server-26/infra/firestore/firestore.rules

// Firestore security rules — the actual tenant boundary for DRB.
//
// WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: drb-frontend reads Firestore directly from the
// browser (see lib/use*.ts — onSnapshot(collection(db, ...))), so c2-core's
// app/internal/auth.py is NOT in that read path at all. These rules are the
// only thing standing between a signed-in stranger and every org's radio
// traffic. Before this file existed, whatever rules were live had been
// hand-set in the Firebase console: unversioned, unreviewed, unknown. See
// SAAS_PLAN.md B1.
//
// DEPLOYED BY CI on every push to main (.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml, job
// deploy-firestore-rules, service-account auth via the FIREBASE_SA_KEY
// secret — server-26#51). That job is separate from the app deploy, so a
// green app deploy does NOT mean these rules are live: check that job too.
// Editing rules in the Firebase console is overwritten by the next push.
//
// MODEL: c2-core (firebase-admin SDK, server-side) bypasses these rules
// entirely and is the sole writer for every collection below — that was
// already the architecture (see CLAUDE.md "Auth — three distinct
// mechanisms"). These rules therefore only need to gate READS for the
// browser client, and can safely deny ALL client writes.
//
// Deny-by-default: the catch-all match at the bottom denies anything not
// explicitly listed above it, including collections added later that
// someone forgets to add a rule for.

rules_version = '2';

service cloud.firestore {
  match /databases/{database}/documents {

    function signedIn() {
      return request.auth != null;
    }

    // Platform-level role (admin/operator/viewer) — set by drb-c2-core
    // routers/users.py custom claims. Distinct from org_role (owner/member),
    // which is per-organization. A platform admin can read across every org
    // (support/debugging), mirroring internal/auth.py's require_org()
    // ?org_id= override for the same role.
    function isPlatformAdmin() {
      return signedIn() &&
        (request.auth.token.role == 'admin' || request.auth.token.admin == true);
    }

    // The org_id claim is set by POST /auth/signup (or /admin/users) at
    // account-provisioning time. No claim => no access, by construction —
    // this is what backs AuthProvider's no-claim guard (SAAS_PLAN.md B3):
    // a user with no org_id claim can hold a valid Firebase session and
    // still read nothing here.
    function myOrgId() {
      return request.auth.token.org_id;
    }

    function inOrg(orgId) {
      return signedIn() && (myOrgId() == orgId || isPlatformAdmin());
    }

    function docInMyOrg() {
      return inOrg(resource.data.org_id);
    }

    // ── Org identity ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    match /organizations/{orgId} {
      allow read: if inOrg(orgId);
      allow write: if false; // c2-core only (POST /auth/signup, routers/org.py)
    }

    match /org_members/{uid} {
      allow read: if signedIn() && (request.auth.uid == uid || isPlatformAdmin() ||
        inOrg(resource.data.org_id));
      allow write: if false; // c2-core only
    }

    // ── Tenant-scoped radio data — the whole point of this file ───────────
    match /nodes/{nodeId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /systems/{systemId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /calls/{callId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /incidents/{incidentId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    // Live map overlays fed by a node's second SDR (node-26#9). Snapshot
    // docs, one per icao/mmsi, last-seen-wins — not a history collection.
    match /aircraft/{icao} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;

      // Flight trail points. Org is checked against the PARENT aircraft doc
      // (one get() per query) so the map can query a trail by time alone,
      // without an org_id filter and the composite index that would need.
      match /positions/{pointId} {
        allow read: if inOrg(get(/databases/$(database)/documents/aircraft/$(icao)).data.org_id);
        allow write: if false;
      }
    }

    match /vessels/{mmsi} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /alert_events/{alertId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /alert_rules/{ruleId} {
      allow read: if docInMyOrg();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    // ── Never client-readable, org-scoped or not ───────────────────────────
    // Secrets / credential material. Reads for these go through c2-core
    // REST routes (which apply their own auth), never straight to Firestore.
    match /node_keys/{nodeId} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }

    match /enrollment_tokens/{tokenHash} {
      allow read, write: if false; // routers/org.py mints/lists/revokes server-side
    }

    match /org_api_keys/{keyId} {
      allow read, write: if false; // not implemented server-side yet (DEFERRED.md) — deny regardless
    }

    // ── Platform-admin-only collections ────────────────────────────────────
    // Listed here mainly so the deny-default catch-all's intent is explicit;
    // these are already read/written exclusively through c2-core admin
    // routes (require_admin_token), never straight from the browser.
    match /audit_log/{entryId} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }

    match /config/{docId} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }

    match /bot_tokens/{tokenId} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }

    // Radio-bot OAuth2 client secrets and in-flight "Connect a Discord
    // server" states (server-26#225 S6). Secrets: c2-core only, never any client.
    match /bot_oauth/{tokenId} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }

    match /discord_oauth_states/{stateHash} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }

    match /waitlist/{entryId} {
      allow read, write: if false; // POST /waitlist writes via the admin SDK
    }

    // ── Trips (internal utility feature, not org-scoped — see
    // [[trips-feature-intentional]] and SAAS_PLAN.md B7. Frontend hides
    // /trips outside the founding org; these rules keep the existing
    // "public unless flagged private" trip model working for whichever
    // users the UI still exposes it to) ────────────────────────────────────
    match /trips/{tripId} {
      allow read: if signedIn();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    match /trip_events/{eventId} {
      allow read: if signedIn();
      allow write: if false;
    }

    // ── Deny-by-default catch-all ──────────────────────────────────────────
    // Anything not explicitly matched above — including collections added
    // later without a corresponding rule — is denied. This is the guard
    // rail: a missing rule fails closed, not open.
    match /{document=**} {
      allow read, write: if false;
    }
  }
}