Files
server-26/infra/ansible/vault.yml.example
T
Logan Cusano 6140dd7b9c
Build & Deploy / Build & push images (push) Successful in 4m24s
Build & Deploy / Deploy to VM (push) Failing after 2m11s
Fix prod compose port collision and make ansible deploy re-runnable
docker-compose.prod.yml: compose merges `ports` by appending, so the prod
override left the base file's 8888:8000 and 3000:3000 in place next to the
127.0.0.1-scoped ones. Each container tried to bind its port twice and the
second bind failed with "address already in use", so c2-core and frontend
could never start. It also meant the localhost-only binding never applied —
both ports were published on every interface. Marked both `!override`, the
same way mosquitto already used `!reset`.

infra/ansible:
- add the missing "Reload Caddy" handler; the Deploy Caddyfile task notified
  a handler that did not exist, which aborts the play
- guard mkswap/swapon on whether /swapfile is already active, so a second run
  does not fail on "mounted" / "Device or resource busy"
- git task now updates instead of clone-once, otherwise a re-run redeploys
  whatever code was on the VM at first clone
- vault.yml.example: correct the registry token comment to read-only scope

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 21:19:03 -04:00

48 lines
3.0 KiB
Plaintext

# Template for your Ansible Vault secrets file.
# Copy to vault.yml, fill in values, then encrypt:
# ansible-vault encrypt vault.yml
# Edit later with:
# ansible-vault edit vault.yml
# ── MQTT ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
vault_mqtt_c2_user: drb-c2-core
vault_mqtt_c2_pass: "CHANGE_ME"
vault_mqtt_node_user: drb-node
vault_mqtt_node_pass: "CHANGE_ME"
# ── C2 Core ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
vault_service_key: "" # openssl rand -hex 32
vault_node_api_key: "" # openssl rand -hex 32
vault_openai_api_key: ""
vault_google_maps_api_key: ""
vault_gemini_api_key: ""
vault_gcs_bucket: "your-gcs-bucket-name"
vault_firestore_database: "c2-server"
# ── Gitea Container Registry ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
vault_registry_host: "git.vpn.cusano.net"
vault_registry_user: "logan"
vault_registry_token: "" # Gitea access token, READ-ONLY package scope.
# The VM only pulls (roles/deploy/tasks/main.yml:62-72);
# nothing here pushes. Pushing is CI's job and uses a
# separate write-scoped token (BUILD_TOKEN in Gitea
# repo secrets). Keep them separate: this token sits on
# an internet-facing VM, and a write-scoped one there
# would let an attacker publish a poisoned image that
# every future deploy and edge node would install.
vault_registry: "git.vpn.cusano.net/logan" # full image prefix
# ── Discord Bot ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
vault_discord_token: ""
# ── Frontend (Firebase) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
vault_firebase_api_key: ""
vault_firebase_auth_domain: ""
vault_firebase_project_id: ""
vault_firebase_storage_bucket: ""
vault_firebase_messaging_sender_id: ""
vault_firebase_app_id: ""
# No GCP key needed — the VM uses Application Default Credentials via the
# GCE metadata server. Terraform grants the required IAM roles at apply time.