Logan Cusano
12c9ad73bb
A password containing "$fP" was interpolated away by compose, giving mosquitto and c2-core two different passwords and producing "MQTT connect refused: Not authorized" with nothing in the logs pointing at the cause. Recorded next to the values so the next person generating credentials sees it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
55 lines
3.4 KiB
Plaintext
55 lines
3.4 KiB
Plaintext
# Template for your Ansible Vault secrets file.
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# Copy to vault.yml, fill in values, then encrypt:
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# ansible-vault encrypt vault.yml
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# Edit later with:
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# ansible-vault edit vault.yml
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# DO NOT put a literal "$" in any value here. Docker compose interpolates the
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# top-level .env, and depending on version it also interpolates env_file, so a
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# password like "aB$fPx" is read as the variable $fPx and silently replaced
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# with an empty string — on one side of the connection but not the other.
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# That produced "MQTT connect refused: Not authorized" with no obvious cause.
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# Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32 (hex output has no shell metacharacters)
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# ── MQTT ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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vault_mqtt_c2_user: drb-c2-core
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vault_mqtt_c2_pass: "CHANGE_ME"
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vault_mqtt_node_user: drb-node
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vault_mqtt_node_pass: "CHANGE_ME"
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# ── C2 Core ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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vault_service_key: "" # openssl rand -hex 32
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vault_node_api_key: "" # openssl rand -hex 32
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vault_openai_api_key: ""
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vault_google_maps_api_key: ""
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vault_gemini_api_key: ""
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vault_gcs_bucket: "your-gcs-bucket-name"
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vault_firestore_database: "c2-server"
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# ── Gitea Container Registry ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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vault_registry_host: "git.vpn.cusano.net"
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vault_registry_user: "logan"
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vault_registry_token: "" # Gitea access token, READ-ONLY package scope.
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# The VM only pulls (roles/deploy/tasks/main.yml:62-72);
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# nothing here pushes. Pushing is CI's job and uses a
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# separate write-scoped token (BUILD_TOKEN in Gitea
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# repo secrets). Keep them separate: this token sits on
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# an internet-facing VM, and a write-scoped one there
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# would let an attacker publish a poisoned image that
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# every future deploy and edge node would install.
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vault_registry: "git.vpn.cusano.net/logan" # full image prefix
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# ── Discord Bot ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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vault_discord_token: ""
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# ── Frontend (Firebase) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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vault_firebase_api_key: ""
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vault_firebase_auth_domain: ""
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vault_firebase_project_id: ""
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vault_firebase_storage_bucket: ""
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vault_firebase_messaging_sender_id: ""
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vault_firebase_app_id: ""
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# No GCP key needed — the VM uses Application Default Credentials via the
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# GCE metadata server. Terraform grants the required IAM roles at apply time.
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