Merge pull request 'ci: deploy Firestore rules + indexes on every push to main (#51)' (#124) from fix/51-ci-firestore-deploy into main

Reviewed-on: #124

.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ jobs:
             NEXT_PUBLIC_FIREBASE_MESSAGING_SENDER_ID=${{ secrets.FIREBASE_MESSAGING_SENDER_ID }}
             NEXT_PUBLIC_FIREBASE_APP_ID=${{ secrets.FIREBASE_APP_ID }}
             NEXT_PUBLIC_FIRESTORE_DATABASE=${{ secrets.FIRESTORE_DATABASE }}
+            NEXT_PUBLIC_MAP_TILE_URL=https://tile.openstreetmap.org/{z}/{x}/{y}.png
 
   deploy:
     name: Deploy to VM
@@ -99,6 +100,28 @@ jobs:
           # Update compose files + mosquitto config
           git pull origin main
 
+          # server-26#51: Firestore rules + composite indexes had no deploy
+          # path and regressed silently after every fix (the alert_events and
+          # calls(org_id,started_at) indexes among them). The VM runs as the
+          # project service account, so firebase-tools authenticates via ADC
+          # with no key file, and infra/firestore/firebase.json pins database
+          # c2-server. Indexes go on additively -- no --force -- so a stray
+          # edit to firestore.indexes.json can never delete a live index;
+          # rules are a full replace, which is the intent. --non-interactive
+          # means the FIRST run after a drift still needs a one-time manual
+          # `firebase deploy` on the VM to clear pending deletions (it aborts
+          # rather than guess). A failure here warns but does NOT fail the
+          # deploy: a transient Firebase API error must not roll back a good
+          # app build.
+          if command -v firebase >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            ( cd /opt/drb/infra/firestore \
+              && firebase deploy --only firestore:rules,firestore:indexes \
+                   --project ${{ secrets.FIREBASE_PROJECT_ID }} --non-interactive ) \
+              || echo "WARNING: firestore deploy failed (server-26#51) -- rules/indexes may be stale"
+          else
+            echo "WARNING: firebase CLI not on the VM -- skipped firestore deploy (server-26#51); install once with: npm i -g firebase-tools"
+          fi
+
           # server-26#65: capture what is actually live BEFORE switching, so
           # a bad deploy has something concrete to fall back to. This reads
           # from a state file rather than re-deriving it from git log,

drb-c2-core/.env.example

@@ -33,6 +33,13 @@ SUMMARY_INTERVAL_MINUTES=15
 CORRELATION_WINDOW_HOURS=4
 EMBEDDING_SIMILARITY_THRESHOLD=0.82
 
+# Browser origins allowed to call this API cross-origin (JSON list). The only
+# browser caller is the frontend's Archive page (GET /calls/search). Set this
+# to the exact origin the frontend is served from — scheme + host, no path.
+# Defaults to https://drb.cusano.net. A "*" entry works for local dev but is
+# logged as a probable misconfiguration and never gets a credentialed response.
+CORS_ORIGINS=["https://drb.cusano.net"]
+
 # Fleet-wide token edge nodes present as X-Enrollment-Token on first boot
 # (POST /nodes/enroll). Shared across every node — NOT a per-node secret.
 # Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32

drb-c2-core/app/config.py

@@ -180,16 +180,18 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     # between genuinely separate transmissions on a busy dispatch channel.
     duplicate_window_seconds: int = 10
 
-    # CORS — set to your frontend origin(s) in production, e.g. ["https://app.example.com"]
-    # Defaults to "*" for local development only.
+    # Browser origins allowed to call this API cross-origin. The only browser
+    # caller is the frontend's Archive page (GET /calls/search) — every other
+    # page reads Firestore directly. The frontend is served on the BARE domain
+    # (see infra Caddyfile.j2 — only drb. and api. have DNS records), so the
+    # default is that origin, not app.<domain>. Override via CORS_ORIGINS (JSON
+    # list) if the frontend ever moves; keep infra/.../c2-core.env.j2 in sync.
     #
-    # Leaving this as "*" is not merely permissive: main.py turns OFF
-    # allow_credentials when it sees a wildcard, because Starlette would
-    # otherwise reflect each caller's origin back WITH
-    # Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. So a production deployment that
-    # forgets to set this gets a loud ERROR at startup and loses credentialed
-    # cross-origin requests, rather than silently accepting every origin.
-    cors_origins: list[str] = ["*"]
+    # A "*" entry here still works for local dev but is refused a credentialed
+    # response: main.py never enables allow_credentials (auth is a Bearer
+    # header, not a cookie), and it logs a loud ERROR when it sees a wildcard
+    # in a deployment so a forgotten override is visible.
+    cors_origins: list[str] = ["https://drb.cusano.net"]
 
     # Discord webhook URL that app/internal/ai_health.py posts to when an AI
     # tier (transcription/correlation) transitions into or out of degraded

drb-c2-core/app/main.py

@@ -78,33 +78,40 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
 
 app = FastAPI(title="DRB C2 Core", lifespan=lifespan)
 
-# "*" plus allow_credentials=True is not the permissive-but-harmless setting it
-# looks like. Starlette does not refuse the combination -- it reflects the
-# caller's Origin back and still sends Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true,
-# so the effective policy becomes "any origin, with credentials", the opposite
-# of what a wildcard normally means. Rather than trust every deployment to
-# remember to override CORS_ORIGINS, make the dangerous pair unrepresentable.
+# The browser needs CORS to reach this API at all: the frontend's Archive page
+# calls GET /calls/search with Authorization + Content-Type headers, which
+# forces a preflight. Without this middleware the OPTIONS gets a bare 405 and
+# the fetch fails (#110). allow_origins is an explicit list -- never "*" in a
+# deployment -- so name every host the frontend is served from in CORS_ORIGINS.
+#
+# allow_credentials stays False on purpose: auth here is a Bearer header, not a
+# cookie, so credentialed CORS is never needed, and keeping it False is what
+# lets an explicit-origin allowlist work without Starlette's "*"-only
+# restriction. "*" + credentials is the dangerous pair (Starlette reflects the
+# caller's Origin back WITH Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true); this code
+# cannot produce it because credentials are hard-off.
 def cors_allows_credentials(origins: list[str]) -> bool:
-    """False when any entry is a wildcard. Extracted so it can be tested
-    without re-importing this module, which drags in every router."""
-    return "*" not in origins
+    """Always False -- credentialed CORS is never enabled here (Bearer auth,
+    not cookies). Kept as a named predicate so a future edit that wants to
+    turn credentials on has to go through here and confront the "*" case.
+    A wildcard entry would additionally be refused a credentialed response."""
+    return False
 
 
-_cors_is_wildcard = not cors_allows_credentials(settings.cors_origins)
+_cors_is_wildcard = "*" in settings.cors_origins
 if _cors_is_wildcard:
     logger.error(
-        "CORS_ORIGINS is '*', so credentialed cross-origin requests are being "
-        "DISABLED to avoid reflecting every caller's origin back with "
-        "Access-Control-Allow-Credentials. Set CORS_ORIGINS to your frontend "
-        "origin(s) in production, e.g. [\"https://app.example.com\"]."
+        "CORS_ORIGINS contains '*'. That is fine for local dev but is almost "
+        "certainly a misconfigured deployment -- set CORS_ORIGINS to your "
+        "frontend origin(s), e.g. [\"https://drb.cusano.net\"]."
     )
 
 app.add_middleware(
     CORSMiddleware,
     allow_origins=settings.cors_origins,
-    allow_methods=["*"],
-    allow_headers=["*"],
-    allow_credentials=not _cors_is_wildcard,
+    allow_methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"],
+    allow_headers=["authorization", "content-type"],
+    allow_credentials=False,
 )
 
 app.include_router(nodes.router,     dependencies=[Depends(require_service_or_firebase_token)])

drb-c2-core/tests/test_cors.py

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"""
+End-to-end CORS wiring for the one browser-facing REST surface.
+
+The frontend's Archive page calls GET /calls/search with Authorization +
+Content-Type headers, which forces the browser to send a CORS preflight
+first. Before #110 that OPTIONS got a bare 405 with no Access-Control-*
+headers and the fetch failed with "TypeError: Failed to fetch". These
+tests drive the real app through TestClient so a regression in the
+middleware wiring (not just the helper) is caught.
+
+TestClient is NOT used as a context manager on purpose: that would run the
+lifespan (mqtt_handler.connect(), the sweeper loops, dynsec bootstrap),
+none of which is needed here -- CORSMiddleware answers a preflight before
+routing or dependencies run.
+"""
+from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+from app.config import settings
+from app.main import app
+
+client = TestClient(app)
+
+ALLOWED_ORIGIN = "https://drb.cusano.net"
+DISALLOWED_ORIGIN = "https://evil.example.com"
+
+
+def test_default_allowed_origin_matches_the_deployed_frontend():
+    # The frontend is served on the bare domain (infra Caddyfile.j2), so the
+    # default must allow exactly that origin without any env override.
+    assert ALLOWED_ORIGIN in settings.cors_origins
+
+
+def test_preflight_for_calls_search_is_allowed():
+    resp = client.options(
+        "/calls/search",
+        headers={
+            "Origin": ALLOWED_ORIGIN,
+            "Access-Control-Request-Method": "GET",
+            "Access-Control-Request-Headers": "authorization,content-type",
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") == ALLOWED_ORIGIN
+    allow_methods = resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-methods", "").upper()
+    assert "GET" in allow_methods
+    # Bearer auth, not cookies -- credentials must never be advertised.
+    assert "access-control-allow-credentials" not in resp.headers
+
+
+def test_preflight_from_disallowed_origin_gets_no_allow_origin():
+    resp = client.options(
+        "/calls/search",
+        headers={
+            "Origin": DISALLOWED_ORIGIN,
+            "Access-Control-Request-Method": "GET",
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") is None
+
+
+def test_simple_get_from_allowed_origin_is_annotated():
+    # Even a non-preflight GET must carry Access-Control-Allow-Origin or the
+    # browser hides the response body from the page.
+    resp = client.get("/health", headers={"Origin": ALLOWED_ORIGIN})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert resp.headers.get("access-control-allow-origin") == ALLOWED_ORIGIN

drb-c2-core/tests/test_cors_policy.py

@@ -5,8 +5,9 @@ Starlette does not reject `allow_origins=["*"]` combined with
 `allow_credentials=True`. It reflects the caller's Origin back in
 Access-Control-Allow-Origin and still sends
 Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, so the effective policy is the
-opposite of what a wildcard usually means. main.py defuses that by turning
-credentials off whenever it sees a wildcard; these tests hold it to that.
+opposite of what a wildcard usually means. main.py never enables
+credentials at all (auth is a Bearer header, not a cookie), which makes
+that pair unrepresentable; these tests hold it to that.
 
 The policy lives in a pure function so it can be exercised directly --
 reloading app.main to vary settings drags every router back through import
@@ -28,11 +29,11 @@ def test_wildcard_among_real_origins_still_disables_credentials():
     assert cors_allows_credentials(["https://app.example.com", "*"]) is False
 
 
-def test_named_origins_keep_credentials():
-    # Naming your origins is how you ask for credentialed requests, so a
-    # correctly configured deployment must not be penalised.
-    assert cors_allows_credentials(["https://app.example.com"]) is True
-    assert cors_allows_credentials([]) is True
+def test_credentials_never_enabled_even_for_named_origins():
+    # Auth here is a Bearer header, not a cookie, so credentialed CORS is
+    # never needed. The predicate is hard-off regardless of the origin list.
+    assert cors_allows_credentials(["https://app.example.com"]) is False
+    assert cors_allows_credentials([]) is False
 
 
 def test_the_app_actually_mounted_that_policy():
@@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ def test_the_app_actually_mounted_that_policy():
         (mw.kwargs for mw in app.user_middleware if mw.cls is CORSMiddleware), None
     )
     assert opts is not None, "CORSMiddleware is not mounted at all"
+    assert opts["allow_credentials"] is False
     assert opts["allow_credentials"] is cors_allows_credentials(settings.cors_origins)
 
 

drb-frontend/app/alerts/page.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 "use client";
 
-import { useState } from "react";
+import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
 import { useAuth } from "@/components/AuthProvider";
 import { useAlerts } from "@/lib/useAlerts";
 import { MachineOutputNotice } from "@/components/ui/MachineOutputNotice";
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ function RulesTab({ isAdmin }: { isAdmin: boolean }) {
     }
   }
 
-  // Load on first render of this tab
-  if (!loaded) { load(); }
+  // Load once when this tab mounts (load() self-guards on `loaded`).
+  useEffect(() => { load(); }, []);
 
   async function handleCreate(e: React.FormEvent) {
     e.preventDefault();

drb-frontend/app/nodes/[id]/page.tsx

@@ -120,7 +120,10 @@ export default function NodeDetailPage() {
   const [approving, setApproving] = useState(false);
   const [deleting, setDeleting] = useState(false);
   const { systems } = useSystems();
-  const { calls } = useCalls(20);
+  // TODO(server-26#109 item5): server-side node_id filter. A where("node_id","==",id)
+  // alongside the existing org_id equality + started_at orderBy needs a brand-new
+  // composite index, so for now pull a wider window and filter client-side.
+  const { calls } = useCalls(200);
   const { isAdmin } = useAuth();
 
   const systemMap = Object.fromEntries(systems.map((s) => [s.system_id, s]));

drb-frontend/components/MapView.tsx

@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ L.Icon.Default.mergeOptions({
 });
 
 // ── Basemap tiles ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-// Default is CARTO's keyless dark raster basemap — no token, fits the dark UI.
-// Overridable via NEXT_PUBLIC_MAP_TILE_URL so a keyed style (a CARTO account
-// style, MapTiler, Mapbox, …) can be dropped in for prod without a code change.
-// Whatever is supplied must use Leaflet's {s}/{z}/{x}/{y}{r} placeholder scheme.
+// Prod sets NEXT_PUBLIC_MAP_TILE_URL to a keyed style (a CARTO account style,
+// MapTiler, Mapbox, …). The in-code fallback is plain OpenStreetMap so the map
+// still renders if that var is missing — CARTO's keyless CDN has proven flaky.
+// Whatever is supplied must use Leaflet's {s}/{z}/{x}/{y}{r} placeholder scheme;
+// the {z}/{x}/{y} tokens below are substituted by Leaflet at runtime.
 const MAP_TILE_URL =
   process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_MAP_TILE_URL ||
-  "https://{s}.basemaps.cartocdn.com/dark_all/{z}/{x}/{y}{r}.png";
-const MAP_TILE_ATTRIBUTION =
-  '&copy; <a href="https://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright">OpenStreetMap</a> contributors &copy; <a href="https://carto.com/">CARTO</a>';
+  "https://tile.openstreetmap.org/{z}/{x}/{y}.png";
+const MAP_TILE_ATTRIBUTION = "&copy; OpenStreetMap contributors";
 
 // ── Colour ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 // Severity is the only hue on this map — see UI_REDESIGN.md §2.3. Incident
@@ -459,9 +459,6 @@ export default function MapView({ nodes, activeCalls, incidents = [], calls = []
   const [drawerOpen, setDrawerOpen] = useState(false);
   const [agoClock, setAgoClock] = useState(0);
   const [radarEpoch, setRadarEpoch] = useState(() => Date.now());
-  const [clockStr, setClockStr] = useState(() =>
-    new Date().toLocaleTimeString([], { hour12: false, hour: "2-digit", minute: "2-digit", second: "2-digit" })
-  );
 
   useEffect(() => {
     const id = setInterval(() => setAgoClock((t: number) => t + 1), 10_000);
@@ -474,15 +471,6 @@ export default function MapView({ nodes, activeCalls, incidents = [], calls = []
     return () => clearInterval(id);
   }, []);
 
-  // Live clock for TOC situational awareness
-  useEffect(() => {
-    const id = setInterval(() =>
-      setClockStr(new Date().toLocaleTimeString([], { hour12: false, hour: "2-digit", minute: "2-digit", second: "2-digit" })),
-      1000
-    );
-    return () => clearInterval(id);
-  }, []);
-
   // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
   const ago = useMemo(() => (lastUpdated ? timeAgo(lastUpdated) : null), [lastUpdated, agoClock]);
 
@@ -623,13 +611,8 @@ export default function MapView({ nodes, activeCalls, incidents = [], calls = []
         )}
       </div>
 
-      {/* ── Clock — bottom-left for TOC situational awareness ───────────────── */}
-      <div className="absolute bottom-8 left-3 z-[1001] bg-surface/90 border border-line rounded-lg px-3 py-2 pointer-events-none">
-        <span className="text-ink text-sm font-mono tabular-nums">{clockStr}</span>
-      </div>
-
       {/* ── Legend — shape-first, both themes. Never a bare colour swatch. ──── */}
-      <div className="absolute bottom-8 right-3 z-[1001] bg-surface/90 border border-line rounded-lg px-3 py-2.5 text-xs pointer-events-none space-y-2">
+      <div className="absolute bottom-8 right-3 z-[1001] bg-surface/90 border border-line rounded-lg px-3 py-2.5 text-xs pointer-events-none space-y-2 max-h-[calc(100%-4rem)] overflow-y-auto">
         <div className="space-y-1">
           <p className="text-ink-muted font-medium text-[10px] uppercase tracking-wide">Severity</p>
           {(["major", "moderate", "minor", "routine"] as Severity[]).map((sev) => (
@@ -673,15 +656,19 @@ export default function MapView({ nodes, activeCalls, incidents = [], calls = []
       {/* ── Incident overlay panel ───────────────────────────────────────────── */}
       {incidents.length > 0 && (
         <>
-          {/* Desktop: left sidebar — starts below zoom controls + fit-all button */}
-          <div className="absolute top-[8rem] left-3 bottom-[4.5rem] z-[1001] hidden md:flex flex-col w-56 gap-1.5">
+          {/* Desktop: left sidebar — offset below the zoom stack + fit-all button
+              so it never overlaps the Leaflet +/- controls (#118). Height is
+              capped and the list scrolls on its own, so the rail never reaches
+              the bottom-right legend. pointer-events are off on the wrapper and
+              back on for the cards, so the map still pans in the gaps. */}
+          <div className="absolute top-[9.5rem] left-3 z-[1001] hidden md:flex flex-col w-56 gap-1.5 max-h-[calc(100%-12rem)] pointer-events-none">
             {/* Gate A / A2 (server-26#46) — the rail's titles, locations and
                 unit counts are pipeline output. Pinned above the scroll area
                 so it cannot be scrolled off the screen it qualifies. */}
-            <div className="bg-surface/90 backdrop-blur-sm border border-line rounded-lg px-2 py-1.5 shrink-0">
+            <div className="bg-surface/90 backdrop-blur-sm border border-line rounded-lg px-2 py-1.5 shrink-0 pointer-events-auto">
               <MachineOutputNotice variant="inline" className="text-[10px] leading-snug items-start" />
             </div>
-            <div className="flex flex-col gap-1.5 overflow-y-auto">
+            <div className="flex flex-col gap-1.5 overflow-y-auto min-h-0 pointer-events-auto">
             {incidents.map((inc) => {
               const color = severityColor(inc.severity);
               const age = inc.started_at ? timeAgo(new Date(inc.started_at)) : null;

infra/firestore/firestore.indexes.json

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 {
   "//": "Composite indexes for the c2-server database. Firestore auto-indexes single-field lookups and equality-only compound queries; an equality filter combined with an inequality, an orderBy on a different field, or array-contains needs an explicit composite index or the query fails at runtime with FAILED_PRECONDITION. Deploy with: firebase deploy --only firestore:indexes --project <project-id> (firebase.json pins database c2-server — without that key the CLI targets (default) and changes nothing the app can see).",
-  "//direction": "Every index here is declared ASCENDING. Firestore scans an index in either direction, so org_id+started_at ASC serves orderBy(started_at, 'desc') as well — which is what every frontend hook actually asks for. Declaring only the ASC form keeps one index per query shape instead of a matched pair.",
-  "//drift-2026-08-23": "Reconciled against `gcloud firestore indexes composite list --database=c2-server` (server-26#33). The file had drifted four indexes behind the live database, and a deploy against the stale file then added ASC copies of indexes that already existed as DESC. The next deploy will offer to delete three live indexes that are deliberately not declared here — answer YES to all three: calls(org_id ASC, started_at DESC) and incidents(org_id ASC, started_at DESC) are duplicates of the ASC entries below, and alert_events(acknowledged ASC, triggered_at DESC) predates tenancy and is superseded by the org-scoped entry below. Nothing else may be deleted.",
+  "//direction": "The sort field's ORDER here must match the query's orderBy direction. The old note claimed 'Firestore scans either direction so ASC serves orderBy(desc)' — that is WRONG for these query shapes and cost us three broken pages (server-26 #33/#51/#110-followup, 2026-09-08): useCalls/useIncidents/useAlerts and c2-core search_calls all orderBy(x,'desc') and each got FAILED_PRECONDITION until an explicit DESCENDING index existed. A range/inequality filter with no orderBy (the backend status/ended_at, system_id/started_at, system_id/ended_at entries) is genuinely direction-agnostic and stays ASCENDING.",
+  "//drift-2026-09-08": "Reconciled against the live c2-server via `gcloud firestore indexes composite list` (server-26#33). Live already carries the three DESC indexes below (calls(org_id,started_at DESC), incidents(org_id,started_at DESC), alert_events(org_id,triggered_at DESC)) plus alert_events(acknowledged,org_id,triggered_at DESC) — created directly with gcloud on 2026-09-08 to unbreak Archive + Watch. This file now declares them so a `firebase deploy --only firestore:indexes` is a no-op, NOT a set of deletions. Do NOT delete calls(org_id,started_at DESC) or incidents(org_id,started_at DESC) — the pre-2026-09-08 note calling them deletable 'duplicates of the ASC entries' was the bug. The only genuinely dead index is the pre-tenancy alert_events(acknowledged,triggered_at) with no org_id, which may be deleted.",
   "indexes": [
     {
-      "//": "drb-frontend lib/useCalls.ts — org-scoped call list, orderBy started_at desc.",
+      "//": "drb-frontend lib/useCalls.ts + c2-core routers/calls.py search_calls — org-scoped call list, orderBy started_at DESC.",
       "collectionGroup": "calls",
       "queryScope": "COLLECTION",
       "fields": [
         { "fieldPath": "org_id", "order": "ASCENDING" },
-        { "fieldPath": "started_at", "order": "ASCENDING" }
+        { "fieldPath": "started_at", "order": "DESCENDING" }
       ]
     },
     {
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
       ]
     },
     {
-      "//": "c2-core internal/recorrelation_sweep.py:45 — status == 'ended' AND ended_at >= cutoff. Backend only; was live but undeclared until 2026-08-23.",
+      "//": "c2-core internal/recorrelation_sweep.py:45 — status == 'ended' AND ended_at >= cutoff. Range filter, no orderBy: direction-agnostic. Backend only.",
       "collectionGroup": "calls",
       "queryScope": "COLLECTION",
       "fields": [
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
       ]
     },
     {
-      "//": "c2-core internal/dedup.py:84 — system_id == X AND started_at within a +/- window. Was live-failing on essentially every inbound call (server-26#84): dedup caught the FAILED_PRECONDITION and degraded to \"not a duplicate\", so double-heard transmissions were stored twice and would have been transcribed and correlated twice the moment an AI window opened. Created directly on c2-server 2026-08-28.",
+      "//": "c2-core internal/dedup.py:84 — system_id == X AND started_at within a +/- window. Range filter, direction-agnostic. Was live-failing on essentially every inbound call (server-26#84): dedup caught the FAILED_PRECONDITION and degraded to \"not a duplicate\", so double-heard transmissions were stored twice. Created directly on c2-server 2026-08-28.",
       "collectionGroup": "calls",
       "queryScope": "COLLECTION",
       "fields": [
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
       ]
     },
     {
-      "//": "c2-core internal/vocabulary_learner.py:290 — system_id == X AND ended_at >= cutoff. Backend only; was live but undeclared until 2026-08-23.",
+      "//": "c2-core internal/vocabulary_learner.py:290 — system_id == X AND ended_at >= cutoff. Range filter, direction-agnostic. Backend only.",
       "collectionGroup": "calls",
       "queryScope": "COLLECTION",
       "fields": [
@@ -49,31 +49,31 @@
       ]
     },
     {
-      "//": "drb-frontend lib/useIncidents.ts — org-scoped incident browse, orderBy started_at desc.",
+      "//": "drb-frontend lib/useIncidents.ts — org-scoped incident browse, orderBy started_at DESC.",
       "collectionGroup": "incidents",
       "queryScope": "COLLECTION",
       "fields": [
         { "fieldPath": "org_id", "order": "ASCENDING" },
-        { "fieldPath": "started_at", "order": "ASCENDING" }
+        { "fieldPath": "started_at", "order": "DESCENDING" }
       ]
     },
     {
-      "//": "drb-frontend lib/useAlerts.ts — org-scoped alert feed, orderBy triggered_at desc.",
+      "//": "drb-frontend lib/useAlerts.ts — org-scoped alert feed, where(org_id ==) orderBy(triggered_at DESC).",
       "collectionGroup": "alert_events",
       "queryScope": "COLLECTION",
       "fields": [
         { "fieldPath": "org_id", "order": "ASCENDING" },
-        { "fieldPath": "triggered_at", "order": "ASCENDING" }
+        { "fieldPath": "triggered_at", "order": "DESCENDING" }
       ]
     },
     {
-      "//": "drb-frontend lib/useAlerts.ts useUnacknowledgedAlerts — the nav badge.",
+      "//": "drb-frontend lib/useAlerts.ts useUnacknowledgedAlerts (nav badge) and the /watch \"Triggered Alerts\" tab — where(org_id ==) where(acknowledged == false) orderBy(triggered_at DESC). Field tuple + triggered_at DESCENDING copy the console create_composite link verbatim (server-26#51). Distinct from the (org_id, triggered_at) feed index above (no acknowledged filter).",
       "collectionGroup": "alert_events",
       "queryScope": "COLLECTION",
       "fields": [
-        { "fieldPath": "org_id", "order": "ASCENDING" },
         { "fieldPath": "acknowledged", "order": "ASCENDING" },
-        { "fieldPath": "triggered_at", "order": "ASCENDING" }
+        { "fieldPath": "org_id", "order": "ASCENDING" },
+        { "fieldPath": "triggered_at", "order": "DESCENDING" }
       ]
     }
   ],