Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5
a3681ea698
The previous commit shipped Firestore rules that reference an org_id claim
nothing issues yet, and an org_id filter nothing writes yet - this is the
commit that makes both real. Backend half of SAAS_PLAN.md B2/B2b/B2c.
Data model: organizations/{org_id} and org_members/{uid} are new
collections (models.py OrganizationRecord/OrgMember). org_id is now an
Optional field on NodeRecord, SystemRecord, CallRecord, IncidentRecord,
AlertRule, and AlertEvent - optional because every existing document
predates it; scripts/backfill_org_id.py (written, not run - it touches
production Firestore and Firebase Auth claims) is what closes that gap
later. plan_id/subscription_status/stripe_* on OrganizationRecord are
deliberately None: no billing or pricing model has been decided, so this is
a seam, not a promise. app/internal/tenancy.py holds FOUNDING_ORG_ID, the
org every pre-tenancy document and every legacy enrollment path resolves
into.
Where org_id comes from, end to end: a customer's node enrolls with a
per-org token (new enrollment_tokens/{token_hash} collection, minted via
POST /org/enrollment-tokens - new routers/org.py) instead of the old
fleet-wide ENROLLMENT_TOKEN, which still works as a fallback that resolves
to FOUNDING_ORG_ID so an already-deployed node's .env doesn't start failing
today. The node's org_id then flows onto every call it produces
(mqtt_handler.py's call_start/call_end, upload.py's /upload handler all
resolve it from the node doc), and onto every incident correlated from
those calls (incident_correlator.py's _create_incident/_create_master_incident).
That last one is the part that isn't just a read filter: _build_context's
`all_active = collection_list("incidents", status="active")` fed every
correlation candidate - fast-path talkgroup match, unit-continuity,
disambiguation - from the entire incidents collection, unscoped. Without
scoping it to the call's own org_id, a call from org A could link into an
incident org B already owns, which is a cross-tenant data merge at
correlation time, not just an over-broad read. Same shape of bug in
alerter.py: rule matching pulled every enabled alert_rule regardless of
org, so org A's keyword rule could fire (and POST org A's Discord webhook)
on org B's radio traffic. Both now resolve org_id from the call doc itself
rather than threading a new parameter through every caller.
Every list/get route gained org scoping via a new resolve_caller_org_id()
helper in internal/auth.py, which handles the three credential shapes those
routes accept (service key, node api_key, Firebase user) uniformly and
returns None (unrestricted) for the service key and platform admins -
preserving today's single-org behaviour exactly while closing the leak for
everyone else: GET /nodes, /systems, /calls, /incidents, /alerts,
/alert-rules. Write routes for nodes/systems (approve, create, delete, etc.)
deliberately stay platform-admin-only for now rather than being loosened to
org-owner/operator - that's a real gap called out in SAAS_PLAN.md 2.4's
"should be" column, but it's a separate authorization redesign the 12-item
build order doesn't actually enumerate, and doing it half-considered here
risked being exactly the "half-applied filter is worse than none" failure
mode the plan warns about. Today's founding org keeps working unchanged;
loosening node/system management to org owners is follow-up work, flagged
rather than guessed at.
Also closed the four spend/access-attack routes SAAS_PLAN.md B2c called out
by file and line: POST /calls/{id}/reprocess is now admin-only (was any
signed-in viewer looping the Whisper+Gemini pipeline for free - DEFERRED.md
had this as a live, independent-of-SaaS exploit) plus a per-call rate
limiter as a second guard; POST /alerts/{id}/acknowledge now checks the
alert's org_id; GET /admin/features moved from require_firebase_token to
require_admin_token; and trips.py's four unauthenticated mutation routes
(create_trip, update_trip_tags, create_event, update_event) are now
restricted to the founding org (or the bot's service key, or a platform
admin) - trips has no org_id of its own and isn't getting one, since
[[trips-feature-intentional]] says it's an internal utility riding along on
this stack, not a tenant-scoped product surface.
New public-but-scoped seam: POST /auth/signup (routers/links.py, alongside
the existing /auth/link* routes) provisions an organizations doc and an
owner org_members doc for a just-created Firebase user, then sets their
org_id/org_role claims - idempotent, so a double-submit doesn't create two
orgs. This is the only route that turns "has a Firebase account" into "can
read anything," which is what the frontend AuthProvider no-claim guard
(next commit) is built around.
Also new: GET/PATCH /org for the organization profile (closes the disabled
"Save changes" button noted in DEFERRED.md - there was no organizations
concept to save into before this), and POST /waitlist (public, source-IP
rate-limited, not coupled to any plan or tier - the commercial model is
still an open decision per SAAS_PLAN.md section 6).
Verified: all touched files py_compile clean; c2-core pytest is 69
passed / 10 failed, matching the documented pre-existing baseline exactly
(DEFERRED.md - mqtt_handler/node_sweeper test-vs-code drift, unrelated to
this change) - no new failures. flake8 --max-line-length=120 shows no new
violations in any touched file (checked each new E501/E221/E30x against
`git diff` to confirm it predates this commit); c2-core has no CI lint gate
regardless (CLAUDE.md - flake8 only runs in Client CI).
No new environment variables. Firestore composite indexes for the queries
this introduces were already shipped in the previous commit
(infra/firestore/firestore.indexes.json).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
58 lines
2.2 KiB
Python
58 lines
2.2 KiB
Python
"""
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Public waitlist submission — no self-serve org creation is promised here,
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just "we'll get back to you". Not coupled to any plan/tier: the commercial
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model (participation-based access, not per-seat SaaS — see
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app/internal/tenancy.py) is still being defined separately, so this route
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only ever writes {email, org_name, note} and never a plan_id.
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Unauthenticated by design (a prospect has no account yet), so the only
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protection against abuse is source-IP rate limiting via the shared
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_RateLimiter (app/internal/auth.py).
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"""
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from typing import Optional
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from uuid import uuid4
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Request
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from pydantic import BaseModel, field_validator
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from app.internal import firestore as fstore
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from app.internal.auth import waitlist_limiter
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from app.internal.logger import logger
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router = APIRouter(tags=["waitlist"])
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class WaitlistBody(BaseModel):
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# Plain str, not pydantic.EmailStr — EmailStr needs the email-validator
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# package, which isn't in requirements.txt, and adding a dependency for
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# one light check wasn't worth it. Good-enough sanity check only; this
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# is a marketing capture form, not an auth path.
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email: str
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org_name: Optional[str] = None
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note: Optional[str] = None
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@field_validator("email")
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@classmethod
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def _basic_email_shape(cls, v: str) -> str:
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v = v.strip()
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if "@" not in v or " " in v or len(v) > 254:
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raise ValueError("Enter a valid email address.")
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return v
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@router.post("/waitlist", status_code=201)
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async def join_waitlist(body: WaitlistBody, request: Request):
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client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
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waitlist_limiter.check(client_ip)
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entry_id = str(uuid4())
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await fstore.doc_set("waitlist", entry_id, {
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"entry_id": entry_id,
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"email": body.email.lower(),
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"org_name": (body.org_name or "").strip() or None,
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"note": (body.note or "").strip()[:2000] or None,
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"created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
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"source_ip": client_ip,
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}, merge=False)
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logger.info(f"Waitlist signup: {body.email!r} (org_name={body.org_name!r})")
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return {"ok": True}
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