
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# top-level .env, and depending on version it also interpolates env_file, so a
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# password like "aB$fPx" is read as the variable $fPx and silently replaced
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# with an empty string — on one side of the connection but not the other.
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# That produced "MQTT connect refused: Not authorized" with no obvious cause.
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# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32 (hex output has no shell metacharacters)
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# ── MQTT ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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# No more shared node credential (vault_mqtt_node_user/pass) — nodes now
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# authenticate as username=<node_id>, password=<their node_keys.api_key>,
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# checked by mosquitto's built-in dynamic-security plugin (c2-core
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# administers it — see app/internal/dynsec.py). See vault_enrollment_token
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# below for how a node gets that key in the first place.
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vault_mqtt_c2_user: drb-c2-core
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vault_mqtt_c2_pass: "CHANGE_ME"
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vault_mqtt_dynsec_admin_pass: "CHANGE_ME" # openssl rand -hex 32 — must be >=12 chars, plugin-enforced minimum
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# ── C2 Core ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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vault_service_key: "" # openssl rand -hex 32 — the Discord bot's key
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# The work-session agent's own key for GET/PUT /admin/features. Generate a
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# SEPARATE value — never a copy of vault_service_key, or a flag flip cannot be
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# attributed to the agent vs the bot (server-26#64).
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vault_agent_service_key: "" # openssl rand -hex 32
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vault_enrollment_token: "" # openssl rand -hex 32 — fleet-wide, shared by every node's POST /nodes/enroll
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vault_openai_api_key: ""
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vault_google_maps_api_key: ""
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vault_gemini_api_key: ""
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vault_gcs_bucket: "your-gcs-bucket-name"
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vault_firestore_database: "c2-server"
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# ── Gitea Container Registry ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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vault_registry_host: "git.vpn.cusano.net"
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vault_registry_user: "logan"
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vault_registry_token: "" # Gitea access token, READ-ONLY package scope.
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# The VM only pulls (roles/deploy/tasks/main.yml:62-72);
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# nothing here pushes. Pushing is CI's job and uses a
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# separate write-scoped token (BUILD_TOKEN in Gitea
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# repo secrets). Keep them separate: this token sits on
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# an internet-facing VM, and a write-scoped one there
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# would let an attacker publish a poisoned image that
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# every future deploy and edge node would install.
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vault_registry: "git.vpn.cusano.net/logan" # full image prefix
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# ── Discord Bot ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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vault_discord_token: ""
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# ── Frontend (Firebase) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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vault_firebase_api_key: ""
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vault_firebase_auth_domain: ""
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vault_firebase_project_id: ""
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vault_firebase_storage_bucket: ""
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vault_firebase_messaging_sender_id: ""
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vault_firebase_app_id: ""
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# No GCP key needed — the VM uses Application Default Credentials via the
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# GCE metadata server. Terraform grants the required IAM roles at apply time.
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vault_nws_user_agent: "" # optional; e.g. "DRB scanner map (ops@yourdomain)" -- blank/absent uses the site URL
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