Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5
ee633cbe46
Edge nodes are deployed to arbitrary locations by arbitrary people, so the
broker has to be reachable from the internet and secured on its own merits
rather than by a VPN.
Three defects made that impossible. The broker only had a plaintext 1883
listener; every node shared one drb-node password; and the ACL pattern used
%c, the client-supplied client id, so any holder of that shared password
could set client_id to another node and take over its namespace. The comment
claiming this cryptographically prevented cross-node access was wrong and is
gone.
Authentication now uses mosquitto 2.x's built-in dynamic-security plugin on
the stock eclipse-mosquitto image. c2-core administers it over the control
topic, creating each node's client on approval with username=<node_id> and
password=<its node_keys api_key>, attached to a role whose ACL is nodes/%u/#
against the authenticated username. One credential, one revocation point.
An HTTP-callback plugin was implemented first and rejected: that project is
archived upstream, which is not an acceptable dependency on an
internet-facing broker.
Because dynsec state is a second source of truth alongside Firestore,
approve/reissue/delete now write to the broker first and surface a 502
rather than drifting, and c2-core reconciles every approved node into dynsec
on startup.
Adds node self-enrollment (POST /nodes/enroll, GET /nodes/{id}/credentials)
so a new node can obtain its key over HTTPS without an operator handling
secrets by hand. Enrolling an already-approved node_id is refused on the
fleet token alone — otherwise a leaked token plus a guessable id would let
an attacker steal a live node's key before the real node asked for it.
Pickup secrets are stored hashed and returned once, and the endpoint is rate
limited per source IP.
Infrastructure: an 8883 TLS listener fed by Caddy's certificate via a
systemd path unit, a firewall rule for it, and Caddy now 404s /internal/*
so the api vhost cannot proxy internal routes.
Also fixes CORS, which allowed https://app.<domain> while the frontend is
served on the bare domain — every call from the portal would have failed —
and widens the vault gitignore to a glob, since ansible-vault leaves
backup siblings that the exact-name rule left committable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
31 lines
1.3 KiB
Bash
31 lines
1.3 KiB
Bash
# drb-c2-core environment — Managed by Ansible. Do not edit manually.
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MQTT_BROKER=mosquitto
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MQTT_PORT=1883
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MQTT_USER={{ vault_mqtt_c2_user }}
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MQTT_PASS={{ vault_mqtt_c2_pass }}
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# Same value as mosquitto's MOSQUITTO_DYNSEC_PASSWORD (root.env.j2) — lets
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# c2-core log in as the dynsec plugin's built-in "admin" client to
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# administer node credentials. See app/internal/dynsec.py.
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MQTT_DYNSEC_ADMIN_PASS={{ vault_mqtt_dynsec_admin_pass }}
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# No GCP_CREDENTIALS_PATH — the VM uses Application Default Credentials
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# via the GCE metadata server. The Terraform IAM bindings grant the required roles.
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FIRESTORE_DATABASE={{ vault_firestore_database }}
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GCS_BUCKET={{ vault_gcs_bucket }}
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OPENAI_API_KEY={{ vault_openai_api_key }}
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GOOGLE_MAPS_API_KEY={{ vault_google_maps_api_key }}
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GEMINI_API_KEY={{ vault_gemini_api_key }}
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SERVICE_KEY={{ vault_service_key }}
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ENROLLMENT_TOKEN={{ vault_enrollment_token }}
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# Bare domain, not app.<domain>: the frontend is served on {{ domain }} itself
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# (see Caddyfile.j2 — only api. and the bare name have DNS records). This said
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# app.{{ domain }} while the browser origin was https://{{ domain }}, so every
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# frontend call to the API would have failed CORS. If the frontend ever moves
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# to app.{{ domain }}, change this at the same time.
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CORS_ORIGINS=["https://{{ domain }}"]
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