Give mosquitto's bind-mounted dirs to uid 1883, not root
The broker crash-looped on every deploy: "Unable to load server certificate /mosquitto/certs/mqtt.crt ... Permission denied". The cert-sync script wrote 600 root:root into a 0700 root:root directory, on the assumption that mosquitto runs as root inside its container. It does not — the stock eclipse-mosquitto entrypoint drops privileges to the in-image mosquitto user, confirmed on the server as uid=1883(mosquitto) gid=1883(mosquitto), and the broker's own log says so on every start. Certs dir is now root:1883 0750 with the cert 0644 and the key 0640, and the data dir is 1883:1883 recursively — recursively because mosquitto WRITES dynamic-security.json there, and a root-owned file left by an earlier deploy would still be unwritable after a directory-only chown. Also drops the "unverified Caddy cert path" note: a real issuance confirmed the path, producing CN=mqtt.drb.cusano.net signed by Let's Encrypt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 5
parent
a0a414ad21
commit
55cd1110df
@@ -72,26 +72,36 @@
|
||||
# read Caddy's own cert storage, so a systemd path unit + oneshot service
|
||||
# copies a readable copy out and SIGHUPs the broker on every change.
|
||||
|
||||
# root:1883 0750, not root:root 0700. The stock eclipse-mosquitto entrypoint
|
||||
# drops privileges to the in-image `mosquitto` user (uid/gid 1883), so a
|
||||
# root-only directory makes the broker fail to read its own cert and
|
||||
# crash-loop: "Unable to load server certificate ... Permission denied".
|
||||
# The host has no `mosquitto` user, hence the numeric gid.
|
||||
- name: Create mosquitto certs directory
|
||||
file:
|
||||
path: /opt/drb/mosquitto-certs
|
||||
state: directory
|
||||
owner: root
|
||||
group: root
|
||||
mode: "0700"
|
||||
group: "1883"
|
||||
mode: "0750"
|
||||
|
||||
# dynamic-security.json (node credentials — see app/internal/dynsec.py)
|
||||
# lives here. Root-owned is fine: the mosquitto container itself runs as
|
||||
# root (no `user` directive in mosquitto.conf, matching the pre-existing
|
||||
# setup this project already ran before the dynsec change), so it can
|
||||
# read/write this directory directly without any host-side chown dance.
|
||||
# lives here, and mosquitto WRITES it, so this must be owned by the uid the
|
||||
# broker actually runs as (1883), not root. The earlier assumption that the
|
||||
# container runs as root was wrong — the image's entrypoint drops privileges
|
||||
# to the `mosquitto` user, which a real deploy proved by failing to read a
|
||||
# root-owned cert. Same numeric-gid reasoning as the certs directory above.
|
||||
- name: Create mosquitto data directory
|
||||
file:
|
||||
path: /opt/drb/mosquitto-data
|
||||
state: directory
|
||||
owner: root
|
||||
group: root
|
||||
owner: "1883"
|
||||
group: "1883"
|
||||
mode: "0700"
|
||||
# recurse so an existing root-owned dynamic-security.json / mosquitto.db
|
||||
# left behind by the earlier root-owned deploy gets fixed too — chowning
|
||||
# only the directory would leave the broker unable to rewrite them.
|
||||
recurse: true
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Deploy MQTT cert-sync script
|
||||
template:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,12 +10,9 @@
|
||||
# source cert file for changes — a path unit rather than cron so this fires
|
||||
# on the actual write instead of racing a polling interval.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# UNVERIFIED: the exact source path below assumes Caddy's default file
|
||||
# storage layout and Let's Encrypt's production ACME directory name. This
|
||||
# has not been confirmed against a real Caddy cert issuance for this
|
||||
# project — check `caddy storage` / find the actual path under
|
||||
# /var/lib/caddy the first time this runs, and correct CADDY_CERT_DIR below
|
||||
# if it doesn't match.
|
||||
# CONFIRMED 2026-08-16 against a real issuance on drb-server: this path is
|
||||
# correct, and the copied cert came out as CN=mqtt.drb.cusano.net issued by
|
||||
# Let's Encrypt. Was previously flagged unverified.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# UNVERIFIED: mosquitto 2.x reloading TLS certs on SIGHUP without dropping
|
||||
# connections is documented upstream but untested here. If listener 8883
|
||||
@@ -43,8 +40,16 @@ mkdir -p "$DEST_DIR"
|
||||
# user) needs its own readable copy, not a pointer to an unreadable file.
|
||||
cp "$SRC_CERT" "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.crt"
|
||||
cp "$SRC_KEY" "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.key"
|
||||
chmod 600 "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.crt" "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.key"
|
||||
chown root:root "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.crt" "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.key"
|
||||
# Ownership matters: the stock eclipse-mosquitto entrypoint drops privileges
|
||||
# to the in-image `mosquitto` user (uid/gid 1883) — the broker does NOT run
|
||||
# as root, despite what an earlier note in DEFERRED.md claimed. Proof from a
|
||||
# real deploy: "running mosquitto as user: mosquitto", immediately followed
|
||||
# by "Unable to load server certificate ... Permission denied" on a
|
||||
# 600 root:root cert. The host has no such user, so use the numeric gid.
|
||||
# The cert is public material (0644); the key is group-read only (0640).
|
||||
chown root:1883 "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.crt" "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.key"
|
||||
chmod 644 "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.crt"
|
||||
chmod 640 "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.key"
|
||||
|
||||
cd "$APP_DIR"
|
||||
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml kill -s HUP mosquitto
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user