node-26#9. Adds POST /telemetry/adsb (node-key authed via require_node_service_or_firebase_token) that upserts one Firestore doc per icao into a new `aircraft` collection, org_id stamped from the reporting node the same way upload.py defensively stamps `calls`. firestore.rules gets a matching docInMyOrg()-gated read rule. Frontend: useAircraft() mirrors useNodes()'s onSnapshot pattern, filtering docs older than 2 minutes client-side since nothing prunes a stale aircraft doc server-side yet. MapView gets an opt-in "Aircraft" overlay (unchecked by default, like the weather radar layer) rendering a rotated plane glyph per sighting. Unverified via typecheck — no Node.js/npm on this authoring box yet (see CLAUDE.md Testing reality). Server side is pytest-covered (test_telemetry.py). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
175 lines
8.4 KiB
Python
175 lines
8.4 KiB
Python
import os
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import asyncio
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from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
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from fastapi import FastAPI, Depends
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from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
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from app.internal.logger import logger
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from app.internal.mqtt_handler import mqtt_handler
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from app.internal.node_sweeper import sweeper_loop
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from app.internal.summarizer import summarizer_loop
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from app.internal.vocabulary_learner import vocabulary_induction_loop
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from app.internal.recorrelation_sweep import recorrelation_loop
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from app.internal import ai_health
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from app.config import settings
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from app.internal.auth import (
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require_firebase_token,
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require_service_or_firebase_token,
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require_node_service_or_firebase_token,
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)
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from app.routers import nodes, systems, calls, upload, tokens, incidents, alerts, admin, trips, places, links, users
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from app.routers import enrollment, media, org, waitlist, telemetry
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from app.internal import dynsec
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from app.internal import firestore as fstore
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async def _release_orphaned_tokens():
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"""Release all in-use tokens on startup — voice connections don't survive server restarts."""
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def _find():
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from app.internal.firestore import db
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return [d for d in db.collection("bot_tokens").where("in_use", "==", True).stream()]
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results = await asyncio.to_thread(_find)
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for doc in results:
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await fstore.doc_update("bot_tokens", doc.id, {
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"in_use": False,
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"assigned_node_id": None,
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"assigned_at": None,
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})
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if results:
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logger.info(f"Released {len(results)} orphaned token(s) on startup.")
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@asynccontextmanager
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async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
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logger.info("DRB C2 Core starting.")
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await _release_orphaned_tokens()
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# dynsec bootstrap + reconcile — must happen before mqtt_handler.connect()
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# so that by the time the app is serving requests, c2-core's own dynsec
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# client/roles exist and every already-approved node's dynsec client
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# matches Firestore (see app/internal/dynsec.py "TWO-SOURCES-OF-TRUTH").
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# Non-fatal by design: if the broker or MQTT_DYNSEC_ADMIN_PASS isn't
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# reachable/configured yet (e.g. first-ever deploy, mosquitto still
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# starting), log loudly and keep booting rather than crash-looping
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# c2-core itself — mqtt_handler.connect() below has its own retry loop
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# and node approval/reissue endpoints fail loudly on their own if dynsec
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# calls fail later, so nothing here is silently swallowed forever.
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try:
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await dynsec.ensure_roles_and_c2core_grant()
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await dynsec.reconcile_all()
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except dynsec.DynsecError as e:
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logger.error(f"dynsec bootstrap/reconcile failed — node approval/reissue will fail until this is resolved: {e}")
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await mqtt_handler.connect()
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sweeper_task = asyncio.create_task(sweeper_loop())
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summarizer_task = asyncio.create_task(summarizer_loop())
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induction_task = asyncio.create_task(vocabulary_induction_loop())
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recorrelation_task = asyncio.create_task(recorrelation_loop())
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yield # --- app running ---
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logger.info("DRB C2 Core shutting down.")
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sweeper_task.cancel()
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summarizer_task.cancel()
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induction_task.cancel()
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recorrelation_task.cancel()
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await mqtt_handler.disconnect()
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app = FastAPI(title="DRB C2 Core", lifespan=lifespan)
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# The browser needs CORS to reach this API at all: the frontend's Archive page
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# calls GET /calls/search with Authorization + Content-Type headers, which
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# forces a preflight. Without this middleware the OPTIONS gets a bare 405 and
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# the fetch fails (#110). allow_origins is an explicit list -- never "*" in a
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# deployment -- so name every host the frontend is served from in CORS_ORIGINS.
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#
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# allow_credentials stays False on purpose: auth here is a Bearer header, not a
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# cookie, so credentialed CORS is never needed, and keeping it False is what
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# lets an explicit-origin allowlist work without Starlette's "*"-only
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# restriction. "*" + credentials is the dangerous pair (Starlette reflects the
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# caller's Origin back WITH Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true); this code
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# cannot produce it because credentials are hard-off.
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def cors_allows_credentials(origins: list[str]) -> bool:
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"""Always False -- credentialed CORS is never enabled here (Bearer auth,
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not cookies). Kept as a named predicate so a future edit that wants to
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turn credentials on has to go through here and confront the "*" case.
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A wildcard entry would additionally be refused a credentialed response."""
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return False
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_cors_is_wildcard = "*" in settings.cors_origins
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if _cors_is_wildcard:
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logger.error(
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"CORS_ORIGINS contains '*'. That is fine for local dev but is almost "
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"certainly a misconfigured deployment -- set CORS_ORIGINS to your "
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"frontend origin(s), e.g. [\"https://drb.cusano.net\"]."
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)
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app.add_middleware(
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CORSMiddleware,
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allow_origins=settings.cors_origins,
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allow_methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"],
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allow_headers=["authorization", "content-type"],
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allow_credentials=False,
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)
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app.include_router(nodes.router, dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])
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# systems is the one router edge nodes read directly (system_cacher.py builds
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# the OP25 config from it), so its gate also accepts a per-node api_key. The
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# write routes inside carry their own require_admin_token, so nodes get read
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# access only.
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app.include_router(systems.router, dependencies=[Depends(require_node_service_or_firebase_token)])
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app.include_router(telemetry.router, dependencies=[Depends(require_node_service_or_firebase_token)])
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app.include_router(calls.router, dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])
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app.include_router(tokens.router, dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])
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app.include_router(incidents.router, dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])
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app.include_router(alerts.router, dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])
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app.include_router(trips.router, dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])
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app.include_router(places.router, dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])
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app.include_router(upload.router) # auth is per-node, handled inline
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app.include_router(admin.router) # auth is per-endpoint (read: firebase, write: admin)
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app.include_router(users.router) # auth: admin only
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app.include_router(links.router) # auth is per-endpoint (generate: firebase, resolve: service key)
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app.include_router(enrollment.router) # public; auth is the enrollment/pickup-secret tokens, checked inline
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app.include_router(org.router) # auth is per-endpoint (read: firebase, write: org owner)
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app.include_router(waitlist.router) # public — no auth, source-IP rate limited inline
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# public by necessity — an <audio src> can't send a bearer token, so the
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# short-lived HMAC in the URL is the credential. Checked inline in media.py.
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app.include_router(media.router)
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# NOTE: there used to be an app.routers.mqtt_auth router here (an HTTP
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# backend for the mosquitto-go-auth plugin). That plugin's upstream project
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# is archived (no CVE patches) and was rejected for an internet-facing
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# broker — see MQTT-PUBLIC-AUTH-PLAN.md. MQTT auth is now mosquitto's own
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# built-in dynamic-security plugin (app/internal/dynsec.py talks to it over
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# MQTT control topics, not HTTP), so there is nothing at /internal/mqtt/*
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# anymore. Caddy's Caddyfile.j2 still 404s /internal/* on api.<domain> as
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# defence in depth even though nothing calls it today — cheap insurance
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# against a future /internal/* route being added and forgotten there.
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# Read straight from the environment rather than through Settings: this is a
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# build stamp baked in by the Dockerfile, not configuration anyone sets or
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# tunes, and keeping it out of Settings avoids implying it can be changed.
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_GIT_SHA = os.getenv("GIT_SHA", "unknown")
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@app.get("/health")
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async def health():
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return {
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"ok": True,
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"mqtt_connected": mqtt_handler.is_connected,
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# CI asserts this equals the commit it just deployed. Without it a
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# deploy can "succeed" while the previous container is still serving.
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"git_sha": _GIT_SHA,
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}
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# Deliberately unauthenticated, same as /health above: the CI deploy step
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# curls /health with no credentials, and this is diagnostic state (which AI
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# tier is degraded and why), not a secret — no API keys or tokens appear in
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# it. Keeping it auth-free means an external uptime check can watch it too.
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@app.get("/health/ai")
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async def health_ai():
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return {"tiers": ai_health.snapshot()}
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