b430cf32f29034beeb98186669de34e7a194f2ab
7
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5
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8b6c170265 |
Close viewer-triggerable OpenAI spend on incident summarize (server-26#81)
POST /incidents/{id}/summarize was gated by require_service_or_firebase_token,
which accepts any authenticated Firebase user including role "viewer". That
route spends OpenAI credits via the background summarizer. The call-side
equivalent was already moved to require_admin_token; this brings the incident
side in line with it.
The frontend's two "summarize now" buttons on the incident detail page are
already gated behind isAdmin, so this backend change matches existing UI
behavior exactly and does not break any viewer/operator surface — it only
closes direct-API access for non-admins.
Swept every other route in incidents.py: list/get are reads with no spend and
correctly stay open to any signed-in user; create/update/delete/link/unlink
were already require_admin_token. No other sibling route needed changing.
Adds test_incident_summarize_auth.py pinning the dependency wiring directly
(the convention used in test_admin_feature_flags.py), so a future revert back
to the weak dependency fails a test immediately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Logan Cusano
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d18e4f0743 |
Make "AI is off" true, and stop the transcript PATCH from destroying calls
config/ai_features was not the switch it was documented to be. Three paths spent money with it off, and one path read it wrong, so per-system opt-outs did not opt anything out. - Correlation in the ingest pipeline tested the raw global flag instead of the per-system resolution. With a system opted out, extraction was skipped but the no-scenes fallback still correlated the call with empty tags, taking the thin/recency path and attaching it to whatever incident was most recent on that system. The opt-out did not disable correlation, it disabled good correlation and left the worst kind running. (#75) - Transcript correction ran on every transcribed call gated only by an env var, spending Gemini tokens and a Places lookup per proposed location. An "STT-only" window was never STT-only and its cost could not be attributed. Now behind transcript_correction_enabled. (#76) - _run_extraction_pipeline and the vocabulary learner, both reachable from PATCH /calls/{id}/transcript, checked no flags at all. (#76, #81) The flag resolver now lives in feature_flags.resolve_flags() rather than as a local helper in upload.py. Three copies of that logic is how #75 happened. PATCH /calls/{id}/transcript now refuses with 409 when correlation is off. That route wipes tags, severity, location, units, embedding and unlinks the call from every incident before queueing re-extraction. Gating extraction alone would have made it destructive-only in the standing flags-off configuration: the call left blank and orphaned forever, with the route still answering 200. The wipe and the rebuild are one transaction in intent, so it refuses before the first write. Also: the summarizer's stale-incident sweep is no longer behind summaries_enabled. It is pure Firestore with no model call in it, and gating it meant nothing auto-resolved while AI was off - so every incident stayed active forever and the candidate set every correlation reads kept growing. transcript_correction_enabled is documented as NOT a pure cost lever. The corrector is also the noise gate that sets not_speech; with it off, recogniser noise reaches extraction as a real transcript, comes back thin, and auto-attaches. Never open an evaluation window with correction off and correlation on. 14 tests added covering flag precedence, both pipeline paths, the 409, the correction gate and the summarizer no-op. Suite: 264 passed. Refs #75, #76, #81, #45. |
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Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5
|
140dfbfc74 |
Give the archive a real read, and the debug view a verdict
Three backend pieces the /calls page needs, plus the fix for a debug view that
hid its data exactly when it was wanted.
GET /calls/search — paged, filterable call archive. GET /calls returns every
call in one unordered shot: fine for a node's handful of active calls, useless
as an archive. Only the org scope and the started_at ordering go to Firestore,
since that pair is the one composite index that exists; the rest filters in
Python over a bounded window, the same shape admin.py's debug route uses. The
cursor advances over the scanned window rather than the returned page, or a
sparse filter would re-scan from the same place forever.
Manual attribution. POST /incidents/{id}/calls/{id} only ever wrote the legacy
scalar incident_id, never incident_ids -- which is what the correlator writes
and what the frontend queries with array-contains. A manually attached call was
therefore invisible on the incident page it had just been attached to. It now
maintains both and marks the summary stale. DELETE is new: there was no way to
undo an attachment at all, so a wrong link was permanent.
The debug view no longer filters to AI-enabled systems by default. That filter
emptied the view the moment the flags went off, which is precisely when a
window gets reviewed -- on 2026-08-23 it fell from 100 incidents to 6 between
switching correlation off and opening the tab. ai_systems_only=true restores it.
It also returns a summary block now: corr_path / fit_signal / consensus /
llm_action tallies, transcript coverage on both linked and orphaned calls,
single-call and median-calls-per-incident for fragmentation, max span and
anything past the server-26#22 caps for merging, and the count of incidents
still carrying a fallback "— TGID" title. All of it was being recomputed by
hand from the raw payload on every review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Logan CusanoandClaude Opus 5
|
a3681ea698 |
Stamp org_id everywhere and gate every route that leaked across tenants
The previous commit shipped Firestore rules that reference an org_id claim
nothing issues yet, and an org_id filter nothing writes yet - this is the
commit that makes both real. Backend half of SAAS_PLAN.md B2/B2b/B2c.
Data model: organizations/{org_id} and org_members/{uid} are new
collections (models.py OrganizationRecord/OrgMember). org_id is now an
Optional field on NodeRecord, SystemRecord, CallRecord, IncidentRecord,
AlertRule, and AlertEvent - optional because every existing document
predates it; scripts/backfill_org_id.py (written, not run - it touches
production Firestore and Firebase Auth claims) is what closes that gap
later. plan_id/subscription_status/stripe_* on OrganizationRecord are
deliberately None: no billing or pricing model has been decided, so this is
a seam, not a promise. app/internal/tenancy.py holds FOUNDING_ORG_ID, the
org every pre-tenancy document and every legacy enrollment path resolves
into.
Where org_id comes from, end to end: a customer's node enrolls with a
per-org token (new enrollment_tokens/{token_hash} collection, minted via
POST /org/enrollment-tokens - new routers/org.py) instead of the old
fleet-wide ENROLLMENT_TOKEN, which still works as a fallback that resolves
to FOUNDING_ORG_ID so an already-deployed node's .env doesn't start failing
today. The node's org_id then flows onto every call it produces
(mqtt_handler.py's call_start/call_end, upload.py's /upload handler all
resolve it from the node doc), and onto every incident correlated from
those calls (incident_correlator.py's _create_incident/_create_master_incident).
That last one is the part that isn't just a read filter: _build_context's
`all_active = collection_list("incidents", status="active")` fed every
correlation candidate - fast-path talkgroup match, unit-continuity,
disambiguation - from the entire incidents collection, unscoped. Without
scoping it to the call's own org_id, a call from org A could link into an
incident org B already owns, which is a cross-tenant data merge at
correlation time, not just an over-broad read. Same shape of bug in
alerter.py: rule matching pulled every enabled alert_rule regardless of
org, so org A's keyword rule could fire (and POST org A's Discord webhook)
on org B's radio traffic. Both now resolve org_id from the call doc itself
rather than threading a new parameter through every caller.
Every list/get route gained org scoping via a new resolve_caller_org_id()
helper in internal/auth.py, which handles the three credential shapes those
routes accept (service key, node api_key, Firebase user) uniformly and
returns None (unrestricted) for the service key and platform admins -
preserving today's single-org behaviour exactly while closing the leak for
everyone else: GET /nodes, /systems, /calls, /incidents, /alerts,
/alert-rules. Write routes for nodes/systems (approve, create, delete, etc.)
deliberately stay platform-admin-only for now rather than being loosened to
org-owner/operator - that's a real gap called out in SAAS_PLAN.md 2.4's
"should be" column, but it's a separate authorization redesign the 12-item
build order doesn't actually enumerate, and doing it half-considered here
risked being exactly the "half-applied filter is worse than none" failure
mode the plan warns about. Today's founding org keeps working unchanged;
loosening node/system management to org owners is follow-up work, flagged
rather than guessed at.
Also closed the four spend/access-attack routes SAAS_PLAN.md B2c called out
by file and line: POST /calls/{id}/reprocess is now admin-only (was any
signed-in viewer looping the Whisper+Gemini pipeline for free - DEFERRED.md
had this as a live, independent-of-SaaS exploit) plus a per-call rate
limiter as a second guard; POST /alerts/{id}/acknowledge now checks the
alert's org_id; GET /admin/features moved from require_firebase_token to
require_admin_token; and trips.py's four unauthenticated mutation routes
(create_trip, update_trip_tags, create_event, update_event) are now
restricted to the founding org (or the bot's service key, or a platform
admin) - trips has no org_id of its own and isn't getting one, since
[[trips-feature-intentional]] says it's an internal utility riding along on
this stack, not a tenant-scoped product surface.
New public-but-scoped seam: POST /auth/signup (routers/links.py, alongside
the existing /auth/link* routes) provisions an organizations doc and an
owner org_members doc for a just-created Firebase user, then sets their
org_id/org_role claims - idempotent, so a double-submit doesn't create two
orgs. This is the only route that turns "has a Firebase account" into "can
read anything," which is what the frontend AuthProvider no-claim guard
(next commit) is built around.
Also new: GET/PATCH /org for the organization profile (closes the disabled
"Save changes" button noted in DEFERRED.md - there was no organizations
concept to save into before this), and POST /waitlist (public, source-IP
rate-limited, not coupled to any plan or tier - the commercial model is
still an open decision per SAAS_PLAN.md section 6).
Verified: all touched files py_compile clean; c2-core pytest is 69
passed / 10 failed, matching the documented pre-existing baseline exactly
(DEFERRED.md - mqtt_handler/node_sweeper test-vs-code drift, unrelated to
this change) - no new failures. flake8 --max-line-length=120 shows no new
violations in any touched file (checked each new E501/E221/E30x against
`git diff` to confirm it predates this commit); c2-core has no CI lint gate
regardless (CLAUDE.md - flake8 only runs in Client CI).
No new environment variables. Firestore composite indexes for the queries
this introduces were already shipped in the previous commit
(infra/firestore/firestore.indexes.json).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Logan
|
18d96193ab |
Security fixes
auth.py
secrets.compare_digest replaces == for service key comparison (timing-safe)
Added require_service_key — bot-only endpoints (trip/event join/leave)
Added require_service_key_or_admin — node commands/config (bot via service key OR dashboard admin via Firebase)
Added _RateLimiter with three shared instances: trip_chat_limiter (20/5min per user), summarize_limiter (5/10min per incident), bootstrap_limiter (2/hr per system)
nodes.py
send_command and assign_system now require require_service_key_or_admin — the Discord bot can still call them via service key, but regular Firebase users are blocked
tokens.py
add_token, flush_tokens, set_preferred_system, delete_token all require require_admin_token
Token masking changed from token[:10] + "…" + token[-4:] to "•••" + token[-4:]
systems.py
All write endpoints (create, update, delete, ai-flags, ten-codes, vocabulary writes, bootstrap) now require require_admin_token
bootstrap_vocabulary also calls bootstrap_limiter.check(system_id)
incidents.py
POST /incidents/summarize (bulk) now requires require_admin_token
POST /incidents/{id}/summarize now calls summarize_limiter.check(incident_id)
trips.py
join_trip, leave_trip, join_event, leave_event require require_service_key — only the Discord bot can set Discord attendee identity
delete_trip, delete_event require require_service_key_or_admin
trip_chat rate-limited per caller UID, history stripped to user/assistant roles only, user message truncated to 2000 chars, Maps query strings capped at 200 chars
upload.py
Rejects files larger than settings.upload_max_bytes (default 100MB) with 413
storage.py
_safe_audio_filename() derives GCS object name from call_id + allowlisted extension, completely ignoring the client-supplied filename
config.py
Added upload_max_bytes: int = 100 * 1024 * 1024
Both Dockerfiles — python:3.14-slim → python:3.12-slim
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Logan
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2d606add75 | Add new on-demand runs | ||
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Logan
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3b3a136d04 | Massive update |