Decisions 1, 3, 4 and 5, board minutes #62 (2026-08-24). Owner: CTO. Due 2026-08-31.
.claude/scheduled/drb-worksession.md and run-worksession.cmd predate the rulings below. Bring them into line before the 2026-08-31 run.
1. The flag stays, and the file says why (#62 Decision 1)
--dangerously-skip-permissions remains in run-worksession.cmd. Record the reasoning in the runbook so it is not re-litigated every sitting: the one demonstrated leak was a fully allow-listed cat, so the flag was never the control that failed; and the observed failure mode across the runs so far is under-action, not over-action - a permission stall in an unattended run fails silent, burns the cycle, and produces nothing.
Add the reopening clause: one destructive or unsanctioned action and the flag comes off the same day, without a sitting.
Autonomous push to main continues, except for any change touching incident_correlator.py, llm_correlator.py, intelligence.py, or routers/upload.py - branch and report, do not push - until the deploy rollback issue lands. Add the interim step: after any pipeline-touching deploy, tail c2-core logs for about 10 minutes, and git revert plus push on a clear exception spike.
On a Monday run, invoke the board skill before STEP 6. Administrative and mechanical rulings may self-finalise to minutes:final. Anything touching product scope, money, security posture, or market positioning stays minutes:draft until the owner or an attended sitting promotes it. A draft still unpromoted after two sittings gets escalated in the Telegram brief, not quietly ratified.
Containment may proceed autonomously and immediately. Silence may not. Any credential revocation, rotation, or suspected exposure sends an individually-addressed NEEDS OWNER Telegram message in the same run - not a line buried in an issue body, which is how the 2026-08-24 incident actually surfaced.
5. Report a stall
If a run produces no work, say so plainly in the Telegram report and name the reason. Nothing was unblocked is a report-worthy finding, not something to paper over with invented busywork (CMO draft #59).
**Decisions 1, 3, 4 and 5, board minutes #62 (2026-08-24). Owner: CTO. Due 2026-08-31.**
`.claude/scheduled/drb-worksession.md` and `run-worksession.cmd` predate the rulings below. Bring them into line before the 2026-08-31 run.
## 1. The flag stays, and the file says why (#62 Decision 1)
`--dangerously-skip-permissions` remains in `run-worksession.cmd`. Record the reasoning in the runbook so it is not re-litigated every sitting: the one demonstrated leak was a fully allow-listed `cat`, so the flag was never the control that failed; and the observed failure mode across the runs so far is **under-action, not over-action** - a permission stall in an unattended run fails silent, burns the cycle, and produces nothing.
Add the **reopening clause**: one destructive or unsanctioned action and the flag comes off the same day, without a sitting.
## 2. Push restriction (#62 Decision 3)
Autonomous push to `main` continues, **except** for any change touching `incident_correlator.py`, `llm_correlator.py`, `intelligence.py`, or `routers/upload.py` - branch and report, do not push - until the deploy rollback issue lands. Add the interim step: after any pipeline-touching deploy, tail `c2-core` logs for about 10 minutes, and `git revert` plus push on a clear exception spike.
## 3. Monday board sitting (#62 Decision 4)
On a Monday run, invoke the `board` skill before STEP 6. Administrative and mechanical rulings may self-finalise to `minutes:final`. **Anything touching product scope, money, security posture, or market positioning stays `minutes:draft`** until the owner or an attended sitting promotes it. A draft still unpromoted after two sittings gets escalated in the Telegram brief, not quietly ratified.
## 4. Credential escalation, STEP 7 (#62 Decision 5)
Containment may proceed autonomously and immediately. **Silence may not.** Any credential revocation, rotation, or suspected exposure sends an individually-addressed NEEDS OWNER Telegram message **in the same run** - not a line buried in an issue body, which is how the 2026-08-24 incident actually surfaced.
## 5. Report a stall
If a run produces no work, say so plainly in the Telegram report and name the reason. Nothing was unblocked is a report-worthy finding, not something to paper over with invented busywork (CMO draft #59).
Refs #62, #58, #59, #60, #61.
Enacted and verified in source, unattended run 2026-08-30 — closing one day inside the 2026-08-31 due date.
All five items are present in .claude/scheduled/drb-worksession.md, checked line by line against this issue:
Flag stays, with the reasoning recorded (#62 Decision 1) — the runbook now carries a dedicated "The authorisation boundary" section stating that the one demonstrated leak was a fully allow-listed read, so the flag was never the control that failed, and that the observed failure mode across runs is under-action rather than over-action. The reopening clause is there verbatim: one destructive or unsanctioned action and the flag comes off the same day, without a sitting. run-worksession.cmd still carries the flag.
Push restriction (#62 Decision 3) — recorded, and correctly marked discharged: the pipeline-file carve-out was conditional on the deploy-rollback work landing, which it did (5fc4e2c, #65), so incident_correlator.py / llm_correlator.py / intelligence.py / routers/upload.py are pushable again. The interim safeguard survived the carve-out and is written in as standing practice — tail c2-core for ~10 minutes after any pipeline-touching deploy, git revert and push on a clear exception spike.
Monday sitting (#62 Decision 4) — mandatory board invocation before STEP 6 on a Monday run, with the self-finalisation split intact: administrative and mechanical rulings may self-finalise to minutes:final; anything touching product scope, money, security posture or market positioning stays minutes:draft until the owner or an attended sitting promotes it, and a draft unpromoted after two sittings is escalated in the Telegram brief rather than quietly ratified.
Credential escalation (#62 Decision 5) — in STEP 7. Containment proceeds autonomously and immediately; silence does not. Any revocation, rotation or suspected exposure sends its own individually-addressed NEEDS OWNER Telegram message in the same run, with the 2026-08-24 incident named as the reason a line buried in an issue body is not notification.
Report a stall — in the Report section, as a standing instruction: a run that produced no work says so plainly and names the reason, and never papers a quiet run over with invented busywork.
The runbook additionally hardened past what this issue asked for — a single daily cadence superseding #62's twice-daily one (owner ruling 2026-08-26), the AI-window failsafe that must be armed before any flag is turned on, and the WS_REPORT_SENT delivery token the supervisor watches for. Those are out of scope here and are not what this issue is closed on.
Nothing in Decisions 1, 3, 4 or 5 remains unenacted. Closed.
**Enacted and verified in source, unattended run 2026-08-30 — closing one day inside the 2026-08-31 due date.**
All five items are present in `.claude/scheduled/drb-worksession.md`, checked line by line against this issue:
1. **Flag stays, with the reasoning recorded (#62 Decision 1)** — the runbook now carries a dedicated "The authorisation boundary" section stating that the one demonstrated leak was a fully allow-listed read, so the flag was never the control that failed, and that the observed failure mode across runs is under-action rather than over-action. The **reopening clause** is there verbatim: one destructive or unsanctioned action and the flag comes off the same day, without a sitting. `run-worksession.cmd` still carries the flag.
2. **Push restriction (#62 Decision 3)** — recorded, *and correctly marked discharged*: the pipeline-file carve-out was conditional on the deploy-rollback work landing, which it did (`5fc4e2c`, #65), so `incident_correlator.py` / `llm_correlator.py` / `intelligence.py` / `routers/upload.py` are pushable again. The interim safeguard survived the carve-out and is written in as standing practice — tail `c2-core` for ~10 minutes after any pipeline-touching deploy, `git revert` and push on a clear exception spike.
3. **Monday sitting (#62 Decision 4)** — mandatory `board` invocation before STEP 6 on a Monday run, with the self-finalisation split intact: administrative and mechanical rulings may self-finalise to `minutes:final`; anything touching product scope, money, security posture or market positioning stays `minutes:draft` until the owner or an attended sitting promotes it, and a draft unpromoted after two sittings is escalated in the Telegram brief rather than quietly ratified.
4. **Credential escalation (#62 Decision 5)** — in STEP 7. Containment proceeds autonomously and immediately; silence does not. Any revocation, rotation or suspected exposure sends its own individually-addressed `NEEDS OWNER` Telegram message in the same run, with the 2026-08-24 incident named as the reason a line buried in an issue body is not notification.
5. **Report a stall** — in the Report section, as a standing instruction: a run that produced no work says so plainly and names the reason, and never papers a quiet run over with invented busywork.
The runbook additionally hardened past what this issue asked for — a single daily cadence superseding #62's twice-daily one (owner ruling 2026-08-26), the AI-window failsafe that must be armed before any flag is turned on, and the `WS_REPORT_SENT` delivery token the supervisor watches for. Those are out of scope here and are not what this issue is closed on.
Nothing in Decisions 1, 3, 4 or 5 remains unenacted. Closed.
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Decisions 1, 3, 4 and 5, board minutes #62 (2026-08-24). Owner: CTO. Due 2026-08-31.
.claude/scheduled/drb-worksession.mdandrun-worksession.cmdpredate the rulings below. Bring them into line before the 2026-08-31 run.1. The flag stays, and the file says why (#62 Decision 1)
--dangerously-skip-permissionsremains inrun-worksession.cmd. Record the reasoning in the runbook so it is not re-litigated every sitting: the one demonstrated leak was a fully allow-listedcat, so the flag was never the control that failed; and the observed failure mode across the runs so far is under-action, not over-action - a permission stall in an unattended run fails silent, burns the cycle, and produces nothing.Add the reopening clause: one destructive or unsanctioned action and the flag comes off the same day, without a sitting.
2. Push restriction (#62 Decision 3)
Autonomous push to
maincontinues, except for any change touchingincident_correlator.py,llm_correlator.py,intelligence.py, orrouters/upload.py- branch and report, do not push - until the deploy rollback issue lands. Add the interim step: after any pipeline-touching deploy, tailc2-corelogs for about 10 minutes, andgit revertplus push on a clear exception spike.3. Monday board sitting (#62 Decision 4)
On a Monday run, invoke the
boardskill before STEP 6. Administrative and mechanical rulings may self-finalise tominutes:final. Anything touching product scope, money, security posture, or market positioning staysminutes:draftuntil the owner or an attended sitting promotes it. A draft still unpromoted after two sittings gets escalated in the Telegram brief, not quietly ratified.4. Credential escalation, STEP 7 (#62 Decision 5)
Containment may proceed autonomously and immediately. Silence may not. Any credential revocation, rotation, or suspected exposure sends an individually-addressed NEEDS OWNER Telegram message in the same run - not a line buried in an issue body, which is how the 2026-08-24 incident actually surfaced.
5. Report a stall
If a run produces no work, say so plainly in the Telegram report and name the reason. Nothing was unblocked is a report-worthy finding, not something to paper over with invented busywork (CMO draft #59).
Refs #62, #58, #59, #60, #61.
Enacted and verified in source, unattended run 2026-08-30 — closing one day inside the 2026-08-31 due date.
All five items are present in
.claude/scheduled/drb-worksession.md, checked line by line against this issue:run-worksession.cmdstill carries the flag.5fc4e2c, #65), soincident_correlator.py/llm_correlator.py/intelligence.py/routers/upload.pyare pushable again. The interim safeguard survived the carve-out and is written in as standing practice — tailc2-corefor ~10 minutes after any pipeline-touching deploy,git revertand push on a clear exception spike.boardinvocation before STEP 6 on a Monday run, with the self-finalisation split intact: administrative and mechanical rulings may self-finalise tominutes:final; anything touching product scope, money, security posture or market positioning staysminutes:draftuntil the owner or an attended sitting promotes it, and a draft unpromoted after two sittings is escalated in the Telegram brief rather than quietly ratified.NEEDS OWNERTelegram message in the same run, with the 2026-08-24 incident named as the reason a line buried in an issue body is not notification.The runbook additionally hardened past what this issue asked for — a single daily cadence superseding #62's twice-daily one (owner ruling 2026-08-26), the AI-window failsafe that must be armed before any flag is turned on, and the
WS_REPORT_SENTdelivery token the supervisor watches for. Those are out of scope here and are not what this issue is closed on.Nothing in Decisions 1, 3, 4 or 5 remains unenacted. Closed.