Two unauthenticated surfaces closed on the edge node. Dashboard and API: the local dashboard and every /api/* route were open to anything on the node's LAN. Adds a login page plus session-cookie auth for the browser, and cookie-or-Basic for the API so scripted callers stay possible. Passwords are hashed with stdlib scrypt (no new dependency, this runs on a Pi) and compared in constant time; the salt and session-signing secret persist in credentials.json. Startup warns while the default password is still in place. No non-browser callers of the node API exist today (C2 talks to nodes over MQTT and nodes call C2 outbound), so nothing breaks. Adds python-multipart, which FastAPI's Form() needs for the login POST and which was missing from requirements entirely. MQTT: nodes authenticated with a shared drb-node password, and the broker ACL keyed off %c — the client-supplied client id — so any holder of that one password could claim another node's topic namespace. Nodes now connect as username=<node_id>, password=<their C2-issued api_key>, which mosquitto's dynamic-security plugin checks, with the ACL keyed off the authenticated %u. TLS is gated on MQTT_TLS and uses default CA verification. The old key_request MQTT path stays in place behind TODO(mqtt-cutover) markers as the fallback until the cutover is proven; a node with no api_key on disk logs a clear repeated refusal rather than spinning. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
65 lines
2.0 KiB
Python
65 lines
2.0 KiB
Python
from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Optional
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from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Form
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from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse, RedirectResponse
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from app.internal import auth
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router = APIRouter(tags=["ui"])
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_TEMPLATE = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "templates" / "index.html"
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_SCANNER_TEMPLATE = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "templates" / "scanner.html"
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_LOGIN_TEMPLATE = Path(__file__).parent.parent / "templates" / "login.html"
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@router.get("/login", response_class=HTMLResponse)
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async def login_page(error: Optional[str] = None):
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html = _LOGIN_TEMPLATE.read_text()
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banner = (
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'<div class="error">Invalid username or password.</div>' if error else ""
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)
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return html.replace("<!--ERROR_BANNER-->", banner)
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@router.post("/login")
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async def login_submit(username: str = Form(...), password: str = Form(...)):
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if not auth.verify_credentials(username, password):
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return RedirectResponse("/login?error=1", status_code=303)
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token = auth.create_session_token(username)
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resp = RedirectResponse("/", status_code=303)
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resp.set_cookie(
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auth.SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
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token,
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max_age=auth.SESSION_TTL_SECONDS,
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httponly=True,
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samesite="lax",
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# No TLS termination on this port (LAN dashboard on :80) — `secure`
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# would make the cookie never get sent at all.
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secure=False,
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)
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return resp
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@router.post("/logout")
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@router.get("/logout")
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async def logout():
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resp = RedirectResponse("/login", status_code=303)
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resp.delete_cookie(auth.SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
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return resp
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@router.get("/", response_class=HTMLResponse)
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async def index(authed: bool = Depends(auth.require_session)):
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if not authed:
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return RedirectResponse("/login")
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return _TEMPLATE.read_text()
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@router.get("/scanner", response_class=HTMLResponse)
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async def scanner(authed: bool = Depends(auth.require_session)):
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if not authed:
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return RedirectResponse("/login")
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return _SCANNER_TEMPLATE.read_text()
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