Let edge nodes read /systems with their own api_key

The node builds its OP25 config from GET /systems, but that router only
accepted a Firebase token or the shared service key — a node holds neither.
Every fetch returned 401 and the node fell back to its stale offline cache,
so a system edited in the UI never reached the field. Confirmed on node-002
against the live server: "Failed to fetch systems from C2: 401 Unauthorized
... Offline cache will be used."

The node sends no node_id with the request, only the bearer token, so the
key is matched by querying node_keys for the value instead of fetching a
known document the way /upload does.

Read access only: the mutating routes in this router each carry their own
require_admin_token, so widening the router-level gate doesn't let a node
create, edit or delete a system.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

drb-c2-core/app/internal/auth.py

@@ -37,6 +37,41 @@ async def require_service_or_firebase_token(
         raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid or expired token")
 
 
+async def require_node_service_or_firebase_token(
+    credentials: Optional[HTTPAuthorizationCredentials] = Security(_bearer),
+) -> dict:
+    """Accept a node's own API key in addition to a service key / Firebase token.
+
+    Edge nodes need to read ``/systems`` to build their OP25 config, but they
+    hold neither a Firebase token nor the shared service key — only the
+    per-node api_key that ``/upload`` already trusts. Without this they got a
+    flat 401 and silently fell back to their stale offline cache, so a system
+    edited in the UI never reached the node.
+
+    Unlike ``/upload``, the node sends no node_id alongside the bearer token,
+    so the key is matched by querying ``node_keys`` for the value rather than
+    fetching a known document. Mutating routes are unaffected: they carry
+    their own ``require_admin_token`` dependency, so widening the router-level
+    gate grants nodes read access only.
+    """
+    if not credentials:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Missing authorization token")
+    token = credentials.credentials
+    if settings.service_key and secrets.compare_digest(token, settings.service_key):
+        return {"service": True}
+    try:
+        return firebase_auth.verify_id_token(token)
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+    # Deferred import: app.internal.firestore initialises firebase-admin at
+    # import time, and auth.py is imported from module scope in the routers.
+    from app.internal import firestore as fstore
+    matches = await fstore.collection_list("node_keys", api_key=token)
+    if matches:
+        return {"node": True, "node_id": matches[0].get("node_id")}
+    raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid or expired token")
+
+
 def get_role(decoded: dict) -> str:
     """Extract the effective role from a decoded Firebase token.
 

drb-c2-core/app/main.py

@@ -9,7 +9,11 @@ from app.internal.summarizer import summarizer_loop
 from app.internal.vocabulary_learner import vocabulary_induction_loop
 from app.internal.recorrelation_sweep import recorrelation_loop
 from app.config import settings
-from app.internal.auth import require_firebase_token, require_service_or_firebase_token
+from app.internal.auth import (
+    require_firebase_token,
+    require_service_or_firebase_token,
+    require_node_service_or_firebase_token,
+)
 from app.routers import nodes, systems, calls, upload, tokens, incidents, alerts, admin, trips, places, links, users
 from app.routers import enrollment
 from app.internal import dynsec
@@ -81,7 +85,11 @@ app.add_middleware(
 )
 
 app.include_router(nodes.router,     dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])
-app.include_router(systems.router,   dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])
+# systems is the one router edge nodes read directly (system_cacher.py builds
+# the OP25 config from it), so its gate also accepts a per-node api_key. The
+# write routes inside carry their own require_admin_token, so nodes get read
+# access only.
+app.include_router(systems.router,   dependencies=[Depends(require_node_service_or_firebase_token)])
 app.include_router(calls.router,     dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])
 app.include_router(tokens.router,    dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])
 app.include_router(incidents.router, dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])

infra/ansible/roles/deploy/tasks/main.yml

@@ -72,26 +72,36 @@
 # read Caddy's own cert storage, so a systemd path unit + oneshot service
 # copies a readable copy out and SIGHUPs the broker on every change.
 
+# root:1883 0750, not root:root 0700. The stock eclipse-mosquitto entrypoint
+# drops privileges to the in-image `mosquitto` user (uid/gid 1883), so a
+# root-only directory makes the broker fail to read its own cert and
+# crash-loop: "Unable to load server certificate ... Permission denied".
+# The host has no `mosquitto` user, hence the numeric gid.
 - name: Create mosquitto certs directory
   file:
     path: /opt/drb/mosquitto-certs
     state: directory
     owner: root
-    group: root
+    group: "1883"
-    mode: "0700"
+    mode: "0750"
 
 # dynamic-security.json (node credentials — see app/internal/dynsec.py)
-# lives here. Root-owned is fine: the mosquitto container itself runs as
+# lives here, and mosquitto WRITES it, so this must be owned by the uid the
-# root (no `user` directive in mosquitto.conf, matching the pre-existing
+# broker actually runs as (1883), not root. The earlier assumption that the
-# setup this project already ran before the dynsec change), so it can
+# container runs as root was wrong — the image's entrypoint drops privileges
-# read/write this directory directly without any host-side chown dance.
+# to the `mosquitto` user, which a real deploy proved by failing to read a
+# root-owned cert. Same numeric-gid reasoning as the certs directory above.
 - name: Create mosquitto data directory
   file:
     path: /opt/drb/mosquitto-data
     state: directory
-    owner: root
+    owner: "1883"
-    group: root
+    group: "1883"
     mode: "0700"
+    # recurse so an existing root-owned dynamic-security.json / mosquitto.db
+    # left behind by the earlier root-owned deploy gets fixed too — chowning
+    # only the directory would leave the broker unable to rewrite them.
+    recurse: true
 
 - name: Deploy MQTT cert-sync script
   template:

infra/ansible/roles/deploy/templates/sync-mqtt-cert.sh.j2

@@ -10,12 +10,9 @@
 # source cert file for changes — a path unit rather than cron so this fires
 # on the actual write instead of racing a polling interval.
 #
-# UNVERIFIED: the exact source path below assumes Caddy's default file
+# CONFIRMED 2026-08-16 against a real issuance on drb-server: this path is
-# storage layout and Let's Encrypt's production ACME directory name. This
+# correct, and the copied cert came out as CN=mqtt.drb.cusano.net issued by
-# has not been confirmed against a real Caddy cert issuance for this
+# Let's Encrypt. Was previously flagged unverified.
-# project — check `caddy storage` / find the actual path under
-# /var/lib/caddy the first time this runs, and correct CADDY_CERT_DIR below
-# if it doesn't match.
 #
 # UNVERIFIED: mosquitto 2.x reloading TLS certs on SIGHUP without dropping
 # connections is documented upstream but untested here. If listener 8883
@@ -43,8 +40,16 @@ mkdir -p "$DEST_DIR"
 # user) needs its own readable copy, not a pointer to an unreadable file.
 cp "$SRC_CERT" "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.crt"
 cp "$SRC_KEY"  "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.key"
-chmod 600 "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.crt" "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.key"
+# Ownership matters: the stock eclipse-mosquitto entrypoint drops privileges
-chown root:root "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.crt" "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.key"
+# to the in-image `mosquitto` user (uid/gid 1883) — the broker does NOT run
+# as root, despite what an earlier note in DEFERRED.md claimed. Proof from a
+# real deploy: "running mosquitto as user: mosquitto", immediately followed
+# by "Unable to load server certificate ... Permission denied" on a
+# 600 root:root cert. The host has no such user, so use the numeric gid.
+# The cert is public material (0644); the key is group-read only (0640).
+chown root:1883 "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.crt" "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.key"
+chmod 644 "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.crt"
+chmod 640 "$DEST_DIR/mqtt.key"
 
 cd "$APP_DIR"
 docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml kill -s HUP mosquitto